July 2004, The American Effort In Iraq Comes Under New Management, But Still Facing The Same Problems

At the end of June 2004, Paul Bremer handed over sovereignty to a new interim Iraqi government, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) ended, and Ambassador John Negroponte took over the responsibility for America’s diplomatic relations with Baghdad. At the same time, General George Casey replaced General Ricardo Sanchez. Those two changes marked the beginning of an entire new set of senior U.S. leaders in Iraq. Ambassador Negroponte and General Casey wanted to reorganize American priorities in the country, namely focusing upon security, which they believed was tantamount to rebuilding the country. As part of this process three separate reviews were carried out of the reconstruction effort, and new organizations were created to manage it. This added more bureaucracy, increased the divided lines of authority, and led to long delays and cancellations of on-going projects. While the change in emphasis was needed, it was executed badly as too many things in Iraq ended up being.

Amb. Negroponte came to Iraq at the end of June 2004 and wanted to focus upon securing the country (AP)

The end of the CPA brought about new American leadership in Iraq. At the end of June, Ambassador John Negroponte took over the diplomatic mission in Baghdad, while at the beginning of July General George Casey replaced General Ricardo Sanchez. Negroponte and Casey had a shared vision of what needed to be done in Iraq, and were generally upset with the previous state of affairs. They both felt that without security nothing could be accomplished. They wanted to reprioritize the rebuilding effort to put more money into Iraq’s security forces, and then governance and the upcoming 2005 elections. At the same time, the White House was hoping to reorganize the reconstruction effort. National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 36 created the Iraq Reconstruction and Management Office (IRMO) and the Project and Contracting Office (PCO). The IRMO was to come up with strategy, while the PCO covered acquisition and management. All the new leaders and organizations were supposed to streamline reconstruction, and give new purpose to the endeavor. What ended up happening was that it added more bureaucracy, and a series of reviews, which only slowed and complicated the process.

A perfect example of the new difficulties was the effect of NSPD 36. The Iraq Reconstruction and Management Office (IRMO) and the Project and Contracting Office (PSO) were supposed to centralize control over reconstruction projects, which had often happened in an ad hoc manner under the CPA. Instead, the two new agencies created more, and often overlapping chains of command. The IRMO for instance, was run by the State Department, while the PCO was under the Pentagon. On top of that, there was already the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), both of which continued to be independent. The head of the PCO Charlie Hess reported to General Casey, the secretary of the Army, and Ambassador Negroponte. He didn’t think he had any responsibility to IRMO, and his organization didn’t get along with USAID. Instead of simplifying things, there were just more delays, infighting, and a fractured management system with officials having to report to a variety of different agencies, few of which shared the same priorities or visions of what was supposed to be happening in Iraq.

Those problems were amplified when three separate reviews were conducted of the reconstruction program in Iraq. First, Ambassador Negroponte called on the IRMO to go over all the existing rebuilding projects and plans, to come up with a new strategy that met his demand for increased security and stability. IRMO worked with USAID, PCO, and the military in the summer of 2004, and came up with new plans to reallocate money already in the pipeline to new projects. In the end, $3.46 billion was mostly taken from water and electricity projects, and moved to the security forces, economic development, democracy building, and preparations for elections. Congress approved this in September 2004. Then the State Department started its own independent review. PCO head Hess objected, because while the first review was going on, all work in Iraq was put on hold, while the companies were still being paid for their costs. Hess pushed for the new plans to be put into effect, rather than waste time and money on another assessment. His objections were ignored. That second review was not finished until December 2004. It recommended a further $457 mill be moved to electricity, and services, and away from water. State wasn’t done, because in the spring of 2005, it ordered a third review, which PCO Hess again complained about. That was finished in March, and suggested another $832 million be re-appropriated to services and maintenance. After all the reviews were finished, water and electricity projects were cut 49% and 21% respectively. The budget for water and sanitation was slashed from $4,247 million in June 2004 to $2,146 million in June 2005. That meant the cancellation of some major projects, and the curtailment of others. The security forces and justice system in comparison saw large increases of 55% and 47%, with the latter having its funds go from $3,235 million to $5,017 million. The change in emphasis of the reconstruction effort was needed with the insurgency taking off in Iraq. The number of reviews however was excessive, and led to huge delays. Companies were paid millions to stand idle for months until the U.S. was done with its evaluations. Ambassador Negroponte was hoping to fix some of the major problems that the U.S. had encountered with the CPA, because it was understaffed, lacked an overall strategy, and often mismanaged events. The new administration proved equally problematic, and hamstrung by an unwieldy bureaucracy.

