Sadr’s Return To Iraq May Be Permanent

On January 5, 2011 Moqtada al-Sadr returned to Iraq. He flew into his hometown of Najaf from Iran. Initial reports were unsure whether this was a short-stay or whether Sadr was moving back to Iraq for the long haul. The Washington Post quoted a spokesman for the Sadrists office in Najaf that Sadr was back for good. His arrival in Iraq set off all kinds of speculation about what it means for his movement and Nouri al-Maliki’s newly seated government.

Sadr comes back to Iraq on the coattails of his party’s accomplishments in the 2010 parliamentary elections. The Sadr trend won the most seats within the Iraqi National Alliance, walking away with 39 out of 70 seats. The Sadrists had proposed the National Alliance back in August 2009 to try to re-unite the fractured Shiite parties that had run together as the United Iraqi Alliance in the 2005 balloting. The list would eventually include the Sadrists, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), the Fadhila Party, the National Reform Trend, and independents. They were not successful however, in convincing Maliki and his State of Law to join them. After the March election, the Sadrists became one of the strongest opponents to a second term for the premier. Sadr went as far as to call Maliki a liar in April. Then suddenly, the party made an about face and came out for the prime minister on October 1. That made the Sadrists kingmakers as they assured Maliki that he would stay in office. In return, the premier has released an estimated 1,500 Sadrists from jail, given the movement six ministries, the deputy speaker of parliament, and the governorship of Maysan. Being in the ascendancy, Sadr decided it was the right time to end his self-imposed exile in Iran so that he could lead his movement in person, rather than by proxy and through statements.

Sadr’s return also shows the new alliance with Maliki. Sadr still has an arrest warrant hanging over his head for the murder of Ayatollah Abdul al-Khoei. Al-Khoei was a moderate Shiite cleric who the U.S. was hoping would help them in Iraq. (1) In early April 2003 he flew into the country from exile in England. A few days later, Sadrists stabbed him to death inside the Imam Ali shrine in Najaf. The move was an attempt to assert themselves as the upstart Shiites against the establishment clergy. An Iraqi court quickly issued an arrest warrant for Sadr, along with two of his lieutenants, Mustafa al-Yacoubi and Riyad al-Nouri. Yacoubi was later arrested by U.S. forces, which set off the first Sadrist uprising in southern Iraq in April 2004. The case is still pending, but a newly elected Sadrist parliamentarian dismissed it, saying that it was made by a previous government that was out to get the Sadr movement, and deny them a role in post-Saddam politics. A lawmaker from State of Law also said that the government had no intention of following through with this issue. This quid pro quo could cause problems for Maliki later on. The prime minister built most of his current standing upon his crackdown on the Mahdi Army in early 2008. His list is called State of Law, which he claimed brought security and stability to the country. Now the premier is ignoring the law, by not arresting Sadr, and letting him return to Iraq as payoff for backing him in the government formation process. It shows that politics trumps justice in the new Iraq.

What Sadr does next is the big question. He’s supposed to make his first address after arriving in Najaf on January 8, to lay out his program. Some early targets for the Sadrist camp are probably finding jobs for their followers through the ministries they control, asserting themselves in parliament, and building up patronage systems to bring in new recruits. Sadr can only hope to build upon his success, as he definitely aspires to be a national leader. He could become a rival to Maliki without holding any official office. That will only happen if the Trend continues to focus upon politics and services. That’s always been a problem for Sadr. In 2005 when he tried to join the new government after the U.S. handed over sovereignty, his movement split, and he ended up turning his back on politics to try to win back the street. That backfired as well as his followers became predators on their own people after they’d purged many Sunnis from various neighborhoods across central Iraq. Whether his movement will have more discipline this time and remain focused upon building up their standing through legitimate means is what needs to be closely monitored and analyzed.

FOOTNOTES

1. Collier, Robert, “Iraq’s Shiites show strength on once-banned pilgrimage,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4/23/03

SOURCES

Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Iraqi cleric implores followers to show discipline,” Associated Press, 1/6/11

AK News, “State of Law: “Our talks with National Coalition stalled due to selection of new Prime Minister,” 4/29/10

Associated Press, “Anti-U.S. Cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr Returns To Iraq,” 1/5/11
- “Sadrists expect big role in new Iraq government,” 12/1/10

Aswat al-Iraq, “Sadr’s return to cement national ties – Iraqiya,” 1/6/11

Bazzi, Mohamad, “What does al Sadr’s return mean for Iraq,” The National, 1/7/11

BBC, “Rowdy welcome in Najaf for Shia cleric Moqtada Sadr,” 1/6/11

Chulov, Martin, “Al-Sadr makes low-key return to Iraq,” Guardian, 1/5/11

Cochrane, Marisa, “The Fragmentation of the Sadrist Movement,” Institute for the Study of War, January 2009

Collier, Robert, “Iraq’s Shiites show strength on once-banned pilgrimage,” San Francisco Chronicle, 4/23/03

Davis, Aaron, “In Iraq, apprehension ahead of speech by Sadr,” Washington Post, 1/7/11

General Electric, “Iraq 2010-2014 Council of Representatives & The Cabinets,” January 2011

Karon, Tony, “Iraq: With al-Sadr Back In, Is U.S. on Way Out?” Time, 1/6/11

Al-Khuzaei, Salah, “Sadr returns to Iraq,” AK News, 1/6/11

Latif, Nizar and Sands, Phil, “Muqtada al Sadr returns to Iraq,” The National, 1/6/11

McEvers, Kelly, “Back From Exile, Sadr Vows To Resist U.S., Help Iraqis,” NRP, 1/6/11

McGeary, Johanna, “New Thugs On The Block,” Time, 4/19/04

Michaels, Jim, “Radical cleric al-Sadr returns to Iraq,” USA Today, 1/6/11

Al-Salhy, Suadad, “Iraq’s two main Shi’ite blocs discuss merger,” Reuters, 3/23/10

Sarhan, Saad and Davis, Aaron, “Cleric Moqtada al-Sadr returns to Iraq after self-imposed exile,” Washington Post, 1/6/11
- “Radical Shia cleric back in Iraq after exile,” Financial Times, 1/5/11

Sengupta, Kim, “Mehdi Army leader ends his exile and returns to Baghdad,” Independent, 1/6/11

Shadid, Anthony, “Sadrists Project Confidence in Iraq,” New York Times, 1/6/11

Shadid, Anthony and Leland, John, “Anti-U.S. Cleric Returns to Iraq, and to Power,” New York Times, 1/5/11

Telegraph, “Muqtada al-Sadr returns to Iraq from exile,” 1/6/11

Visser, Reidar, “After Sadr-Badr Compromise in Tehran, the Iraqi National Alliance (INA) Is Declared,” Historiae.org, 8/24/09

AL-SABAH CARTOON: Corruption In Iraq: "Personal privileges" sucking dry the "public budget"

Source: Al-Sabah, 1/5/11 via MEMRI Blog

Government Employees Grow And Drain Budget

The Iraqi press recently reported that Iraq has more public employees in proportion to its population than any other country its size. Iraq still lives with the legacy of the socialist economy created under Saddam Hussein. That means the government is the largest employer in the country, which distorts the labor market, drains the budget, and adds inefficiency.

The media said that there were approximately 4 million government workers. That would be an increase from the 3 million reported by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction in July 2010. That means that Baghdad employs around 10% of the population. In Kurdistan the numbers are even higher. Out of around 4.5 million Kurds, 1 million work for the government. The authorities provide 60% of all full time work in the Kurdistan Regional Government. That makes the government the largest employer in the country overall. The private sector in comparison only employs 33% of the workforce, and those jobs tend to be informal, insecure, and low waged, which is the reason why most Iraqis seek work with the government.

This huge workforce is a tremendous drain upon government coffers. In the 2010 budget for example, 72% of spending, $52.12 billion was appropriated for operational costs, most of which went to salaries and pensions. This portion of the budget continues to increase each year, as in 2009 only $42.61 billion was for the operational budget. A parliamentarian claimed that the president, prime minister, and parliament are due to receive $1.1 billion alone in the 2011 budget, which is now under consideration. In April 2010 an auditor for the Finance Ministry warned that the budget could eventually be dominated by all these costs, denying investment and development funds.

