Review The U.S. Army In The Iraq War Volume 2, Surge And Withdrawal 2007-2011

Rayburn, Colonel Joel, Sobchak, Colonel Frank, Editors, The U.S. Army In The Iraq War Volume 2, Surge And Withdrawal 2007-2011, Strategic Studies institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2019

 

The second volume of the U.S. Army’s official history of the Iraq War covers the Surge of 2007 to the Americans returning to Iraq after the fall of Mosul in 2014. Three things stand out. First was how dysfunctional the Bush administration was when it rolled out its new strategy in 2007. The second is the details provided on how Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki hallowed out the Iraqi Security Forces so he could take control of them which helped lead to the resurgence of the insurgency. Last, it touches on how paranoid Maliki was. The sheer length of the book at over 600 pages and its density makes it one for Iraq researchers more than the general public.

 

In January 2007 President Bush announced he was changing strategy in Iraq with a surge of American forces. This was a turning point in the war as the U.S. finally came up with an approach that worked against the insurgency. The book details the problems that remained in Washington however. First, by mid-2006 the White House finally realized that Iraq was not going well and wanted to change direction but it took 6 months to finally decide on a new course. Then when Bush chose to increase the number of troops it was initially not laid out in detail allowing various officials and officers to make their own interpretations of what the president wanted. For instance, the U.S. commander in Iraq General George Casey continued with his withdrawal policy which was the opposite of what Bush wanted. The general’s ground forces commander General Ray Odierno on the other hand was already moving towards raising the number of U.S. forces in Baghdad which was more in line with what the president had in mind. Finally, there was an almost two month gap between when the Surge was announced and when the new Iraq commander General David Petraeus arrived in country leading to more differences. Dysfunction had been a trademark of the Bush administration from the moment it started planning for the Iraq invasion. The Surge is generally considered the moment that changed but even then it took time to get things rolling and the divisions and lack of unity of effort continued.

 

The second major point of Volume 2 was how Prime Minister Maliki undermined the Iraqi forces (ISF) which helped lead to their collapse in 2014. Maliki disrupted the chain of command by using his office of commander in chief to give orders directly to units. He also created regional commands which gave him more control over the army and police. Next, he replaced all but two of the army division commanders with Shiite loyalists many of which were not qualified for their positions. He also took direct control of the intelligence service and specific units. The result was a politicized force that was not ready to take on the insurgency which re-emerged in part due to decisions by Maliki which are also covered in the book. When the Islamic State attacked Mosul in 2014 the ISF would collapse and lose roughly one third of its forces and become largely combat ineffective.

 

The authors give some examples of how paranoid Maliki was while in office. For instance, he believed a major reason why the U.S. military was in Iraq was to protect his government. He then thought the sahwa movement which started in 2007 where tribes and former insurgents started working with the Americans against the Islamic State was a plot by the U.S. and Baathists to overthrow him. Finally, when the U.S. departed in 2011 he felt that without American support the Baathists would launch a coup. Maliki came of age while in exile where he constantly had to maneuver between rival opposition groups, foreign countries and Saddam’s security services. That led him to believe there were constant conspiracies which shaped his worldview while he was premier. He comes off as an isolated figure who couldn’t tell friend from foe as shown by the fact that he viewed the U.S. as trying to protect him while moving to get rid of him at the same time.

 

There is lots of interesting information included in The U.S. Army in The Iraq War Volume 2. It is far better than the first volume which largely went over well-known stories about the start of the U.S. occupation of Iraq. There is a lot more on the dysfunction in Washington for example and the move towards autocracy by PM Maliki in this book. The size of Volume 2 however is daunting and may put off a lot of casual readers. That leaves it largely in the realm of experts and researchers who are interested in the details of history of this period of U.S. involvement in Iraq.

 

Link to all of Musings On Iraq’s book reviews listed by topic