Ambassador Negroponte and General Casey wanted dramatic changes in the U.S. effort in Iraq. They rightly pointed to security as being the overriding priority in the country. Without that, the government couldn’t function, the economy could not grow, elections might be undermined, and the average citizen could not live their life. They pushed for an immediate re-evaluation of reconstruction in Iraq. The problem was that this led to two more reviews by the State Department, and new organizations created by the White House just added to the number of agencies that projects had to go through before they were approved. The two new American leaders ended up being bogged down in many of the same issues that had beset Paul Bremer and the CPA. There might be a new vision for the future of Iraq, but it was going to take a long time to ever be implemented, and those delays were going to take a heavy toll on both Americans and Iraqis.

SOURCES

Burns, John, “If It’s Civil War, Do We Know It?” New York Times, 7/24/05

Klein, Joe, “Saddam’s Revenge,” Time, 9/26/05

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Hard Lessons,” 1/22/09

Understanding Iraq’s Syrian Policy

When talking about the relationship between Iraq and Syria, the conventional wisdom seems to be that Baghdad is backing Damascus at the behest of Iran. Syria has been one of Tehran’s closest allies in the region. It is therefore threatened by the possible fall of President Bashar al-Assad. Many also see Iraq as being under the influence of Iran now that the United States military is out of the country. This assumes that Iraq cannot act independently, and is basically a proxy of Tehran in the Middle East. This theory overlooks the security concerns of the Iraqi government, which is the driving force being its Syrian policy.

Iraq has passively supported the Syrian government, while criticizing it at the same time. Officially, Baghdad is neutral towards Damascus. Diplomatically, Iraq has called for a peaceful resolution to the conflict. At the end of August 2012 for instance, it suggested that the Non-Aligned Movement act as a middleman in negotiations between President Bashar al-Assad’s government and the opposition. Before that, it backed a United Nations-Arab League initiative led by former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan. Officially, Baghdad has also said that it wants democracy in Syria, but only through peaceful means. At the same time, Iraq has done nothing to push Assad to compromise with his opponents. In July, it rejected an Arab League resolution calling for him to step down. In February, it was against an Arab League proposal to arm the Syrian opposition. In December 2011, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki warned that if Assad were to fall, it would cause problems throughout the Middle East, and when the fighting first broke out, he called on the Syrian people to wait for their government to carry out reforms rather than use violence. On the other hand, Maliki has been critical of Assad. Baghdad has said that Damascus needed to give its people more freedoms, and an adviser to the premier called Assad a dictator. Overall, Iraq has given its implicit support to Syria. The Annan plan has proved to be a failure, and Maliki’s suggestion that the Non-Aligned Movement get involved is unlikely to go anywhere as well. Baghdad therefore has given off the impression that it wants to help the situation next door, but is basically allowing Assad to stay in power. This stance has led to accusations that Iraq is doing Iran’s bidding. Several Saudi papers have attacked Maliki as being an Iranian puppet for example. The driving force behind this policy however, is the foreign interference in the fighting, and the fear that it will spill over into Iraq.