So many government workers also creates huge inefficiencies. In October 2010 former Planning Minister Ali Baban told the Iraqi press that 70% of state employees don’t have real jobs, and don’t produce anything. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s new cabinet for instance, is going to have more ministries, and top positions than his previous 2005 one. There will be three instead of two deputy prime ministers and possibly three vice presidents this time around, even though the latter will have no powers and if they’re created, will only exist to appease all of the parties that make up Maliki’s new ruling coalition. Officials also want to fill 115,000 vacant jobs. Maliki attempted to include them in the 2010 budget, but was blocked because his opponents believed he was trying to use them to buy votes in the national election that year. Since the government is now formed those spots will likely be filled as part of the patronage system each party will control through their command of the ministries and offices.

The government’s leading role in employment means that it sets wages and controls the labor market. Many of these workers have no real position, and exist to maintain support for political parties, and keep people off the streets in an attempt to control social unrest. This is similar to many developing countries, especially ones based upon oil since the industry is not labor intensive, so the government ends up creating jobs with the profits. The problem with Iraq is that the number of public employees keeps on increasing each year. That will eventually drain the budget unless priorities are changed. Unfortunately, Baghdad doesn’t seem to have any urge to do so, and will likely continue on with the current path as petroleum revenues are expected to rise with the added production from deals made with foreign companies.

SOURCES

Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq June 2010,” 9/7/10

Knights, Michael, Carpenter, J. Scott, and Ali, Ahmed, “After the Elections: Prospects for Democratic Consolidation in Iraq,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 3/5/10

Nakhel News, Al-Mada, “Four Million Government Employees In Iraq,” MEMRI Blog, 1/3/11

Radio Nawa, “Minister of Planning: Seventy percent of state employees without a real job,” 10/13/10

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 7/30/10
- “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 4/30/10
- “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/10

Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” Chapter 8 “Treasury’s Triage”

Chapter 8 of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s “Hard Lessons” review of the American rebuilding effort covers the initial U.S. work to reform Iraq’s economy. Immediately after the March 2003 invasion, Iraq was a wreck. The Iraqi military and government had collapsed, and looting was taking place in many of its urban centers. U.S. officials were caught by surprise at the chaotic situation, and were in panic mode trying to put everything back together again. They focused upon getting Iraq’s ministries and banks to re-open, pumping money into the economy, and then moved onto longer term policies such as reforming the currency system, relieving Iraq’s debt, and trying to implement free market policies. The Americans were largely successful at stabilizing the immediate situation and helping with Iraq’s money and debt, but failed at bringing wide-ranging capitalist principles to the nation.

In April 2003, officials from the Treasury Department arrived in Iraq. They found the country’s finances in tatters. The two largest banks, Rafidain and Rasheed, had been looted, and only two of Rafidain’s 170 branches were still open. The Central Bank of Iraq only had $350 million in gold in its vaults. Almost $1 billion in foreign currency had been withdrawn from its accounts before the U.S. invasion. Government ministries were bankrupt, there was no money to pay civil servants, Iraq’s currency, the dinar, was unstable, and the looting had done an estimated $12 billion in damages. 

Pallets full of U.S. cash were flown into Baghdad to get the Iraqi government and economy running again (Guardian)

The first order of business for the Americans was to get money flowing again through the Iraqi economy. They got the bank’s to re-open, began paying government employees, reformed the civil service code and pensions, created a budget for the ministries, stabilized the dinar, and temporarily stopped debt payments to build up foreign reserves. This was mostly funded through the Development Fund for Iraq that was created by the United Nations. Since the Gulf War sanctions, Iraq’s oil revenues had been regulated by the international body, and deposited in the Federal Reserve Bank in New York. $12 billion from the Fund was eventually flown to Iraq in new $100 bills, and distributed throughout Iraq with little to no accountability. The priority was to get people back to work and the economy up and running as quickly as possible, so the U.S. skipped the book keeping.

Next the U.S. moved to Iraq’s currency. At the time, the country used two types of money. In Kurdistan there were Swiss dinars, and the rest of the country used Saddam dinars. The latter was easy to counterfeit, and was plagued by high inflation. The U.S. came up with a single dinar and a new exchange rate. In July 2003 CPA head Paul Bremer announced that the Central Bank of Iraq would replace the old notes with the new ones. That process lasted from October 2003 to January 2004.

By the end of 2003 the Americans were working on Iraq’s considerable debt. The Iran-Iraq and Gulf Wars had left the country $130 billion in the hole. The Treasury Department started renegotiation this debt, and got an 18-month moratorium on payments. In December, President Bush appointed former Secretary of State and Treasury James Baker to work on debt relief. He went to the Paris Club made up of 19 industrial countries, and got them to forgive 80% of the $38.9 billion Iraq owed them. In July 2004 the G-8 agreed to an IMF plan to reduce 90-95% of their Iraqi debt. Later, Finance Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi of the Iraqi interim government got the Paris Club to forgive 95% of Iraq’s debt and rescheduled the rest.

CPA’s economic director McPherson wanted free market reforms in Iraq (Oklahoma State Univ.)

The CPA also wanted to transform Iraq from a socialist to capitalist country. That was largely based upon the ideas of the CPA’s economic policy head Peter McPherson. He modeled his plans after Eastern Europe, which went through rapid economic changes after the fall of the Iron Curtain. McPherson's ideas were fully supported by Bremer.

In July McPherson focused upon Iraq’s 192 state-owned businesses. Most of them were closed during the war, and even when opened suffered from a lack of assets, obsolescence, high costs, and surplus employees. The looting and post-war chaos had made their situation worse. At the same time they accounted for 1/8 of the workforce, provided basic services, and included 90% of the country’s industry. McPherson decided to close all but the most efficient ones by freezing their assets and cutting off their money. The Treasury Department objected because they were afraid of the affects upon employment and whether it was legal under international law for an occupying power to carry out such changes. There were also differences within the CPA, and many Iraqi objections. That led the CPA to change course in just a matter of days and re-open the companies that would help with reconstruction such as cement factories. By August a third of the businesses were open again.

The U.S. also wanted to transform Iraq’s banks. Under Saddam they were mostly used for savings and transferring money. The Americans wanted them to support businesses, provide loans, and promote economic growth. The CPA suspended the old banking laws, created the Trade Bank of Iraq, started new regulations, and tried to modernize the banking system and change its credit policies. This U.S. effort was only slightly more successful than the ones aimed at bringing capitalism. By 2010 Iraq’s banks are still dominated by large and inefficient state-run ones like Rafidain and Rasheed, which lack transparency, business models, and have high costs. More importantly, Iraq remains a cash rather than credit based economy. 

In the end, the U.S. was successful at getting the economy, banks, and government up and running again, while its long-term plans were sidelined due to differences within the American camp, and opposition from Iraqis. Billions of dollars were pumped into the country through the CPA’s use of the Development Fund for Iraq, and much of the country’s debt was rescheduled or forgiven. The attempt to bring free market reforms to the state-run businesses and banks were either derailed or were ineffective, while the U.S. never even considered privatizing the country’s main asset, oil, because it didn’t want to appear to be after Iraq’s resources. The insurgency was also taking off, switching the emphasis from the economy to security. The result, was that by the beginning of 2004 the U.S. had largely given up on any ideas of bringing capitalism to Iraq, and simply wanted the economy working in the midst of a growing war with militants. This would foreshadow the coming actions by the Americans, who would score several more tactical victories in Iraq. The larger and more important strategic situation however, was much more difficult for the U.S. to shape because it was largely determined by Iraqis who had their own contested ideas about their country’s future.

SOURCES

England, Andrew, “Calls for bank reform to unlock Iraq’s potential,” Financial Times, 12/13/10

Packer, George, “War After The War,” New Yorker, 11/24/03

Pallister, David, “How the US sent $12bn in cash to Iraq, And watched it vanish,” Guardian, 2/8/07

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09

Sterngold, James, “Another enemy looms – Iraq debt,” San Francisco Chronicle, 5/23/04

Prices For Iraqi Oil Continue To Climb At The End Of 2010

World oil prices have been climbing in the second half of 2010, boosting Iraq’s revenue. In November the country earned $4.618 billion. That surpassed October’s $4.5 billion, which was the previous high for the year. The increased profits were due to the price of Iraqi crude going up from $77.10 in October to $80.59 in November. Otherwise, oil exports were relatively flat, going slightly down from an average of 1.92 million barrels a day in October to 1.910 million barrels in November. That’s largely because the country’s infrastructure is at capacity.

