Maliki Hits The Campaign Trail

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is riding high off of his recent government offensives against insurgents and Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army. The crackdowns have given him a nationalist image that he lacked before as he has taken on both Sunni and Shiite groups. This is a huge turnaround for Maliki who was facing a no confidence vote in parliament in late-2007. Now the prime minister is facing another challenge, the provincial elections.

While Maliki currently has the highest popularity ratings of his term in office, he lacks a strong party to build upon these successes. His Dawa party split in two in June 2008 when former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari created the National Reform Party. Dawa was already the smallest of the three major Shiite factions, the Sadrists and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) being the other two. Dawa was one of many exile groups that returned to Iraq after the invasion, and found itself with little popular support. After Jaafari’s defection, Maliki is looking at an even smaller following. He is now doing what he can to build up a base.

The latest effort is to hand out cash to the public. Wherever Maliki goes, he and his aides pass out money. According to the Associated Press, Maliki can give up to $8,000 to an individual, but only one time. Mostly the amounts are much smaller at around $200-$400 at a time, which is still huge to most Iraqis who are struggling with wages, joblessness, and a recent spike in prices. The government claims that these handouts are part of the government’s plans to boost the economy, but they are too small and haphazard, not to mention it would be a joke if they thought such an effort would have any real effect. It is much more likely that these payouts are a way to get publicity, especially word of mouth, about the generosity of the Prime Minister in an election period.

Maliki is also trying to take away some of Sadr’s Shiite followers. The government has set up local neighborhood security units in Sadr City, similar to the U.S.-supported Sons of Iraq. This could sway some militiamen to Maliki’s side. The Iraqi Army is also handing out food and supplies to residents of Sadr City three to five times a week. While this isn’t the $100 million that the Prime Minister has promised, it is something for an area that is widely considered one of the poorest in the capitol. Finally, as reported earlier, Maliki is also trying to usurp Sadr’s anti-American stance by demanding a timetable for U.S. troops to withdraw in the U.S.-Iraqi security negotiations. Forcing America out of Iraq has been one of the main goals of Sadr.

It is still to be seen whether these tactics will work for Maliki. The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council for one, has much more of a machine behind it, and has gained in the south after the security crackdowns on the Mahdi Army. Sadr is down, but not out as well. This inter-Shiite battle for supremacy is one of the major issues that will play out in the elections. How Maliki does will be a sign of whether he really has been able to fashion himself into a nationalist leader, or if force was the only weapon the Prime Minister had in his arsenal.

SOURCES

Associated Press, “Six parliamentary factions to coordinate efforts in Iraqi parliament, lawmakers say,” 6/8/08

Biddle, Stephen, Nasr, Vali, Nash, William, “Political and Security Developments in Iraq and the Region,” Council on Foreign Relations, 6/12/08

Bruce, Andrea, “Desperate for Army Aid in Baghdad,” Washington Post, 7/14/08

Buzbee, Sally and Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Iraq handing out cash to people on the streets,” Associated Press, 7/12/08

Fadel, Leila and al Dulaimy, Mohammed, “Fighting resumes in Baghdad; rockets kill three Americans,” McClatchy Newspapers, 4/6/08

Glanz, James and Farrell, Stephen, “Crackdown on Militias Raises Stability Concerns,” New York Times, 4/8/08

Mohsen, Amer, “Iraq Papers Mon: Australian Troops to Depart,” IraqSlogger.com, 6/1/08

O’Hanlon, Michael and Pollack, Kenneth, “Iraq: One Year Later,” Brookings Institution, 6/13/08

Sadr Struggles To Remain Relevant

Since March 2008 Moqtada al-Sadr has faced a series of government crackdowns and mass arrests of his followers. His top officials are being assassinated by rival Shiites. His often unclear and contradictory leadership style reported on earlier has also cost him support. Sadr’s new plan is to try to focus upon politics, specifically the negotiations between the U.S. and Iraq for a security agreement. Since May, Sadr has been calling for protests against the negotiations every week after prayers. He also said that any deal needs to be put before the public for a national referendum. This follows Sadr’s long-time anti-American stance. There have been arguments about just how many people show up, whether it is in the hundreds or thousands, but they have been continuing. The problem is that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s increasing calls for a timetable for a U.S. withdrawal are undermining Sadr’s position. This is just another sign that it will be an uphill battle for Sadr to keep his movement together.

