Chapter 6 of the U.S. Army’s second volume on the Iraq War is about the ups and downs during the heart of the Surge in the mid to late-2007. Continued U.S. operations were degrading the insurgency leading to a dramatic drop in violence. Part of that success was due to the continued expansion of the Sunni Sahwa which the government rejected. On the other hand PM Maliki’s administration remained plagued by problems while still relying upon militias. In the middle of all that the Iraqi ruling parties continued their machinations against each other.
The second half of 2007 saw the U.S. military on the offensive. In August Operation Phantom Strike was aimed at central Diyala. Operation Lightning Hammer and Iron Hammer began the next month seeking to clear the mountains between Diyala and Salahaddin as well as central Salahaddin and southern Kirkuk. There were continued operations in the outer Baghdad districts as well which were insurgent strongholds. This was supported by a continued expansion of the Sahwa program where tribes and insurgents agreed to fight the Islamic State of Iraq in return for U.S. support. All of this was aimed at cutting off the insurgent bases that fed men and material into Baghdad which was considered the center of the war to secure Iraq.
This all put the Islamic State of Iraq on the defensive. When Ramadan came around for instance the group could barely carry out any operations. In September ISI’s foreign fighter commander was killed while raids and other deaths disrupted the flow of men into Iraq. The situation was so bad that Osama bin Laden issued a recording in October calling for all Islamists to unify into one group to continue the fight. This was an acknowledgement that many insurgent groups had turned on ISI. He even called for reconciliation with the Sahwa to try to win them back.
The numbers show how much the insurgency had fallen off by the end of the year. In June there were an average of 58 insurgent attacks per day. By November there were only 27 per day. On November 3 there was no reported violence in Baghdad the deadliest province in the nation. On December 7 there were only 13 attacks in all of Iraq.
Ironically the Maliki government was unwilling to give the United States any credit for the changes in the country. At the end of the year for instance, the Americans met with Iraqi officials to discuss a renewing of the U.N. Security Council authorizing the Coalition presence. Maliki and his Dawa advisors complained about the U.S. forces and wanted to place restrictions upon them because they were seen as interfering in Iraqi affairs rather than helping with security.
Parallel to that Prime Minister Maliki continued to reject the Sahwa. As part of that he announced a freeze on integrating the fighters into the government as he had promised. After U.S. lobbying the premier agreed again to take in all the fighters. This troubled General David Petraeus who saw accepting the Sahwa as a crucial part of reconciliation. That would never happen.
Not only that but Baghdad was full of conspiracy theories about the Sunnis. In November the director of the PM’s commander in chief office told Maliki that the Americans and the Sahwa were planning to overthrow him. Maliki and his inner circle were constantly worrying about plots against them. This complicated relations because the PM believed that the U.S. was there to protect his regime but then constantly thought they were going to get rid of him as well.
There were other problems between Washington and Baghdad. For one the U.S. wanted to double the size of the Iraqi Security Forces. 600,000 ISF were believed to be needed to keep units at adequate staffing to carry out their duties. The Bush administration however did not want to fund the effort.
American red tape was also holding up the sale of U.S. equipment to Iraq. It took extended time to get any military supplies to Baghdad. That led Iraq to go elsewhere such as Serbia, Ukraine and China. That meant Iraq ended up with a mix of equipment that complicated an already dysfunctional logistics and maintenance systems.
Baghdad had its own set of issues. A U.S. review of the Interior Ministry found different political parties were trying to control it and the police and American advisors were doing nothing about it. Badr for instance controlled much of the ministry and was using it to carry out sectarian attacks against Sunnis. There was also widespread corruption. The review recommended huge pressure be brought upon Interior to carry out reforms. Some of that worked as the National Police considered one of the most sectarian units had most of its top commanders removed. On the other hand the bigger issues were never dealt with due to Iraqi objections.
During this time Moqtada al-Sadr’s ceasefire was holding with his Mahdi Army which had greatly reduced sectarian violence. In October Sadr returned to Iraq from Iran to try to bring order to his movement but he left in a month. One militia leader told the Americans that Sadr constantly changed his mind which angered his followers. He believed that Sadr was unorganized and incompetent. He didn’t take advice, often acted on impulse and became more dictatorial shunning his lieutenants. This would lead to his militia to fracture during this period.
One breakaway group was Asaib Ahl Al-Haq (AAH). Maliki courted them as a counter to Sadr. Moqtada had been instrumental in putting the PM in office in 2006 but by the end of 2007 Maliki was feeling more confident and wanted to drop his former backer. As part of that move Maliki asked the Americans to release AAH members and remove members from targeting lists. The hope was that AAH would cut into Sadr’s support since he had the only mass movement in the country giving Maliki more leeway to form a ruling coalition after the next election that he would have control of.
The premier continued to centralize power as well. Maliki created regional commands in Basra, Diyala, Ninewa and the mid-Euphrates which he used to control ISF units outside of the Defense and Interior Ministries chain of command. He also used his office of commander in chief to do the same. At first, the Americans supported these moves believing that the PM was being more assertive and taking on a leadership role. It was only later that they realized Maliki wanted to be an autocrat and would use the security forces against his political rivals.
The other ruling parties were much quicker to pick up on Maliki’s moves. The Sunni Iraqi Accordance Front boycotted the cabinet over Maliki not including them in decisions and he tried to block them from returning accusing its leaders of working with the insurgency which was actually true. At the end of the year the Kurdistan Democratic Party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq began talk about a no confidence vote against the PM. They accused Maliki of having a conspiratorial mind which he did and only relying upon his inner circle instead of the cabinet which included all the major groups. Leaders even asked Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to help them get rid of Maliki. She turned them down because Washington was afraid it would take months to find a replacement right in the middle of the Surge. The attempts against the prime minister would continue for years and fail due to disunity amongst the lists and Iranian influence. Maliki wouldn’t step down until 2014 after he was humiliated by the fall of Mosul to the insurgency.
SOURCES
Rayburn, Colonel Joel, Sobchak, Colonel Frank, Editors, The U.S. Army In The Iraq War Volume 2, Surge And Withdrawal 2007-2011, Strategic Studies institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2019
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