The numbers also show that the foreign oil deals that Iraq signed in the last year have still not affected exports. On December 22 for example, the Oil Ministry claimed that production had gone up 10% or 100,000 barrels a day thanks to the petroleum companies. That may change December’s numbers when they come out next year, but so far production has remained relatively unchanged since 2008 with the output at the end of 2010 being the same as the beginning of the year. Iraq earns 90% or more of its money from petroleum.

Month	Total Oil Earnings	Price Per Barrel	Avg. Monthly Exports (Mil/Bar/Day)
Jan. 10	$4.4 bil	$73.97	1.92
Feb.	$4.2 bil	$73.40	2.05
Mar.	$4.3 bil	$76.20	1.84
Apr.	$4.2 bil	$79.66	1.80
May	$4.3 bil	$73.85	1.88
Jun.	$3.8 bil	$71.10	1.86
Jul.	$4.0 bil	$71.21	1.82
Aug.	$3.9 bil	$71.43	1.82
Sep.	$4.4 bil	$73.07	2.00
Oct.	$4.5 bil	$77.10	1.92
Nov.	$4.6 bil	$80.59	1.91

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “Oil ministry achieves highest production since 2003,” 12/22/10

Hafidh, Hassan, “Iraq Now Oil Revenues At $4.618B, Year’s Largest-Oil Ministry,” Dow Jones, 12/23/10

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/10

The State Of Iraq’s Provinces

At the end of 2010 the United Nations’ Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit (IAU) released its annual reports on Iraq’s 18 provinces. They provided a brief rundown of the economic and humanitarian conditions in each governorate. Iraq’s provinces are highly diverse from the highly urbanized Baghdad, Dohuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniya, to the more rural Diyala, Muthanna, and Salahaddin. There are also inequalities between them with the urban areas in general being far better off than the rural areas, where most people rely upon agriculture that consists largely of unpaid work. A drought also hit the country for the last two years devastating many acres of farmland. The country in general also suffers from high poverty and illiteracy despite a large percentage of the population going through or being enrolled in primary school. There continues to be a large number of internally displaced families, most of which lost their homes during he sectarian civil war, especially in Baghdad. This large population suffers from worst living conditions in general than the rest of the nation. Below is a short-run down of each province along with the statistical information provided by the IAU.

(Wikimedia)

Anbar is the largest province in size, but only has the seventh largest population at 1,485,985. Most residents are concentrated in the northeastern section along the Euphrates River, because the rest of the land is dominated by desert. From 2008-2010 a drought hit, devastating the farmland, farmers, and livestock. 25% of the workforce is in agriculture, but 2/3 of those are unwaged jobs. Overall 50% of work is unwaged in the governorate. Unemployment is 14%, which is lower than the national average, but unlike most of the rest of the country, the urban center of Ramadi has the highest unemployment rate in the province at 21%. 27% of children are chronically malnourished. 19% of households in Ramadi, 27% in Rawa, and 33% in Hit drink water directly out of a river or lake.

Anbar’s Rankings
Population #7
Most Urban #13
% Living Below National Poverty Line #13
% Of Households In Lowest Per Capita Expenditure Quintile #5
% Enrolled In Primary Schools #4
% Enrolled in Secondary Schools #3
Women Enrolled In Primary Schools Compared To Men #12
Illiteracy Rate #15
% Of Women Working In Non-Agricultural Sector #9
Under Five Mortality Rate #16
% Using Improved Drinking Water Source #6
% Using Improved Sanitation Facility #2

(Wikimedia)

Babil benefits from a large amount of arable land, which is fed by water from the Euphrates River. 44% of the workforce, the highest rate in the country, is employed in agriculture. The province grows dates, maize, and legumes. The local government wants to increase investment, bring modern farming techniques, and improve skills in the industry. Unfortunately, 50% of the cropland was hit hard by drought the last two years. The informality in the farming sector, weakness in other sectors of the economy, low employment in the public sector, and 52% of workers in unwaged jobs has created a high poverty rate. 41.2% of the population, the second highest mark in the country, lives below the national poverty line of $2.20 per day. 15% of the province is also out of work. Still, in July 2010 the American Provincial Reconstruction team in the Babil said that its economy developed because of growth in banking and small businesses. The water network is poor  in the province with only 53.1% of the population using an improved water drinking source.

Babil’s Rankings
Population #5
Most Urban #12
% Living Below National Poverty Line #2
% Of Households In Lowest Per Capita Expenditure Quintile #8
% Enrolled In Primary Schools #13
% Enrolled in Secondary Schools #6
Women Enrolled In Primary Schools Compared To Men #14
Illiteracy Rate #11
% Of Women Working In Non-Agricultural Sector #8
Under Five Mortality Rate #17
% Using Improved Drinking Water Source #16
% Using Improved Sanitation Facility #11

(Wikimedia)

Baghdad is the most populated province in Iraq, with 7,145,470 people. The next closest is Ninewa with 2,811,091. Most of Baghdad lives in the capital city, which is why the province has the highest urbanization rate at 87%. Only 13.0% of the population lives below the poverty line of $2.20 per day, and 6.7% of households are in the lowest per capita expenditure quintile. The vast majority of the country’s displaced are from the capital province, and the largest number reside there. Four of the top five districts with post-2006 displaced people are in Baghdad. 2006 is when the civil war really took off, causing the largest amount of displacement. The Karkh district has 171,400 displaced, followed by 123,239 in Rusafa, 76,673 in Adhamiya, and 69,463 in Kadhimiyah.

Baghdad’s Rankings
Population #1
Most Urban #1
% Living Below National Poverty Line #14
% Of Households In Lowest Per Capita Expenditure Quintile #18
% Enrolled In Primary Schools #5
% Enrolled in Secondary Schools #1
Women Enrolled In Primary Schools Compared To Men #2
Illiteracy Rate #17
% Of Women Working In Non-Agricultural Sector #3
Under Five Mortality Rate tied #11
% Using Improved Drinking Water Source #4
% Using Improved Sanitation Facility #1

(Wikimedia)

Basra is the third most populated province with 1,912,533 people, and has the second highest urbanization rate at 78%. Basra contains Iraq’s only major port Um Qasr, and has the largest oil deposits. For those reasons, the provincial council has focused upon oil and transportation, and neglected agriculture. Water in Basra suffers from high salinity, and is often only good for washing and cleaning, not for drinking. Only 1.5% of the population has access to a modern drinking source, by far the worst rate in the country. Most drinking water has to be bought as a result. 31.2% of the population lives below the national poverty line of $2.20 per day, but only 9.8% of households are in the lowest per capita expenditure quintile.

Basra’s Rankings
Population #3
Most Urban #2
% Living Below National Poverty Line #8
% Of Households In Lowest Per Capita Expenditure Quintile #16
% Enrolled In Primary Schools #9
% Enrolled in Secondary Schools #5
Women Enrolled In Primary Schools Compared To Men #4
Illiteracy Rate #14
% Of Women Working In Non-Agricultural Sector #5
Under Five Mortality Rate #13
% Using Improved Drinking Water Source #18
% Using Improved Sanitation Facility #15

(Wikimedia)

Dhi Qar suffers from high unemployment at 31%. 32.0% of the population also lives below the national poverty line, and 44.7% of households are in the lowest per capita expenditure quintile. The Chibayish district has the second worst mark in the country with 61.8% of households in that lowest quintile, followed by 59.6% in the Shatra district. Dhi Qar also has a low education rate for women, resulting in high illiteracy for them. Only 6% of women in rural areas are involved in the work force as well. Access to water is poor in the governorate, but power supply is good.

Dhi Qar’s Rankings
Population #6
Most Urban #11
% Living Below National Poverty Line #9
% Of Households In Lowest Per Capita Expenditure Quintile #1
% Enrolled In Primary Schools #16
% Enrolled in Secondary Schools #12
Women Enrolled In Primary Schools Compared To Men #17
Illiteracy Rate #7
% Of Women Working In Non-Agricultural Sector #10
Under Five Mortality Rate tied #11
% Using Improved Drinking Water Source #15
% Using Improved Sanitation Facility #14

(Wikimedia)

Diyala has the most rural population in Iraq at 59%. The government provides 36% of jobs. The private sector is hampered by a lack of electricity, water, infrastructure, capital, and skilled workers, plus cheap imports. Agriculture dominates the economy, and provides 19% of jobs, and 1/5 of the GDP. The province specializes in fruits and dates. At the same time, 12.5% of women are employed outside of farming, the highest rate in Iraq. 8% of the population is displaced, one of highest rates in Iraq. 83% of the displaced are from within the governorate. 33.1% of the population lives below the national poverty line, and 62.2% of households in the Baladrooz district are in the lowest per capita expenditure quintile, the highest mark in the country. Despite the poverty, Diyala has the lowest illiteracy rate in the country at 6.8%, possibly because it has the highest enrollment rate in primary schools, and the second highest enrollment in secondary schools.

