Opposition Party Demands Dissolution Of Iraq’s Kurdish Regional Government

The events in Tunisia and Egypt have not just been felt in the streets of Iraq, but in the seat of government in Kurdistan as well. At the end of January 2011, the opposition Change List demanded that the Kurdish parliament be dissolved, and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) be reformed. KRG President Massoud Barzani immediately rejected the Change List’s demands. Then in mid-February there was a large demonstration in Sulaymaniya that led to Kurdish guards to fire into the crowd, and then the Change List’s headquarters were set on fire, increasing tensions between the different factions in the region.







On February 17, a large demonstration was held outside the headquarters of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in Sulaymaniya. Hundreds participated, demanding reforms in the KRG. When they got to the KDP building, they began throwing stones, which led to guards firing into the crowd, killing two, and wounding 47 others. In retaliation, later that day the headquarters of the opposition Change List in Irbil had rocks thrown at it and was then set on fire, along with its offices in Dohuk. The ruling KDP and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) are considering this a major challenge to their rule and are calling emergency meetings to discuss the situation.

These violent acts began over calls by the Change List for the Kurdish government to step down. On January 29, the Change List issued a statement calling for the Kurdish parliament to be dissolved, new elections in three months, and a series of reforms in the region. It said, “We are witnessing the fall of dictators and totalitarian states … but officials in the Kurdistan region have not taken any real steps towards the democratization of the ruling regime.” Its list of demands included transparent voting, for the ruling parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), to separate themselves from the bureaucracy, to provide services and economic development, that the peshmerga and intelligence services stay out of politics, and that the PUK and KDP should leave government owned property. These were all similar to demands that the Change List has been making since it was formed in late 2008 by former PUK co-founder Nishurwan Mustafa. It ran on the same issues in the Kurdish parliamentary elections in 2009 and won 25 out of 111 seats.

The PUK and KDP were swift to respond to this challenge to their authority. On January 30, KRG President Barzani held a meeting with all the political parties in Kurdistan, but not the Change List. All of them, with the exception of the Kurdistan Islamic Group, came out with a statement rejecting Change’s demands. They then placed armored vehicles outside of the Premier Barham Saleh’s offices, and other government buildings in Sulaymaniya City. The Peshmerga Minister said that his forces were on full alert, and warned that Change was attempting to foment anarchy and destabilize the region. The PUK and KDP then told the opposition if it wanted change, it needed to reform itself by exiting all government owned property. At the same time, the Kurdish Prime Minister released remarks trying to be a little conciliatory by saying that the ruling parties had made mistakes, and that they had started reforms to address them.

Divisions in Kurdistan have increased because of the Change List’s demands. What started as a largely political war of words between the PUK, KDP, and Change List, quickly escalated into a violent protest, and an act of vandalism. Change does have legitimate concerns. The PUK and KDP have been in power since 1991 after the Gulf War. They have direct control of the bureaucracy, have monopolized power, demanded a cut of business deals made in the region, arrested political opponents, tried to limit criticism of themselves, etc. Change has been trying to work within the system, becoming part of the new parliament, but does not have much to show for itself. It took the opportunity created by the events in the rest of the region to make a dramatic statement against the ruling parties. It doesn’t have the power or popular support to do much more, but the situation could be taking on a life of its own with the events in Sulaymaniya and Irbil.

SOURCES

Abubakir, Idris, “Islamic Group leader refutes confiscating govt. premises,” AK News, 2/2/11

Ahmad, Zanko, “tanks in sulaymaniyah: “we are not the same as egypt or tunisia,”” Niqash, 2/7/11

Amnesty International, “Hope and Fear, Human rights in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq,” April 2009

Aswat al-Iraq, “Iraqi Kurdistan’s opposition movement calls for fighting corruption,” 2/7/11
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Clark, Kate, “Corruption in Iraqi Kurdistan,” BBC News, 1/11/08

Hennessy-Fiske, Molly, “IRAQ: At least two protesters dead,” Babylon & Beyond, Los Angeles Times, 2/17/11

Al Jazeera, "Fresh protests hit Iraqi cities," 2/18/11

Khabat, Fryad, “Opposition headquarters set on fire in Erbil,” AK News, 2/17/11

Mackinnon, Mark, “Corruption: The Dark Underbelly of Kurdistan’s Dream,” Globe And Mail, 3/12/07

Mahmood, Azeez and Mahmood, Rebaz, “Talabani Supporters Rally Over Media Controversy,” Institute For War & Peace Reporting, 4/4/08

Nawzad, Khabat, “Kurdish deputies called back home for emergency in Sulaimaniya,” AK News, 2/18/11

Ose, Oshnag, “talabani battles new calls for reform,” Niqash, 3/4/09

Saifaddin, Dilshad, “Goran firm on call to abolish Kurdish parliament refuses to apologize,” AK News, 2/7/11

Samuels, Lennox, “The Myth of Kurdistan,” Newsweek, 3/23/09

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Iraq’s Parliament Takes Longer To Name Leadership Than Form Cabinet

Iraq’s new parliament is supposed to consist of 26 committees this time, up from 24 from the old one. By January 2011, the membership of most of these committees was decided upon, but so far only four chairmen have been named.