Premier Maliki is afraid of what might happen if the Assad government were to fall in Syria (AP)

Iraq’s stance towards Syria is driven by security concerns. Baghdad is afraid that Sunni militants within the opposition will take over after the fall of Assad or at least be able to set up bases there, which will then be used to threaten Iraq. Former National Security Adviser to Prime Minister Maliki Mowfaq Rubaie for instance, said that civil war in Syria could give way to Islamists coming to power there. He stated that they could in turn fuel the insurgency in Iraq, and start a new civil war. Iraqi officials have also claimed that people from Anbar and Ninewa are heading to Syria to fight, that there were training camps in Anbar for Syrian fighters, and recruiting drives in the province. Deputy Interior Minister Adnan Asadi warned that weapons were being shipped to Syria to be used against the government, and that jihadists from foreign countries were heading there as well. Baghdad has also warned of Al Qaeda in Iraq taking advantage of the situation. U.S. officials have made similar claims. Those views have been bolstered by Al Qaeda in Iraq’s umbrella organization, the Islamic State of Iraq, calling for jihad in Syria, saying the fight there was a battle between Sunnis and Shiites. These concerns of the growing threat posed by the conflict in Syria seem to resonate amongst many in Iraq. There was a report on Radio Free Iraq for example, interviewing average Iraqis in Karbala who worried that Islamists were taking advantage of the situation next door, and how that would negatively affect them. The son of a leading cleric in Najaf also told the New York Times that his father was afraid of the fall of Assad, and how that would play out in Iraq. A representative of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani stated that he wanted Assad to stay in power, because of the possible negative consequences his removal might have on Iraq. Finally, the Sadr Movement has voiced similar concerns. To add to this, Iraq has accused countries like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey, who Baghdad believes are already trying to undermine Maliki’s government, of arming the Syrian opposition. The fighting in Syria is seen in sectarian terms in Iraq. Baghdad, the Sadr movement, elements of the Shiite clerical establishment, and the street have all voiced fears that if Assad were to go, Sunni militants would take over or at least be able to take advantage of the ensuing chaos to establish new bases. They would then turn their attention back to Iraq. The Islamist elements within the Syrian opposition appear to be rather small, but calls for jihad within and without Iraq to fight Shiites, and the foreign interference of countries, which have also opposed Baghdad, all play upon the country’s recent history. To many, it seems like a repeat of Iraq’s insurgency and civil war. Iraq is just pulling itself out of that chaos, and does not want to see it renewed, because of Syria. That is why Maliki is following his current policy, not because of any Iranian influence. If Tehran did not exist, many Iraqis would still feel threatened by the events occurring next door.

Iraq once saw Syria as a direct threat, because it supported the insurgency, but is now afraid of what might happen if Damascus were to fall to those same types of militants. From 2003-2010, Syria was the main conduit for foreign fighters to enter Iraq. The Assad government helped ferry them through the country, made contacts with Al Qaeda in Iraq, and gave them logistical support. In 2010, relations between the two improved, as U.S. troops began to leave Iraq, and the Assad and Maliki governments attempted to renew ties, and increase trade. When the Arab Spring hit Syria, and Damascus cracked down on it. Baghdad in turn, began criticizing the violence, while giving implicit support to Assad. As the fighting escalated, many elements within Iraq became more and more alarmed, as jihadists and neighboring countries began getting involved. Today, those groups see the Syrian fighting as a direct threat to stability in Iraq. They are afraid that if the Syrian government was to fall, the chaos would spill over, and there would be increased violence in Iraq. A lot of Iraqis see elements of their own civil war playing out in Syria, and want to protect themselves from it. That is the driving force behind Baghdad’s policy, far more than any influence Iran might have.