Diyala’s Rankings
Population #9
Most Urban #18
% Living Below National Poverty Line #7
% Of Households In Lowest Per Capita Expenditure Quintile #7
% Enrolled In Primary Schools #1
% Enrolled in Secondary Schools #2
Women Enrolled In Primary Schools Compared To Men #7
Illiteracy Rate #18
% Of Women Working In Non-Agricultural Sector #1
Under Five Mortality Rate #9
% Using Improved Drinking Water Source #12
% Using Improved Sanitation Facility #4

(Wikimedia)

Dohuk has the smallest population amongst Iraq’s provinces with 505,491 people. Most of those, 73%, live in urban areas. 52% of jobs are provided by the government. Only 11% of women in the province are in the work force. Around 40% of females are unemployed. Drought has severely affected the province. In 2009 it did have a better harvest than 2008. Flash floods and landslides hit in November 2009 affecting 340 families. 21% of the population is displaced, the highest amount in country. Almost all are from Ninewa fleeing the violence there or Dohuk itself, having been forced out during the Saddam era. Only 9.3% of population lives below the poverty line. It does have the highest illiteracy rate in the country at 30.5%.

Dohuk’s Rankings
Population #18
Most Urban #4
% Living Below National Poverty Line #16
% Of Households In Lowest Per Capita Expenditure Quintile #12
% Enrolled In Primary Schools #6
% Enrolled in Secondary Schools #16
Women Enrolled In Primary Schools Compared To Men #6
Illiteracy Rate #1
% Of Women Working In Non-Agricultural Sector #15
Under Five Mortality Rate tied #4
% Using Improved Drinking Water Source #1
% Using Improved Sanitation Facility #3

(Wikimedia)

Irbil has the third highest urbanization rate in the country at 76%. Irbil’s farm sector lacks modern techniques and investment. There is a 24% unemployment rate in rural areas, and 66% of women are unemployed in those places as well. 26% of children 0-5 years old suffer from acute malnutrition, and 15% face chronic malnutrition. The province has poor infrastructure. Only 31.5% of the province has access to improved sanitation facilities. Still, only 3.4% of population lives below poverty line, and 7.1% of households are in the lowest per capita expenditure quintile. Like the other three provinces in Kurdistan, Irbil suffers from high illiteracy at 25.8%. The Choman district at 43.0% has the third highest rate in the country.

Irbil’s Rankings
Population #10
Most Urban #3
% Living Below National Poverty Line #17
% Of Households In Lowest Per Capita Expenditure Quintile #17
% Enrolled In Primary Schools #7
% Enrolled in Secondary Schools #4
Women Enrolled In Primary Schools Compared To Men #5
Illiteracy Rate #5
% Of Women Working In Non-Agricultural Sector #2
Under Five Mortality Rate #3
% Using Improved Drinking Water Source #3
% Using Improved Sanitation Facility #18

(Wikimedia)

Karbala is one of the smallest and least populated provinces in Iraq. It is the site of the Imam Hussein shrine, which brings in large amounts of religious tourists. It also has a high poverty rate. 36.9% live below the national poverty line. That’s partly due to the fact that 27% of jobs are unwaged. Many work in wholesale and retail, farming, transportation, communication. 29% of waged work is from the government, while 12% work in agriculture. The province has poor health care with 53 under five deaths per 1,000 live births, the second worst mark in the country.

Karbala’s Rankings
Population #14
Most Urban #8
% Living Below National Poverty Line #4
% Of Households In Lowest Per Capita Expenditure Quintile #4
% Enrolled In Primary Schools #8
% Enrolled in Secondary Schools #17
Women Enrolled In Primary Schools Compared To Men #9
Illiteracy Rate #12
% Of Women Working In Non-Agricultural Sector #12
Under Five Mortality Rate #2
% Using Improved Drinking Water Source #7
% Using Improved Sanitation Facility #6

(Wikimedia)

Maysan’s economy has declined because of deteriorating infrastructure, poor access to resources, and the drought. The last hit the province from 2009-2010, reducing agriculture in 43% of the farmland, and affecting 325,000 people. The provincial council wants to improve irrigation and farming techniques to help the industry. Maysan has the lowest enrollment in primary schools at 65.6%. Only 37.5% of the population has access to an improved sanitation facility, the second worst rate in the country.

Maysan’s Rankings
Population #15
Most Urban #9
% Living Below National Poverty Line #10
% Of Households In Lowest Per Capita Expenditure Quintile #11
% Enrolled In Primary Schools #18
% Enrolled in Secondary Schools #9
Women Enrolled In Primary Schools Compared To Men #18
Illiteracy Rate #8
% Of Women Working In Non-Agricultural Sector #13
Under Five Mortality Rate tied #11
% Using Improved Drinking Water Source #10
% Using Improved Sanitation Facility #17

(Wikimedia)

Muthanna is the second largest province in size, but second smallest in population with 614,997 people. Most of the governorate is covered in desert, and 56% of the people live in rural areas. It is also the poorest province with 48.8% living below the national poverty line, and 41.0% of households in the lowest per capita expenditure quintile. In the Rumaitha and Salman districts more than half of the households are in that lowest quintile. This is due to several reasons. First, unemployment is high at 25%, 28% in rural areas. 40% of jobs are unwaged, and half of those are in farming. It has the second lowest enrollment in primary schools at 75.3%, and third highest illiteracy rate at 26.8%. In fact, the Salman district has the highest illiteracy rate in the country at 51.8%. The water system is also poor in Muthanna with only 53.1% of the population having access to an improved water drinking source. 44% of jobs are in manufacturing and agriculture. The provincial council wants those industries to be developed. It also wants to create trade with Saudi Arabia, but the kingdom’s animosity towards Shiite rule in Iraq makes that unlikely to happen.

Muthanna’s Rankings
Population #17
Most Urban #17
% Living Below National Poverty Line #1
% Of Households In Lowest Per Capita Expenditure Quintile #2
% Enrolled In Primary Schools #17
% Enrolled in Secondary Schools #18
Women Enrolled In Primary Schools Compared To Men #15
Illiteracy Rate #3
% Of Women Working In Non-Agricultural Sector #17
Under Five Mortality Rate tied #6
% Using Improved Drinking Water Source #17
% Using Improved Sanitation Facility #13

(Wikimedia)

Najaf is the site of the Ali Ibn Abi Talib tomb, which is regarded as the first Imam by Shiites and the fourth Caliph by Sunnis. The tomb is one of the holiest sites to Shiites, making religious tourism a major business. It provides 30% of the GDP. Najaf also produces cement, glass, wheat, rice, dates, and vegetables. Industry is 14% of the GDP, and agriculture 15%. Industry lacks investment, infrastructure, and restrictions due to tourism, while the provincial council wants to improve farming skills and the irrigation system. 45% of unwaged labor is in agriculture. Najaf is the only province where there are more girls than boys enrolled in primary schools.

Najaf’s Rankings
Population #16
Most Urban #7
% Living Below National Poverty Line #11
% Of Households In Lowest Per Capita Expenditure Quintile #13
% Enrolled In Primary Schools #14
% Enrolled in Secondary Schools #8
Women Enrolled In Primary Schools Compared To Men #1
Illiteracy Rate #9
% Of Women Working In Non-Agricultural Sector #11
Under Five Mortality Rate #8
% Using Improved Drinking Water Source #7
% Using Improved Sanitation Facility #6

(Wikimedia)

Ninewa has the second highest population after Baghdad with 2,811,091 people. Ninewa’s economy is based around farming. It’s known for growing cereal, sugar cane, sunflowers, vegetables, and herbs. The provincial council wants to modernize agriculture with modern techniques. Drought has affected the industry severely. 47% of farmland was impacted over the last two years. Farmers can’t afford seed to return to 2009 levels. Industry in the province specializes in cement, sugar, textiles, and beverages. The province is around the middle in the country in illiteracy at 20.9%, but three of its nine districts, Hatra, Aqri, and Sinjar, have some of the highest rates at 49.0%, 41.7%, and 41.2% respectively. It remains one of the most violent areas of the country, which hinders development.