By January 17, the membership of all the 26 committees were agreed upon. The most powerful committees corresponded with the most important issues facing the country, such as foreign affairs, security, legal affairs, finance, and oil. Like the rest of the new government, the different legislative bodies were divided up according to the size of the winning lists. The security and defense committee for example, has three members from Maliki’s State of Law, one from Fadhila, one from the Sadr Trend, all of which are part of the Iraqi National Coalition, and three lawmakers from Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National Movement.

The leadership of those committees is still on hold however. Originally, lawmakers said that naming the committee heads would be delayed because of the hold up over forming the new cabinet. Parliamentarians didn’t want a list to control a ministry as well as the committee supposed to oversee it. On December 21, 2010 however, most of the ministers were named, but as of February 2011 only four chairmen have been appointed. Those are Khaled Shwani of the Kurdish Coalition for the head of the legal committee, Adnan Janabi of the Iraqi National Movement for the oil committee, Saeed Rasoul Khoshnaw also of the Kurdish Coalition for youth and sports, and a member of the Iraqi National Coalition for finance. There’s no timeline for when the rest of the chairmen are supposed to be appointed, but the rough outline of what list will get what positions has been decided.

The same divisions that dragged out the formation of the ruling coalition, are at work in the assembly. There are still four open cabinet positions, and 22 chairmanships. It’s still weeks, and perhaps months before all those posts will be filled since almost every winning list has been included in the new government, and none of them can agree upon much of anything. There is deep distrust between Allawi and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, and many parties have a zero-sum view where any gain by another is seen as a loss for themselves. Eventually the ministers and committees will be finished, but the amount of time wasted to accomplish that will be a loss for the country as little is moving forward until then.

SOURCES

Abdul-Rahman, Mohammed, “KBC allocated second parliamentary committee,” AK News, 2/2/11

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A Closer Look At Adnan Janabi, The New Head Of Iraq’s Oil Committee

Adnan Janabi meeting with Pres. Talabani in 2009 (Iraqi National News Agency)

On February 10, 2011 Adnan Abdul-Munim Rashid Janabi was named the head of the oil committee in the new Iraqi parliament. Janabi received his chairmanship as part of a deal between his Iraqi National Movement and the Kurdish Coalition who received control of the legal committee in return. This was actually the second time that Janabi held this position, as he was a Baathist, and leading petroleum official in Saddam Hussein’s government.

Adnan Janabi’s family is the head of the Janabi tribe in Babil. The Janabis were favored by Saddam, who turned towards tribes for support and internal security during the Iran-Iraq War and again after the Gulf War. Adnan was actually an urban technocrat, who had little say in his tribe’s affairs.

Janabi was western educated, and rose up the Baathist ranks under Saddam. He went to school in England, where he received a degree in economics. In the 1970s he became the head of marketing at the Oil Ministry, and then the head of its foreign relations in the 1980s. He became the Iraqi representative to OPEC in their Vienna offices as a result. In 1996 he was elected to the Iraqi parliament, where he was appointed the head of the oil committee for the first time. During that period he also received oil vouchers from Saddam, which was a means for the regime to break United Nations sanctions and restrictions on their oil sales. With the vouchers, Janabi and others could receive oil at discounted prices, and then resell it for a profit. 

After the 2003 invasion, Janabi became part of Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National List. In 2004 Janabi was named Minister of State in Allawi’s interim government. The next year he was named to the deputy head of the committee drafting the new Iraqi constitution, and helped include more Sunnis in that body. At the end of 2005, he was a candidate for the Iraqi Nationalist List, and ran Allawi’s election campaign where he was accused of attempting to bribe reporters. Janabi, along with 90 others, was then banned by the deBaathification Commission. The deBaathification law said that officials could be barred for enriching themselves under Saddam, which Janabi did by receiving the oil vouchers. He was then cleared.

A similar series of events happened to him in 2010. Again, he ran as part of an Allawi led list, the Iraqi National Movement, and again he was barred by the Accountability and Justice Commission that replaced the deBaathification Commission. He was still on the ballot however, and received just over 6,000 votes in Baghdad. Afterward, Janabi was cleared, barred again, and then cleared once more for his Baathist past. That led to the confirmation of his election to office, and his eventual return to the powerful oil committee.

Adnan Janabi has had a charmed life. He rose through the ranks of Saddam’s Iraq, and spent nearly thirty years in the oil industry, both with the Oil Ministry and the oil committee in parliament. The fall of the former regime, was not as much of a setback as one would expect for an ex-Baathist. By joining Allawi’s Iraqi National List, he was able to gain new prominent positions, such as being the deputy head of the constitutional committee. Even when he was twice targeted for his Baathist past in 2005 and 2010, he was able to be cleared due to his close connections to Allawi. He is now back to being the head of the oil committee fifteen years after his first stay as chairman. Rather than being a sign of redemption or political reconciliation in the new Iraq, Janabi represents the political compromises and backroom deals between the country’s powerful elite that really characterize the country today.

SOURCES

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SOURCE: Al-Sabah Al-Jihad 2/14/11 via MEMRI Blog