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iraq accuses some Arab states of helping fund terror,” 2/17/12

- “Iraq, Iran funding Syrian crackdown: former official,” 1/5/11

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AIN, “Syrian FM: Syria welcomes Iraqi proposal over Syrian crisis,” 8/31/12

Ali, Hussam, “Al-Qaeda trains militants in Nineveh for Syria, says security committee,” AK News, 3/17/12

Ali, Sara, “Shia forces are supporting Damascus and Sunni forces are supporting the opposition, says Kurdish Syrian opposition leader,” AK News, 4/23/12

Alsumaria News, “Governor of Anbar confirms possession of evidence of the entry of armed elements of the Mehdi Army to Syria,” 11/19/11

- “”Jihadists” and weapons from Iraq to Syria,” 2/12/12

Arango, Tim, “Syria’s Sectarian Fears Keep Region on Edge,” New York Times, 2/28/12

Arango, Tim and Adnan, Duraid, “For Iraqis, Aid to Rebels in Syria Repays a Debt,” New York Times, 2/13/12

Associated Press, “As Iraq hosts summit, Syria crisis puts it under pressure to choose between Iran, Arab ties,” 3/24/12

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Aswat al-Iraq, “Diplomats warns against Jihadists’ infiltration from Iraq into Syria,” 4/23/12

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Bayoumy, Yara, “Iraq Sunni tribes warn against arming Syrian opposition,” Reuters, 3/4/12

Blomfield, Adrian, “Syria: fall of Bashar al-Assad will bring war to Middle East, warns Iraq,” Telegraph, 12/4/11

Dagher, Sam, “Syria Chaos Pushes Iraqis Back Home,” Wall Street Journal, 2/17/12

Dickinson, Elizabeth, “Nervous Iraq keeps its eye on neighbouring Syria,” The National, 7/27/12

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Habib, Mustafa, “why iraq didn’t vote on syria: vested interests incapacitate foreign ministry,” Niqash, 11/17/11

Haddadi, Anissa, “Syria: Iraq’s Muqtada al-Sadr Reported Sending Fighters to Prop Up Assad Regime,” International Business Times, 11/23/11

International Crisis Group, “Déjà vu All Over Again? Iraq’s Escalating Political Crisis,” 7/30/12

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Issa, Sahar, “As Al Qaeda moves fight to Syria, violence in Iraq drops sharply,” McClatchy Newspapers, 2/21/12

Jakes, Lara and Yahya, Mazin, “Iraqis profit from Syrian arms smuggling,” Associated Press, 2/16/12

Kane, Sean, Abouaoun, Dr. Elie, “Baghdad’s Wary Support for the Syrian Status Quo,” United States Institute of Peace, 10/18/11

Khalat, Khidir, “Arms still smuggled into Syria from Sinjar,” National Iraqi News Agency, 2/25/12

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Kitabat, “Pumping Iraqi financial and travel agencies in Damascus and the interface for the recruitment of two articles to keep the lion,” 6/6/12

Landay, Jonathan, “U.S. officials: Al Qaida behind Syria bombings,” McClatchy Newspapers, 2/10/12

Al-Mada, “Official in Basra calling for the formation of an army of two million to support Assad,” 1/7/12

Miller, Elhanan, “Syrian Kurds ‘training in Iraq for the day after Assad,’” Times of Israel, 3/30/12

Miller, Greg, “Al-Qaeda infiltrating Syrian opposition, U.S. officials say,” Washington Post, 2/16/12

Murphy, Dan, “Deadly Iraq bombings and a reawakening insurgency,” Christian Science Monitor, 7/24/12

National Iraqi News Agency, “Dabbagh : The Iraqi government refuse the Arab League resolution calling on Assad to step down,” 7/23/12

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Sabri, Abdullah, “Maliki does not support arming Syrian opposition,” AK News, 3/30/12

Al-Salhy, Suadad, “Iraq insurgents reject sending arms, fighters to Syria,” Reuters, 2/22/12

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Schmidt, Michael and Ghazi, Yasir, “Iraq Calls for Change of Syrian Regime,” New York Times, 9/20/11

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Iraq’s Insurgents Have Grown Deadlier Since U.S. Withdrawal

Since the United States withdrew its military in December 2011, Iraq’s insurgents have grown bolder and deadlier. Press reports of large scale attacks in 2012 would seem to point to this turn of events, but the number of deaths and security incidents are largely unchanged from 2011 to 2012. It’s only upon closer examination of the number of casualties per attack and the fact that Shiite Special Groups have largely ceased their operations that the turn in security can be deciphered. This largely undermines hopes that the insurgency would be fading now that foreign forces are out of Iraq.