Ninewa’s Rankings
Population #2
Most Urban #10
% Living Below National Poverty Line #12
% Of Households In Lowest Per Capita Expenditure Quintile #10
% Enrolled In Primary Schools #10
% Enrolled in Secondary Schools #15
Women Enrolled In Primary Schools Compared To Men #10
Illiteracy Rate #12
% Of Women Working In Non-Agricultural Sector #11
Under Five Mortality Rate tied #6
% Using Improved Drinking Water Source #9
% Using Improved Sanitation Facility #7

Qadisiyah’s economy is dominated by agriculture. It provides 47% of the GDP, and 35% of jobs. The province mainly produces rice, wheat, and barley. 46% of jobs are unwaged, mostly in farming. That’s the main reason why 33.7% of households live in the lowest per capita expenditure quintile, and 35.0% live below the national poverty line of $2.20 per day.

Qadisiyah’s Rankings
Population #12
Most Urban #14
% Living Below National Poverty Line #5
% Of Households In Lowest Per Capita Expenditure Quintile #3
% Enrolled In Primary Schools #15
% Enrolled in Secondary Schools #10
Women Enrolled In Primary Schools Compared To Men #16
Illiteracy Rate #6
% Of Women Working In Non-Agricultural Sector #7
Under Five Mortality Rate #10
% Using Improved Drinking Water Source #11
% Using Improved Sanitation Facility #16

(Wikimedia)

54% of Salahaddin’s population lives in rural areas, the third highest rate in the country. 36% of jobs are in agriculture, but two years of drought have devastated the farming sector leading to a 50% reduction in land use. Many farm jobs are unwaged, and the industry suffers from land ownership issues, outdated methods, and a lack of coordination between farms and factories. Industry in the province suffers from poor management, lack of investment, and a lack of markets.  It has an 18% unemployment rate, which is higher in urban areas, and 39.9% live below the poverty line of $2.20 per day. Salahaddin also has poor health care with the highest under five mortality rate in the country at 70 deaths per 1,000 live births.

Salahaddin’s Rankings
Population #8
Most Urban #16
% Living Below National Poverty Line #3
% Of Households In Lowest Per Capita Expenditure Quintile #14
% Enrolled In Primary Schools #12
% Enrolled in Secondary Schools #13
Women Enrolled In Primary Schools Compared To Men #13
Illiteracy Rate #13
% Of Women Working In Non-Agricultural Sector #16
Under Five Mortality Rate #15
% Using Improved Drinking Water Source #13
% Using Improved Sanitation Facility #10

(Wikimedia)

Of the three governorates in Kurdistan, Sulaymaniya has the largest population at 1,893,617. Like the rest of the region, Sulaymaniya is highly urbanized at 70%. Unemployment is low at 12%. 27% of women are unemployed, and few women are employed in the workforce outside of agriculture. Only 3.3% of the population lives below the poverty line. It has good water supplies, weather, and security, which has allowed for economic growth. Poor infrastructure and bureaucracy is impeding further development. It still has the second highest illiteracy rate in the country at 27.8%.

Sulaymaniya’s Rankings
Population #4
Most Urban #5
% Living Below National Poverty Line #18
% Of Households In Lowest Per Capita Expenditure Quintile #14
% Enrolled In Primary Schools #2
% Enrolled in Secondary Schools #7
Women Enrolled In Primary Schools Compared To Men tied #2
Illiteracy Rate #2
% Of Women Working In Non-Agricultural Sector #4
Under Five Mortality Rate #15
% Using Improved Drinking Water Source #5
% Using Improved Sanitation Facility #9

(Wikimedia)

Tamim is an oil rich province, but wealth has not trickled down to the people. Still, only 9.8% of the population lives below the national poverty line, and it has the third lowest illiteracy rate in the country at 11.9%. It also has the lowest under five death rate in the country at 21 deaths per 1,000 live births. The local government wants to expand farming and reduce food imports. It also blames the oil industry for the low supply of electricity.

Tamim’s Rankings
Population #13
Most Urban #6
% Living Below National Poverty Line #3
% Of Households In Lowest Per Capita Expenditure Quintile #14
% Enrolled In Primary Schools #3
% Enrolled in Secondary Schools #11
Women Enrolled In Primary Schools Compared To Men #8
Illiteracy Rate #16
% Of Women Working In Non-Agricultural Sector #6
Under Five Mortality Rate #18
% Using Improved Drinking Water Source #2
% Using Improved Sanitation Facility #5

(Wikimedia)

Wasit is a largely agricultural province. 38% of the workforce, the second highest amount in the country, works in farming. The industry has been hit by high salinity, old techniques, the migration of workers from rural to urban areas, and the degradation of the land from military use since the Iran-Iraq War. Unlike the rest of the country, there is low unemployment in rural areas at 10% compared to 18% in urban ones. Most farm work is unwaged however because it is informal, and the farms are not profitable. A lack of regulations and investment hinders the development of industries in the governorate, which is a reason for the high jobless rate in the province’s cities.

Wasit’s Rankings
Population #11
Most Urban #15
% Living Below National Poverty Line #6
% Of Households In Lowest Per Capita Expenditure Quintile #6
% Enrolled In Primary Schools #11
% Enrolled in Secondary Schools #14
Women Enrolled In Primary Schools Compared To Men #11
Illiteracy Rate #4
% Of Women Working In Non-Agricultural Sector #14
Under Five Mortality Rate tied #4
% Using Improved Drinking Water Source #14
% Using Improved Sanitation Facility #12

Iraq’s Provinces’ Information

Population (2007 estimates)
Baghdad 7,145,470
Ninewa 2,811,091
Basra 1,912,533
Sulaymaniya 1,893,617
Babil 1,651,565
Dhi Qar 1,616,226
Anbar 1,485,985
Salahaddin 1,191,403
Diyala 1,560,621
Irbil 1,542,421
Wasit 1,064,950
Qadisiyah 990,483
Tamim 902,019
Karbala 887,859
Maysan 824,147
Najaf 614, 997
Muthanna 614,997
Dohuk 505,491

Most Urban (2007)
87% Baghdad
78% Basra
76% Irbil
73% Dohuk
70% Sulaymaniya
69% Tamim
68% Najaf
65% Karbala
65% Maysan
61% Ninewa
58% Dhi Qar
53% Babil
52% Anbar
52% Qadisiyah
52% Wasit
46% Salahaddin
44% Muthanna
41% Diyala

Most Rural (2007)
59% Diyala
56% Muthanna
54% Salahaddin
48% Anbar
48% Qadisiyah
48% Wasit
47% Babil
42% Dhi Qar
39% Ninewa
35% Karbala
35% Maysan
31% Najaf
31% Tamim
30% Sulaymaniya
27% Dohuk
24% Irbil
21% Basra
13% Baghdad

% Living Below National Poverty Line ($2.20 per day)
22.9% Iraq
48.8% Muthanna
41.2% Babil
39.9% Salahaddin
36.9% Karbala
35.0% Qadisiyah
34.8% Wasit
33.1% Diyala
32.1% Basra
32.0% Dhi Qar
25.3% Maysan
24.4% Najaf
23.0% Ninewa
20.9% Anbar
13.0% Baghdad
9.8% Tamim
9.3% Dohuk
3.4% Irbil
3.3% Sulaymaniya

Households In Lowest Per Capita Expenditure Quintile By Province
20.0% Iraq
44.7% Dhi Qar
41.0% Muthanna
33.7% Qadisiyah
32.9% Karbala
32.2% Anbar
32.2% Wasit
30.1% Diyala
27.9% Babil
26.8% Tamim
26.0% Ninewa
25.2% Maysan
18.1% Dohuk
15.4% Najaf
15.2% Salahaddin
10.1% Sulaymaniya
9.8% Basra
7.1% Irbil
6.7% Baghdad

(Global Security)