Shiites no longer need the protection of the Mahdi Army anymore with the end of the sectarian war. The government is intent on breaking Sadr’s hold on neighborhoods throughout southern and central Iraq. Maliki is also out to undercut the Sadrists’ opposition to the United States with his hard-line stance in negotiations with Washington. This is all part of the inter-Shiite battle for power before the upcoming provincial elections. Sadr use to be one of the most powerful Shiite leaders in the country, who was expected to gain power after the voting, but now he is quickly losing support. Maliki is now trying to mold himself into the nationalist leader of the country, a position Sadr tried to stake himself as. After securing several cities in Iraq, he now needs to build up his own base and rebuild his Dawa party that recently split in two. So far, he has outplayed Sadr in both the military, and political fields, but what happens in the elections is still up for grabs.

SOURCES

Al Alam News, “Sadrists Protest US-Iraqi Security Deal,” 6/20/08

Ali, Fadhil, “The Mahdi Army: New Tactics for a New Stage,” Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, 6/26/08

Salaheddin, Sinan, “Hundreds of Shiites protest US-Iraqi security deal,” Associated Press, 6/20/08

Bruce, Andrea, “Desperate for Army Aid in Baghdad,” Washington Post, 7/14/08

Fadhil, Omar, “Iraq’s political parties wrangle over the status of forces agreement,” Long War Journal.org, 6/17/08

Al Jazeera, “Iraqis condemn US defense pact plan,” 6/7/08

Missing Links Blog, “Backtracking,” 7/9/08

Mohsen, Amer, “Iraq Papers Mon: Australian Troops to Depart,” IraqSlogger.com, 6/1/08

Monsters & Critics, “Al-Sadr calls for protests against US security deal,” 5/27/08

Murphy, Brian and Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “’Martyrs’ List’ tallies Mahdi Army troubles,” Associated Press, 7/29/08

Oppel, Richard and Farrell, Stephen, “Growing Opposition to Iraq Security Pact,” New York Times, 5/31/08

Raghavan, Sudarsan, “Followers of al-Sadr protest U.S. presence,” San Francisco Chronicle, 5/31/08

Roggio, Bill, “Sadr forms new unit to attack US forces,” Long War Journal.org, 6/13/08

Tavernise, Sabrina, “Shiite Militia in Baghdad Sees Its Power Ebb,” New York Times, 7/27/08

Only Sunni Displaced Welcomed in Baghdad’s Dora District?

It was reported earlier that Dora in south Baghdad was one area that had received a number of Iraqi refugees coming back to their homes. In June 2008, 150 families moved back to that neighborhood. The local Sons of Iraq unit helped coordinate the return. IraqSlogger.com reported that yesterday, August 4, flyers were posted throughout the neighborhood warning Shiite families not to come back to Dora. The area was historically a middle to upper class Sunni one with many Baath party members, and army officers. During the sectarian war of 2006-2007, the locals felt threatened by neighboring Shiite Mahdi Army units, and called in Al Qaeda in Iraq and other insurgents to help defend Dora. Up to 50% of the families fled the area as a result of the intense fighting. The anti-Shiite flyers highlight one of the major problems Iraqi refugees face, many of their neighborhoods have been ethnically cleansed and are now controlled by one sects’ armed group. While security is much improved in Dora, the area is now more Sunni than previously. The flyers point to some in Dora that want to keep it that way.

Dora is an example of the dual problems of returning refugees while dealing with sectarian divisions that will be especially difficult in places such as Baghdad. The capitol has accounted for more than half the country’s displaced creating many new, largely homogenous neighborhoods in the process. The central government should be the natural arbitrator of such disputes, but they are largely absent from Dora, and are still biased. That will leave U.S. forces as the de facto sovereign in the area and many others. This is a major impediment to U.S. counterinsurgency policy, which is supposed to build up the authority and standing of the Iraqi government. It also points out holes in the Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s newly announced refugee policy. It only deals with providing money for people to go home and to remove squatters. The causes of the displacement, such as sectarianism, and the re-integration of the displaced are not addressed.

SOURCES

IraqSlogger.com, “Flyers Threaten Dora’s Displaced Shi’a,” 8/4/08

Pepper, Daniel, “Rebuilding a Baghdad Neighborhood,” Time, 1/14/08

Shishkin, Philip, “In Baghdad Neighborhood, A Tale of Shifting Fortunes,” Wall Street Journal, 10/31/07

Monthly Media Coverage of Iraq From July 7 to August 3, 2008

Iraq continues to fade from the headlines of America’s media. The only time the war seems to get much coverage across the media spectrum is when it is brought up by one of the candidates for the president of the United States. The Project for Excellence in Journalism’s (PEJ) weekly media watch shows that Iraq only broke the top 10 stories in the United States one week, from July 14-20. That week the conflict was the number 10 story in America’s newspapers, magazines, television, radio, and internet coverage. Two factors led to the increased coverage, one 13% of the campaign stories that week were about Obama’s position on Iraq, and two, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki told a German magazine that he supported Obama’s position of a withdrawal of American forces. Even then, Iraq was only 2% of the press’ stories. Newspapers continue to have the most coverage of the war, but in the other media outlets it is quickly disappearing.