The aggregate numbers on security in Iraq show little change over the last fourteen months. According to the United Nations, there was a drop in attacks from the first half of 2011 to the second, but then they have held steady into 2012. In the first quarter of 2011 there was an average of 441 attacks per month. That went up to 524 in the second quarter, but then decreased to 354 and 322 in the last two quarters of the year. The number of security incidents then stayed relatively level at 289 in the first quarter of 2012 and 326 in the second. Deaths have plateaued as well. Using figures from the U.N. and Iraq Body Count, in the first quarter of 2011 there were an average of 292 casualties per month, 344 in the second, 392 in the third, and 343 in the fourth. That trend continued into 2012 with averages of 354 casualties in the 1^st quarter, and 342 in the next. Recent news stories of mass casualty attacks would seem to point to the security situation in Iraq worsening, but the statistics show that for the last twelve months there has been little change within the country. From the third quarter of 2011 to the second of 2012 attacks and deaths have almost flat-lined. That shows despite the headline grabbing attacks groups like Al Qaeda in Iraq are carrying out there are within the norm, and do not point towards increasing insecurity. A deeper analysis is needed to really understand what is currently going on however.

A break down of the daily attacks in Iraq, and an analysis of who is responsible for these incidents provides further insight into the security situation. When casualties per attack are analyzed it reveals that Iraq’s militants are growing deadlier. Using U.N. statistics, there was an average of 0.63 deaths per attack in the first quarter of 2011. That level was continued into the second quarter with an average of 0.64. Over the course of the next year however, those numbers nearly doubled. In the third quarter of 2011 there was an average of 1.21 deaths per incident, then 1.1 in the fourth, 1.19 in the first quarter of 2012, and 1.07 in the next. Those were higher than any quarterly counts since the start of 2008. It’s also important to note that a whole class of attacks has largely ceased in the country. Those are by Special Groups and Shiite militias. Before the U.S. withdrawal in December 2011, they were picking up their operations to try to cause as many American casualties as possible, so that the Shiite militants could claim that they were responsible for the U.S. leaving. Now, those parties may only be responsible for a few assassinations of their political opponents per month. That means insurgents have vastly increased the scope of their attacks since the monthly numbers have largely stayed the same from the end of 2011 into the first half of 2012. Both trends point to an increasingly efficient group of Sunni armed groups within the country.

The withdrawal of American forces from Iraq has not improved security. In fact, the country has become more dangerous since their departure. Al Qaeda in Iraq, the Baathist Naqshibandi, and other insurgent groups are now carrying out more operations, and killing more people in each attack. That undermines hopes that militants would be in decline after foreign forces were out of the country, and that reconciliation might be possible. Instead, Sunni militants have simply gone from targeting the Americans to the Iraqi security forces and government officials. Al Qaeda in Iraq and its umbrella organization the Islamic State of Iraq are ideologically driven and have a deep hatred of Shiites who they consider apostates. Baathists, seeing successive waves of arrests of alleged former regime members and the barring of candidates for ties to the party in recent elections see no reason to compromise either. Other insurgent groups also believe that the consolidation of power by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki means that Shiite parties have no reason to compromise with Sunni ones, and see Baghdad as being tools of Iran who has always been an existential enemy of Iraq. The continued political disputes since the 2010 parliamentary vote also means that the ruling elites are more concerned with their personal struggles over power than the security situation. Iraq’s security forces are no longer carrying out counterinsurgency operations like they did when they were cooperating with the Americans. All together that means there will be no respite in attacks and casualties. At the same time, it is very important to note that violence in Iraq is nothing like what it was before during the sectarian civil war. Despite the deadlier attacks, those are concentrated in specific areas, and target certain groups. For Iraqis in southern and northern Iraq for instance, bombings and shootings are very rare. Even in Baghdad, areas away from government buildings, checkpoints, and Shiite shrines are largely quiet. This all points to the complicated security situation that exists in Iraq, which daily reporting on attacks and monthly statistics on casualties cannot capture.