Click on map for larger view

Households In Lowest Per Capita Expenditure Quintile By District
20.0% Iraq
62.2% Baladrooz, Diyala
61.8% Chibayish, Dhi Qar
59.6% Shatra, Dhi Qar
58.2% Tal Afar, Ninewa
55.4% Shamiya, Qadisiyah
52.9% Rumaitha, Muthanna
51.1% Salman, Muthanna
48.9% Hawija, Tamim
47.6% Shirqat, Salahaddin
46.9% Afaq, Qadisiyah
46.2% Rifai, Dhi Qar
45.3% Fallujah, Anbar
43.1% Khalis, Diyala
42.7% Nasiriyah, Dhi Qar
42.2% Fars, Salahaddin
42.2% Hatra, Ninewa
40.4% Maimouna, Maysan
40.0% Ain Tamur, Karbala
39.1% Khidhir, Muthanna
38.7% Hashimiya, Babil
37.9% Tilkaif, Ninewa
37.8% Daquq, Tamim
37.3% Suwair, Wasit
36.9% Hindiya, Karbala
36.4% Hamdaniya, Ninewa
36.0% Ali al-Gharbi, Maysan
35.8% Shikhan, Ninewa
35.6% Kahla, Maysan
33.8% Mahawil, Babil
33.3% Baquba, Diyala
33.3% Kut, Wasit
32.9% Ramadi, Anbar
32.4% Hai, Wasit
32.0% Musayyib, Babil
31.1% Aziziya, Wasit
31.1% Qalat Saleh, Maysan
31.1% Rawa, Anbar
30.7% Sinjar, Ninewa
30.2% Karbala, Karbala
30.0% Aqri, Ninewa
29.3% Dibis, Tamim
29.3% Meja al-Kabi, Maysan
28.9% Pshdar, Sulaymaniya
28.9% Samawa, Muthanna
28.0% Kaim, Anbar
26.3% Manathera, Najaf
25.8% Namaniya, Wasit
24.2% Kufa, Najaf
22.7% Rania, Sulaymaniya
21.8% Suq al-Shoyokh, Dhi Qar
21.1% Baaj, Ninewa
20.9% Midaina, Basra
20.9% Sharbazher, Sulaymaniya
20.9% Sumel, Dohuk
20.4% Penjwin, Sulaymaniya
20.0% Badra, Wasit
19.6% Chamchamal, Sulaymaniya
19.6% Diwaniya, Qadisiyah
19.1% Qurna, Basra
18.9% Koisnjaq, Irbil
18.7% Fao, Basra
18.7% Rutba, Anbar
17.8% Hillah, Babil
17.4% Touz, Salahaddin
17.3% Amarah, Maysan
16.9% Hit, Anbar
16.9% Najaf, Najaf
16.9% Kirkuk, Tamim
16.0% Abu al-Khasib, Basra
16.0% Khanaqin, Diyala
14.7% Mosul, Ninewa
13.8% Daur, Salahaddin
12.9% Amedia, Dohuk
12.9% Zakho, Dohuk
12.7% Rusafa, Baghdad
12.7% Tharwa 1, Baghdad
12.7% Tharwa 2, Baghdad
11.6% Dohuk, Dohuk
11.1% Dokan, Sulaymaniya
10.9% Kifri, Diyala
10.7% Shaqlawa, Irbil
10.2% Samarra, Salahaddin
9.8% Halabja, Sulaymaniya
9.1% Irbil, Irbil
8.7% Kadhimaiyah, Baghdad
8.4% Ana, Anbar
8.4% Tikrit, Salahaddin
8.3% Hamza, Qadisiyah
8.0% Basra, Basra
7.8% Soran, Irbil
7.1% Haditha, Anbar
6.7% Makhmour, Irbil
6.7% Mergasur, Irbil
5.8% Shatt al-Arab, Basra
5.4% Madain, Baghdad
5.2% Karkh, Baghdad
4.4% Balad, Salahaddin
4.4% Choman, Irbil
4.4% Darbandihkan, Sulaymaniya
3.6% Kalar, Sulaymaniya
2.2% Sulaymaniya, Sulaymaniya
2.0% Abu Ghraib, Baghdad
1.7% Adhamiya, Baghdad
1.3% Muqtadiya, Diyala
1.2% Mahmudiyah, Baghdad
0.9% Baiji, Salahaddin
0.3% Tarmiyah, Baghdad
N/A Tharthar, Salahaddin

% Enrolled in Primary Schools
84.8% Iraq
92.2% Diyala
91.4% Sulaymaniya
90.7% Tamim
90.1% Anbar
90.0% Baghdad
89.8% Dohuk
89.6% Irbil
88.9% Karbala
86.6% Basra
81.7% Ninewa
79.5% Wasit
78.3% Salahaddin
78.2% Babil
78.2% Najaf
78.1% Qadisiyah
77.9% Dhi Qar
75.3% Muthanna
65.6% Maysan

% Enrolled in Secondary Schools
36.7% Iraq
42.0% Baghdad
35.8% Diyala
34.8% Anbar
29.7% Irbil
24.9% Basra
24.1% Babil
22.8% Sulaymaniya
22.1% Najaf
21.2% Maysan
17.9% Qadisiyah
17.7% Tamim
15.8% Dhi Qar
14.7% Salahaddin
13.8% Wasit
13.5% Ninewa
12.0% Dohuk
10.6% Karbala
9.8% Muthanna

Women Enrollment Compared To Men In Primary Schools
84.8% Iraq
110% Najaf
100% Baghdad
100% Sulaymaniya
99.8% Basra
99.4% Irbil
96.8% Dohuk
96.5% Diyala
96.2% Tamim
95.7% Karbala
93.4% Ninewa
91.% Wasit
91.2% Anbar
87.2% Salahaddin
83.2% Babil
83.0% Muthanna
82.1% Qadisiyah
81.7% Dhi Qar
79.1% Maysan

Illiteracy Aged 10+ By Province
17.5% Iraq
30.5% Dohuk
27.8% Sulaymaniya
26.8% Muthanna
25.9% Wasit
25.8% Irbil
24.9% Qadisiyah
22.8% Dhi Qar
21.5% Maysan
20.9% Najaf
20.9% Ninewa
19.6% Babil
17.2% Karbala
15.7% Salahaddin
14.6% Basra
13.9% Anbar
11.9% Tamim
10.0% Baghdad
6.8% Diyala

Illiteracy Aged 10+ By District
17.5% Iraq
51.8% Salman, Muthanna
49.0% Hatra, Ninewa
43.0% Choman, Irbil
41.7% Aqri, Ninewa
41.2% Sinjar, Ninewa
38.4% Chamchamal, Sulaymaniya
38.3% Qalat Saleh, Maysan
38.0% Pshdar, Sulaymaniya
36.8% Penjwin, Sulaymaniya
35.9% Kahla, Maysan
35.1% Mergasur, Irbil
34.7% Khidhir, Muthanna
33.9% Hai, Wasit
33.6% Fars, Salahaddin
33.2% Hamza, Qadisiyah
33.0% Rania, Sulaymaniya
32.9% Sharbazher, Sulaymaniya
32.9% Shikhan, Ninewa
32.6% Dokan, Sulaymaniya
32.6% Shaqlawa, Irbil
32.5% Ali al-Gharbi, Maysan
31.5% Chibayish, Dhi Qar
31.5% Shamiya, Qadisiyah
31.2% Maimouna, Maysan
30.9% Amedia, Dohuk
30.6% Koisnjaq, Irbil
30.2% Soran, Irbil
29.7% Rutba, Anbar
29.3% Namaniya, Wasit
29.3% Suwair, Wasit
29.2% Sumel, Dohuk
29.1% Kalar, Sulaymaniya
29.1% Rumaitha, Muthanna
29.0% Irbil, Irbil
29.0% Zakho, Dohuk
28.6% Ain Tamur, Karbala
27.5% Shatra, Dhi Qar
27.3% Midaina, Basra
26.4% Halabja, Sulaymaniya
26.3% Manathera, Najaf
26.3% Rawa, Anbar
26.2% Afaq, Qadisiyah
26.1% Daquq, Tamim
26.1% Kifri, Diyala
25.7% Darbandihkan, Sulaymaniya
25.7% Suq al-Shoyokh, Dhi Qar
25.6% Samarra, Salahaddin
25.4% Dohuk, Dohuk
25.4% Rifai, Dhi Qar
24.6% Baaj, Ninewa
24.2% Kufa, Najaf
23.4% Hashimiya, Babil
23.4% Makhmour, Irbil
23.3% Meja al-Kabi, Maysan
23.0% Aziziya, Wasit
23.0% Fao, Basra
23.0% Hindiya, Karbala
22.8% Tal Afar, Ninewa
21.2% Sulaymaniya, Sulaymaniya
21.0% Badra, Wasit
21.0% Qurna, Basra
20.7% Kut, Wasit
20.6% Tilkaif, Ninewa
20.3% Hillah, Babil
19.5% Samawa, Muthanna
19.4% Madain, Baghdad
19.2% Mahawil, Babil
18.3% Daur, Salahaddin
18.3% Kaim, Anbar
17.5% Diwaniya, Qadisiyah
16.9% Hit, Anbar
16.9% Khanaqin, Diyala
16.9% Najaf, Najaf
16.7% Shatt al-Arab, Basra
16.5% Nasiriyah, Dhi Qar
16.4% Touz, Salahaddin
16.2% Mosul, Ninewa
16.1% Hamdaniya, Ninewa
16.1% Tharwa 1, Baghdad
16.1% Tharwa 2, Baghdad
15.8% Mahmudiyah, Baghdad
15.1% Zubayr, Basra
14.8% Karbala, Karbala
14.5% Abu al-Khasib, Basra
14.2% Musayyib, Babil
14.1% Hawija, Tamim
13.8% Ana, Anbar
13.8% Balad, Salahaddin
13.4% Ramadi, Anbar
13.2% Shirqat, Salahaddin
12.4% Amarah, Maysan
12.4% Fallujah, Anbar
11.2% Tikrit, Salahaddin
10.5% Dibis, Tamim
10.4% Basra, Basra
9.4% Kirkuk, Tamim
9.0% Baladrooz, Diyala
8.9% Abu Ghraib, Baghdad
8.5% Kadhimiyah, Baghdad
8.3% Rusafa, Baghdad
8.1% Tarmiyah, Baghdad
7.7% Haditha, Anbar
7.0% Adhamiya, Baghdad
6.6% Khalis, Diyala
4.4% Muqtadiya, Diyala
3.7% Karkh, Baghdad
3.1% Baquba, Diyala
0.7% Baiji, Salahaddin
N/A Tharthar, Salahaddin