SOURCES

Project for Excellence in Journalism, “PEJ Campaign Coverage Index: July 7-13, 2008: Gaffes Drove The Campaign Narrative Last Week,” 7/11/08
- “PEJ Campaign Coverage Index: July 14-20, 2008: War Takes Center Stage as Obama (and Media) Moves Overseas,” 7/21/08
- “PEJ Campaign Coverage Index: Amid Charges of Bias, the Media Swarm on Obama Overseas: July 21-27, 2008,” 7/30/08
Project for Excellence in Journalism, “Extra! Extra! McCain Makes as Much News as Obama: July 28-August 3, 2008,” 8/5/08

Missed Deadlines

Last week saw two important deadlines pass with no deals made. First, July 31 was the day set by the White House for when it wanted security and diplomatic agreements signed with Iraq. Despite several reports that the two sides were coming closer, the 31st passed with little fanfare. The U.S. and Iraq are still working on the details over Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s call for a timetable for the withdrawal of American combat troops. Second, Sunday August 3 a special session of parliament was suppose to be held to vote on the controversial provincial elections law, which is being held up over different opinions about how to deal with Kirkuk. The vote didn’t happen, and now there is talk that another one is scheduled for Tuesday, August 5. There still appears to be no agreement between the different parties on how to deal with the disputed region, this despite pressure from U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker and President Bush. A sign that no deal is imminent might be seen in the fact that President Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, left Iraq for a medical appointment in the United States, and Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi, the leader of the Sunni Islamic Party, is in Turkey after having surgery. They, along with Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi of the Shiite Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, are part of the Presidential Council that any bill must pass through to go into affect. When the original election law was passed by parliament in July, it was President Talabani and Vice President Mahdi that vetoed it, sending it back to the legislature where it now stands. Any delay will only aid the parties that are currently in power as they face challenges from a large number of newly established groups that will run in the elections. No breakthroughs appear imminent in either set of negotiations.

SOURCES

Fadel, Leila, and Issa, Sahar, “Battle over oil-rich city threatens to derail Iraqi elections,” McClatchy Newspapers, 8/3/08

Missing Links Blog, “Monday news roundup,” 8/4/08

Parker, Ned and Ahmed, Caesar, “Iraq lawmakers again fail to approve election law,” Los Angeles Times, 8/4/08

Raghavan, Sudarsan and Mizher, Qais, “Elections Bill in Iraq Stalls On Kirkuk,” Washington Post, 8/4/08

Robertson, Campbell and Al-Salhy, Suadad, “Iraqis fail to Agree on Provincial Elecitons,” New York Times, 8/4/08

Rubin, Alissa and Myers, Steven Lee, “Deal on a Security Agreement Is Close, Iraqis Say,” New York Times, 7/31/08

Voices of Iraq, “MP rules out voting over elections law on Tuesday,” 8/4/08

Displaced Iraqis Returning Slowly, Government Bureaucracy Might Be Slower

In mid-July 2008, the International Organization for Migration reported that the displacement of Iraqis had slowed, and that some were returning home. The group counted 2.8 million internal refugees in the country. It said that many of them can’t find housing, food, medical care, water, or services. While some families are going back to their homes, there is no reporting that this is anything but a small fraction of the total. What they find when they arrive is often local support, but no real government assistance.

The New York Times and Alsumaria TV had two stories about Iraqis returning to their homes last month. Alsumaria reported that approximately 150 families returned to the south Baghdad neighborhood of Dora in mid-July. It said that the effort was coordinated with the local Sons of Iraq (SOI). The area was once a stronghold of Al Qaeda in Iraq, but in 2007, local Sunnis began turning on it, eventually forming a Sons of Iraq unit with the assistance of the U.S. that mostly pushed the militants out. The American forces also erected a blast wall around the district to control the flow of traffic in and out as part of the Surge, and also spent a few million dollars on small reconstruction projects. Today, normalcy is beginning to return with businesses and foot traffic. What is missing is the government. Relative security has been established in Dora, but through the work of the U.S. and SOI, and that has allowed some families to go back to their homes. Baghdad has only argued with the SOIs there and little else. The New York Times reported on a similar story from the village of Al Etha in Diyala province. The town was the site of intense sectarian fighting in 2006, which forced out many of the Shiites after their homes were destroyed by Sunni fighters. In June 2008, around 60 families returned because they felt Iraqi forces had secured the area, the government offered food, money and a place to stay, and local Sunnis had offered a fig leaf. When they got there, they found that the government offered little to no assistance. In these two cases security has allowed a small fraction of displaced Iraqis to come home, but it is largely up to themselves and the locals to help them rebuild.