SOURCES

Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit, “Security in Iraq”

Iraq Body Count

Casualties In Iraq Drop In August 2012, But Insurgent Summer Offensive Still On-Going

Violence in Iraq goes through ebbs and flows. August 2012 was an example of that. Despite the insurgency’s on going summer offensive, casualties dropped last month. They were on average, higher than before the season began, and there is still probably one or two more months of escalated deaths before they go down.

Both Iraq Body Count and Iraq’s government recorded drops in deaths in August 2012. Iraq Body Count had 393 casualties last month, compared to 436 the month before, and 490 in June. Iraq’s ministries reported 164 deaths in August. That was down from 325 in July, and 131 in June. July was a rare month when Baghdad’s figures were in line with Iraq Body Count. Since the end of 2010, the government’s statistics have consistently been far lower than any other organization tracking violence in the country. That’s probably due to political interference. For August, Iraq’s Health, Interior, and Defense Ministries reverted back to their low counts. Government and Iraq Body Count figures averaged out to 8.9 deaths per day in August, down from 12.2 in July, and 10.3 in June. The dip in August was still above the months before the summer started when insurgents started their latest offensive. In May for instance, there was only an average of 5.6 casualties per day, 7.2 in April, and 6.9 in March. In 2011, deaths were up from June to October. That means there are still a few more months until casualties in Iraq go down.

Deaths In Iraq 2011-2012

Month	Iraq Body Count	Iraqi Ministries	Avg. Monthly Deaths	Avg. Daily Deaths
Jan. 2011	387	259	323	10.4
Feb.	250	167	208	7.4
Mar.	307	247	277	8.9
Apr.	285	211	248	8.0
May	378	177	277	8.9
Jun.	385	271	328	10.9
Jul.	305	259	282	9.0
Aug.	398	239	318	10.2
Sep.	394	185	289	9.6
Oct.	355	258	306	9.8
Nov.	272	187	229	7.6
Dec.	371	155	263	8.4
2011 Mo. Avg.	340	217	279	9.0
Jan. 2012	479	151	315	10.1
Feb.	304	150	227	8.1
Mar.	320	112	216	6.9
Apr.	309	126	217	7.2
May	220	132	176	5.6
Jun.	490	131	310	10.3
Jul.	436	325	380	12.2
Aug.	393	164	278	8.9

Every year since 2003, Iraq’s insurgency has carried out a summer offensive. Originally, it was aimed at coinciding with Ramadan. Now it begins anytime from March to June when the temperature starts rising, and continues until the end of the season. The press never seems to catch onto this trend, and regularly reports that security is deteriorating, and begins speculating that Iraq may be falling into another civil war when deaths and attacks pick up. This year has been no exception, especially in June and July when casualties took a dramatic jump. That combined with the removal of U.S. troops and the on-going political crisis gives Iraq the air of a country falling into chaos. Instead, it is simply following its yearly pattern. When the summer is over, and casualties go down, the coverage on Iraq will change, only to be repeated again the next year when insurgents go after Shiite pilgrims in January, and then start another campaign in the summer.

SOURCES

Iraq Body Count

Reuters, “Iraq’s monthly death toll halves in August,” 9/1/12

EURONEWS VIDEO: Iraq's Monthly Death Toll Halves In August 2012

Iraq's monthly death toll halves in August by euronews-en

Western Style Fast Food Businesses Take Off In Iraq's Baghdad

Lee's Famous Recipe Chicken in Baghdad (AP)

Inside Lee's (AP)

Burger Friends (AP)

Pizza Pizza (AP)

Servers inside Lee's dishing out food (AP)