% Working In Agriculture
21% Iraq
44% Babil
38% Wasit
36% Salahaddin
35% Qadisiyah
25% Anbar
19% Diyala
16% Tamim
12% Karbala
6% Irbil
N/A Baghdad
N/A Dhi Qar
N/A Dohuk
N/A Maysan
N/A Muthanna
N/A Najaf
N/A Ninewa
N/A Sulaymaniya

% Of Women Working In Non-Agricultural Sector
7.4% Iraq
12.5% Diyala
9.5% Irbil
9.0% Baghdad
9.0% Sulaymaniya
8.9% Basra
7.3% Tamim
7.2% Qadisiyah
6.8% Babil
6.4% Anbar
6.4% Dhi Qar
6.0% Najaf
5.6% Karbala
5.5% Maysan
5.2% Wasit
5.0% Dohuk
4.8% Salahaddin
4.3% Muthanna
4.0% Ninewa

Under Five Mortality Rate For Every 1,000 Live Births
41 deaths Iraq
70 deaths Salahaddin 1.
53 deaths Karbala 2.
46 deaths Irbil 3.
45 deaths Dohuk 4.
45 deaths Wasit 4.
43 deaths Muthanna 6.
43 deaths Ninewa 6.
42 deaths Najaf 8.
39 deaths Diyala 9.
38 deaths Qadisiyah 10.
35 deaths Baghdad 11.
35 deaths Dhi Qar 11.
35 deaths Maysan 11.
34 deaths Basra 13
31 deaths Sulaymaniya 15
30 deaths Anbar 16
30 deaths Babil 16
21 deaths Tamim 18

% Using Improved Drinking Water Source
79.0% Iraq
98.6% Dohuk
97.7% Tamim
97.2% Irbil
96.0% Baghdad
95.% Sulaymaniya
94.2% Anbar
90.3% Karbala
88.1% Najaf
83.7% Ninewa
75.1% Maysan
74.5% Qadisiyah
72.5% Diyala
72.5% Salahaddin
71.0% Wasit
69.9% Dhi Qar
63.9% Babil
53.1% Muthanna
1.5% Basra

% Using Improved Sanitation Facility
83.9% Iraq
100.0% Baghdad
99.4% Anbar
98.2% Dohuk
97.5% Diyala
93.7% Tamim
93.1% Karbala
92.4% Ninewa
90.3% Najaf
84.7% Sulaymaniya
82.4% Salahaddin
80.6% Babil
77.0% Wasit
76.4% Muthanna
71.8% Dhi Qar
71.0% Basra
59.1% Qadisiyah
37.5% Maysan
31.5% Irbil

Post-2006 Displaced By District
171,400 Karkh, Baghdad
123,239 Rusafa, Baghdad
91,959 Mosul, Ninewa
76,673 Adhamiya, Baghdad
69,463 Kadhimiyah, Baghdad
62,128 Baquba, Diyala
43,869 Kirkuk, Tamim
42865 Karbala, Karbala
41,364 Tharwa 1, Baghdad
41,364 Tharwa 2, Baghdad
35,181 Hamdaniya, Ninewa
32,837 Najaf, Najaf
31,974 Madain, Baghdad
31,641 Fallujah, Anbar
27,218 Kut, Wasit
25,943 Hillah, Babil
24,509 Abu Ghraib, Baghdad
22,712 Basra, Basra
22,163 Tikrit, Salahaddin
20,713 Amarah, Maysan
20,463 Ramadi, Anbar
19,322 Tarmiyah, Baghdad
18,773 Khalis, Diyala
16,150 Tilkaif, Ninewa
14,684 Nasiriyah, Dhi Qar
14,035 Khanaqin, Diyala
13,525 Mahawil, Babil
13,413 Diwaniya, Qadisiyah
12,030 Hashimiya, Babil
11,220 Baladrooz, Diyala
9,742 Rumaitha, Muthanna
9,711 Kufa, Najaf
9,456 Muqtadiya, Diyala
9,193 Baiji, Salahaddin
9,005 Aziziya, Wasit
8,911 Rifai, Dhi Qar
8,788 Musayyib, Babil
8,587 Mahmudiyah, Baghdad
8,274 Meja al-Kabi, Maysan
7,920 Chibayish, Dhi Qar
7,115 Daur, Salahaddin
6,696 Suwair, Wasit
6,445 Shatra, Dhi Qar
6,222 Suq al-Shoyokh, Dhi Qar
6,116 Shirqat, Salahaddin
5,979 Hit, Anbar
5,815 Qalat Saleh, Maysan
5,701 Samawa, Muthanna
5,468 Tal Afar, Ninewa
5,377 Hamza, Qadisiyah
5,212 Hawija, Tamim
4,814 Manathera, Najaf
4,724 Zubayr, Basra
4,600 Hai, Wasit
4,330 Haditha, Anbar
4,086 Namaniya, Wasit
4,011 Hindiya, Karbala
3,962 Samarra, Salahaddin
3,144 Balad, Salahaddin
3,041 Kaim, Anbar
2,924 Midaina, Basra
2,913 Kahla, Maysan
2,825 Shamiya, Qadisiyah
2,787 Ana, Anbar
2,765 Fars, Salahaddin
2,747 Afaq, Qadisiyah
2,670 Daquq, Tamim
2,558 Maimouna, Maysan
2,252 Ali al-Gharbi, Maysan
2,072 Abu al-Khasib, Basra
1,991 Touz, Salahaddin
1,654 Shikhan, Ninewa
1,633 Badra, Wasit
1,478 Baaj, Ninewa
1,450 Qurna, Basra
1,282 Rawa, Anbar
1,206 Shatt al-Arab, Basra
1,162 Ain Tamur, Karbala
1,008 Rutba, Anbar
515 Sinjar, Ninewa
476 Hatra, Ninewa
394 Khidhir, Muthanna
290 Dibis, Tamim
204 Kifri, Diyala
138 Fao, Basra
N/A Dohuk province
N/A Irbil province
N/A Sulaymaniya province

SOURCES

Inter Agency Information and Analysis Unit, “Anbar Governorate Profile,” November 2010
- “Babil Governorate Profile,” November 2010
- “Baghdad Governorate Profile,” United Nations, November 2010
- “Basra Governorate Profile,” United Nations, November 2010
- “Diyala Governorate Profile,” United Nations, November 2010
- “Dohuk Governorate Profile,” November 2010
- “Erbil Governorate Profile,” November 2010
- “Kerbala Governorate Profile,” November 2010
- “Kirkuk Governorate Profile,” December 2010
- “Missan Governorate Profile,” November 2010
- “Muthanna Governorate Profile,” November 2010
- “Najaf Governorate Profile,” November 2010
- “Ninewa Governorate Profile,” November 2010
- “Qadissiya Governorate Profile,” November 2010
- “Salahaddin Governorate Profile,” United Nations, January 2011
- “Sulaymaniya Governorate Profile,” November 2010
- “Thi-Qar Governorate Profile,” November 2010
- “Wassit Governorate Profile,” November 2010

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/10

What Does 2011 Hold For Iraq?