These incidents reflect badly upon Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s newly launched campaign to bring back the country’s refugees and displaced. The main tactic is to offer cash to those that have had their houses damaged, or are returning. As the two examples of Dora and Al Etha point out, the government is still lagging to fulfill their promises. Refugees in Al Etha and other places have complained that the bureaucracy is either slow or non-existant in providing the money offered under Maliki’s plan. The amounts of aid have also been criticized as being too small. In Al Etha for example, the most the government could provide to the returning families was $5,000 a piece, which they said was only enough to clear the rubble from their destroyed homes, but not sufficient to rebuild them. Even the head of parliament’s Displaced and Migration committee said that Baghdad should not encourage people to return until it provides more aid. Providing services is the Achilles heel of Maliki’s government. It has consistently failed to spend most of its capital budgets, and doesn’t even exist in some areas of the country. Maliki’s refugee plan therefore, could be more rhetoric than actual action, as Baghdad lacks the capability to plan or carry out such a policy.

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “150 Iraqi families return to Al Dora region,” 7/12/08

Associated Press, “Group says displacement of Iraqis has slowed,” 7/18/08

O’Kane, Maggie and Black, Ian, “Sunni militia strike could derail US strategy against al-Qaida,” Guardian, 3/21/08

Pepper, Daniel, “Rebuilding a Baghdad Neighborhood,” Time, 1/14/08

Rubin, Alissa, “Iraqi Shiies Reclaim a Village Razed by Sunnis,” New York Times, 7/12/08

Voices of Iraq, “Lack of services, financial support make life difficult for returnees,” 7/31/08

Yanes, Deborah, “Al-Qaeda faces rebellion from the ranks,” Times of London, 7/23/07

International Crisis Group’s Report on Iraqi Refugees

In July 2008, the International Crisis Group issued a new report on Iraq’s refugees. According to the United Nations, Iraq has the second largest refugee problem in the world, only behind Afghanistan, with almost one in five Iraqis being displaced. The majority of people left during the sectarian war period from 2006-2007. The Crisis Group’s study focused upon Iraqis in Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon, and the Iraqi government’s and international community’s response. Its overall conclusions were that while those three countries have absorbed thousands of Iraqis, they have since tightened restrictions and failed to adequately care for them, while Baghdad and the world have not done much better.

Some general trends appear in the study’s look at how Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon dealt with Iraqis. First, when the war started there were few restrictions on the flow of refugees to these countries. As the numbers grew however, they began imposing restrictions to stem the flow. Since many of the fleeing Iraqis were middle class professionals they also added to inflationary pressures with their added spending, especially in the housing market. This caused public resentment against their presence in Syria and Jordan. In Lebanon the government and public were too involved with their own internal problems to care about Iraqis and their plight. Many believed that the Iraqis would eventually leave, but as time passed governments began to worry that the refugees might become permanent. These issues together led countries to cut whatever assistance they were giving to Iraqis, and increase the limits on further immigration.

The international community was late to recognize the problem, and was tight fisted when giving aid. Some countries do not want to give assistance because they are opposed to the war. Some do not give because they are against Syria’s regional policies. Others who have donated, simply aren’t offering enough to meet basic needs. The European Commission for example, offered 50 million Euros in 2007, but by the end of the year had only come up with 10 million of what they promised.

The worst culprit in the report is the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Its main concern seems to be to keep Iraqis within the country with little regard for their plight. When Syria said it was passing visa restrictions on Iraqis, Maliki and his advisers welcomed it, with one calling the refugees cowards. The government’s main response has been to offer money to the displaced to come home, but then nothing else once they do. For instance, in late 2007 when Baghdad began a public relations campaign to encourage refugees to come back, it later admitted that it could not handle any that did. U.S. commanders complained that they were stuck with the job of dealing with returnees because the government couldn’t. There is no evidence that many have returned, but those that do often find security to still be a question, their homes have been destroyed or occupied, their neighborhoods are controlled by different sects or militias, and there are few services. 70% of those that have tried to return have not been able to go back to their original homes, becoming displaced persons once again.

The Crisis Group’s main conclusion is that the Iraqi refugee problem is long term and actors need to step up with their aid. They do not believe that many Iraqis will return in the near future. Therefore host countries, the international community, and Baghdad need to assist them more. Some need to be integrated into their present countries, others need help to travel on to other places, but in the end, the majority do need to go back to Iraq. Many Iraqi refugees are middle class, which has robbed the country of its human resources. In order to rebuild it needs this know how, but until conditions and the government improve considerably these important persons will stay away because they do not feel safe.

SOURCES

International Crisis Group, “Failed Responsibility: Iraqi Refugees In Syria, Jordan and Lebanon,” 7/10/08