As Iraq enters 2011 it faces a number of important decisions regarding politics and economics. In the coming weeks and months Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s new cabinet has to be completed. Next the government has to decide how it will deal with the Kurds’ demands, which are directly linked to oil, the country’s most important resource. International energy companies are expected to begin major production increases this year as well. By mid-year Baghdad will have to decide whether it wants to re-negotiate the Status of Forces Agreement to allow American troops to stay in Iraq past the end of 2011. Finally, the new year could give a taste of how Maliki plans on governing this time around. The end of his last term was marked by a turn towards autocracy and confrontation. Will there be check and balances this time around or will the premier continue to concentrate power in his hands? These issues are all too familiar for Iraq, as they are largely the same ones dealt with in the preceding years. 2011 could therefore be déjà vu for Iraq.

PM Maliki’s cabinet is yet to be completed (Agence France Presse)

Iraq’s first order of business is to complete the formation of Prime Minister Maliki’s new government. When the premier’s cabinet was introduced on December 21, ten ministries were leaderless. Those included Defense, Interior, and National Security. Currently, all three of those are being run by Maliki, but politicians have said that the State of Law-Sadrist led Iraqi National Coalition will get Interior and National Security, while Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National Movement will receive Defense. The newest twist to those negotiations is that the Kurds are demanding that they receive the National Security Ministry based upon an ethnosectarian quota. The Kurdish Coalition claims that since a Shiite will get Interior, and a Sunni Defense, than a Kurd should be named to the remaining ministry. Arab politicians have countered by saying that the Kurds have gotten their just due already, and that there will be no quota system for the security posts. Another issue is the creation of the National Council for Strategic Policies, which Allawi is supposed to head. Officials have increasingly talked about the bill to create the new office being completed. The Council will include Allawi, Maliki, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, Speaker of parliament Osama Nujafi, and Kurdish President Massoud Barzani, but the other members have not yet been decided. The National Coalition will get 50% of the seats whoever they are, the National Movement 30%, and the Kurds 20%. The Council will require an 80% vote to have its decisions be binding, but recommendations will only need a simple majority. The real issue is whether the Council will have any real power, because Maliki’s allies have said it won’t. If it doesn’t, Allawi will likely be an absentee member, and his list could break apart into its constituent parts. Figuring out who will control what will be the most important issues facing Iraq at the beginning of 2011, dragging out the government formation process for almost an entire year.

Afterward determining the relationship with the Kurds could be a problem. The day that Maliki’s cabinet was voted on he signed the Kurds’ 19 demands. Those include allowing Kurdistan to export oil again, and to have Baghdad recognize their petroleum contracts. New Oil Minister Abdul Karim Luaibi claimed that a breakthrough had been achieved on both of those issues, but that’s disputed by the Kurds. Luaibi said that there was a signed agreement between the two sides over exports, which could begin in days, and that the central government would approve the Kurdish deals. The Kurdistan Regional Government however, stated that there was nothing signed, only talks, and that no foreign sales will occur without recognition of their oil contracts, which Baghdad has called illegal. The Kurds have also threatened to hold up passage of the 2010 budget that includes 150,000 barrels a day in Kurdish production unless this matter is solved. If the two sides achieve that it would be an early victory for Maliki. If not, it will be a sign that the government will continue to be deadlocked over the major differences facing the country.

2011 is also supposed to be the year that oil production takes off due to the work of foreign companies. Oil Minister Luaibi has said that Iraqi output will rise from the current 2.4 million barrels a day to 3 million by the end of the year. The country has to overcome its infrastructure and transportation limitations to achieve this goal. New pipelines have to be built, Um Qasr port in Basra has to be repaired and expanded along with another possible access to the Gulf, along with the expansion of roads, storage facilities, and water supplies. So far, the companies have had little affect because the petroleum industry is working at capacity. A lot of construction has to be done before the businesses can move the country forward.

By the middle of the year, Iraqi politicians will have to decide whether they want U.S. troops to stay in the country past the December deadline. Maliki recently gave an interview with the Wall Street Journal where he said that there would be no amending or extending the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that allows American forces to only stay twelve more months in Iraq. That might have just been politicking after the announcement of his cabinet, but if the prime minister does want to change the SOFA it will be difficult because the Sadrists, who were a major player in Maliki returning to office, oppose any stay by the U.S. If he gives into the anti-occupation forces Iraq will be left even more vulnerable to interference by neighboring countries because the Iraqi military will not be able to defend the country from outside threats within a year, nor maintain most of the high-tech equipment its in the process of purchasing such as M1A1 Abrams tanks and F-16 fighters without Washington’s aid. This will be a mid-year test for Maliki to see whether he will bow to political pressure within his own coalition or not.

That points to the most important topic in the new year, how will Prime Minister Maliki act in his second term. From 2008-2010 the premier assumed more control of the security forces and government offices. He confronted the Kurds in the disputed territories and over oil. He created his own State of Law list, and won a sweeping victory in the 2009 provincial elections. He tried to repeat that success in 2010, but ended up splitting the Shiite vote and came in second to Allawi. All of those were part of Maliki’s turn towards nationalism, in an attempt to break free of the other major parties such as the Sadrists, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, and the Kurds, that had backed him previously. At the same time, the prime minister continued to follow sectarian policies by cracking down upon and neglecting the Sons of Iraq after they were turned over to Iraqi control by the Americans, and supporting the deBaathification bans on candidates before the March 2010 vote. Maliki was able to keep his job through all the arguments and horse trading over forming a new government, but what will the deals he cut to get that far mean for his position is unknown. As the winner in the national election, many fear that he will slowly but surely assume more power around himself and his party at the expense of his rivals as he did before. Others think that the political parties have learned from the first Maliki administration, and will attempt to restrain him, and force the premier into compromises. Politicians like Speaker Nujafi and Allawi, if the National Council is given any real authority, can do that by requiring Maliki to forge a consensus over policy and calling his ministers to account for their actions in front of parliament. On the other hand, if the government ends up weak, divided, and deadlocked like the last one, that will free the prime minister to do what he wants.

While Iraq faces many important decisions, 2011 shows how much the country has changed. Since 2009 the major issues have been political and economic rather than about security. While the insurgency and Special Groups still operate and people are killed every day, violence has reached an “irreducible minimum” that’s unlikely to change for some time. Reviving the oil industry from years of neglect and sanctions so that Baghdad has the money necessary to develop and employ the rest of the country is of paramount concern instead. That may require an understanding with the Kurds over their independent energy policy. At the same time, Kurdish petroleum production is so small that the rest of Iraq can progress and profit without its contribution for now. Maliki also needs to complete his government, and his coalition has to assert itself otherwise the prime minister is likely to amass more power, which will inevitably lead to more conflicts. While this is all happening the Americans are on their way out, and even if the SOFA is amended and some military personnel stay to help Iraq with national defense, they will have less and less say in the country. Rather Iraqis will make the final decisions. The problem is that their politicians are immature, selfish, and venal, often choosing the path of least resistance, which is to do nothing or drag things out as long as possible in petty arguments. That’s likely to be the real news of the new year.

SOURCES

AK News, “Iraq’s other stage of govt formation: naming security ministers,” 12/28/10

Ali, Yaser, “KBC: Maliki signs agreement to Kurdish conditions,” AK News, 12/21/10

Aswat al-Iraq, “Iraq targets 3m bpd by 2011 end – minister,” 12/25/10
- “Iraq’s Kurdistan ready to export oil according to Baghdad govt.’s export level, official,” 12/20/10

Cordesman, Anthony, “Victory And Violence In Iraq: Reducing the ‘Irreducible Minimum,’” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2/25/08

Dagher, Sam, “Iraq Wants the U.S. Out,” Wall Street Journal, 12/28/10

Hafidh, Hassan, “Impasse On Kurdish Exports Signals Broader Iraq Oil Uncertainty,” Dow Jones, 12/31/10

Iraq Body Count, “Iraqi deaths from violence in 2010,” 12/30/10

Al-Nashimi, Fadel, “the changing face of nouri al-maliki,” Niqash, 12/28/10
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraqi Parliament Blocs Agree On New National Council,” 12/30/10

Sly, Liz, “Maliki’s governing style raises questions about future of Iraq’s fragile democracy,” Washington Post, 12/22/10