International Organization for Migration’s Report On Displaced In Kurdistan

The situation of the displaced in the three provinces of Kurdistan, Dohuk, Irbil and Sulaymaniya, are different from the rest of the country. The stability of Kurdistan has been a draw for displaced from across the country. Professionals and manual labors alike have found jobs there. A large number of Iraqi minorities fled there. Most of the displaced in the three provinces also left their homes before the February 2006 Samarra bombing that set off the sectarian war. At the same time Kurdistan has strict restrictions on the entry of non-Kurds, and there are fears amongst officials that these refugees will upset the demographics of the region. In December 2008, the International Organization for Migration released its latest report on the displaced in Kurdistan.

The relative security of Kurdistan has led many displaced Iraqis to try to move there, but at the same time it is the hardest part of the country to gain entry into. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is worried about Arab insurgents entering, as well as non-Kurds disrupting the Kurdish majority. The KRG also doesn’t want to take care of so many displaced families. As a result, Kurdish security forces tightly control the border. People that don’t originally come form Kurdistan must have sponsors to enter. The Kurds are especially suspicious of Arabs, but requirements are looser for minorities who are seen as victims of terrorism. Once a family has entered Kurdistan they have to go through a complicated series of offices and requirements to stay. Every three months they have to renew their residency permit. For individuals, they have to renew it every month. If they don’t they are considered illegal residents. These tight restrictions have led many displaced to hide their movements outside the region, for example to collect their food rations from their home province, out of fear that they will be caught by the authorities and expelled.

Most of Iraq’s minorities live in the north. As reported before, they have been singled out for attack since the U.S. invasion. Many have fled to Kurdistan as a result because of its safety and proximity. 22.8% of the displaced in the region are Christians for example, compared to 5% in the rest of the country.

Kurdistan also has the largest amount of pre-2006 displaced. Most of these are Kurds, Turkomen, and Christians forced out by Saddam Hussein’s Arabization policy and Anfal campaign. Over 600,000 people came to Dohuk, Irbil and Sulaymaniya before 2006 as a result.

The displaced have caused both problems, and been welcomed in the region. The refugees can strain a community by increasing demand for services, and competing for jobs. In Khabat in the Irbil district there are more than 2,000 displaced families causing problems with the health facilities and schools. There are also reports of women turning to prostitution for money, and child labor. In Dohuk there are stories of women being raped to keep their jobs. Another problem is that the displaced have to know Kurdish to get jobs. Those that have stayed longer, usually have developed some language skills, and are thus better suited to find work. At the same time, because of the better security situation there are more jobs in Kurdistan than the rest of the country. The displaced have added both skilled and unskilled labor to the regional economy. This is seen in the fact that 56.6% of the displaced surveyed had at least one family member working compared to 34.8% in the rest of the country.

The ability to receive services and assistance by the displaced has been mixed. There is little coordination between the KRG and the Ministry of Trade that runs the food rations system. In a survey 74.6% of the displaced said they don’t get any food rations at all. Less then 3% said they received food aid, compared to the 43% national average. In Irbil no displaced received any food assistance. Only 23% said they received any aid period, compared to 63% in the rest of the country. Dohuk was the exception with 57% saying they had gotten some form of aid. 66% of the displaced said they also had no access to fuel, higher than the 33% average in the rest of Iraq. People in Kurdistan also pay higher prices for fuel, which adds more strain to the displaced that often have financial difficulties. Schools are a special problem for the displaced because classes are conducted in Kurdish. Some displaced Kurds are not use to the written form of the language either. Even so, there is a very high percentage of the displaced attending schools. 62.3% of families said all their girls were going, and 73.9% said their boys were as well. Water supply and access to health care however, are better than the rest of the country for internal refugees.

Dohuk

Dohuk has the least amount of pre-2006 displaced, and the most post-2006 refugees of the three Kurdish provinces. The majority came from Baghdad 52% and Ninewa 47%. The largest amount of people came during the summer of 2006, and has since declined. There are concerns that because of economic hardships some families are turning to crime to support themselves. Services and aid are mixed there. Electricity is available for an average of six hours per day, leaving many to turn to private generators or buying power from private businesses to make up the difference. 99.1% say they have no access to fuel, higher than the 65.9% average for the region and 32.7% rate for the country. Dohuk also has the least amount of displaced people working. Only 33.5% said they had at least one family member working compared to 56.6% in Kurdistan. Refugee families do have the best access to humanitarian aid out of the region.

Statistics On The Displaced In Dohuk

Overall:
Population: 954,087
Total pre-Feb 06 displaced: 22,474 families, approx. 138,844 people
Total post-Feb 06 displaced: 17,390 families, approx 104,824 people

Background:

Religion & ethnicity of displaced:
Sunni Kurd 39.7%
Chaldean Christian 29.0%
Assyrian Christian 19.8%
Armenian Christian 3.4%
Sunni Arab 2.1%
Shiite Arab 2.0%
Turkomen Shiite 0.7%
Shiite Kurd 0.3%
Christian Kurd 0.2%
Other 0.1%

Place of origin:
Baghdad 51.79%
Ninewa 46.65%
Tamim 0.58%
Basra 0.48%
Anbar 0.32%
Muthanna 0.05%
Salahaddin 0.05%
Babil 0.03%
Diyala 0.03%
Irbil 0.03%

Reasons For Displacement:
Fear 92.8%
Violence 88.1%
Direct Threat 71.2%
Armed Conflict 33.7%
Forced From Home 7.3%
Other 0.4%

Reason For Being Targeted:
Sect 68.20%
Ethnicity 22.84%
Political opinion 18.29%
Social group 14.57%
Don’t think targeted 7.42%

Intentions of Displaced:
Integrate locally 60.2%
Return to place of origin 22.0%

Services And Employment:

Access to food rations:
Yes 2.7%
Sometimes 4.3%
Never 92.9%

Water source:
Municipal water 89.8%
Water tanks/trucks 31.9%
Others 4.7%
Wells 6.8%
Rivers, streaks, lakes 5.1%
Broken pipes 0.2%

Electricity access:
Four or more hours per day 86.4%
1-3 hours per day 8.9%
No electricity 4.7%

Fuel access:
No access 99.1%
Propane 0.6%
Benzene 0.0%
Kerosene 0.5%
Diesel 0.1%
Other 0.0%

Have been visited by health worker in last 30 days?
No 31.1%
Yes 68.5%

Employment:
At least one family member working 33.5%
No one working 66.5%

Assistance:

Sources of aid:
No aid 42.7%
Iraqi Red Crescent 23.6%
Religious group 21.0%
Relatives 19.7%
Humanitarian group 6.3%
Other government agency 14.6%
Host community 4.1%
Other 3.0%

Food aid source:
No aid 98.6%
Federal government 0.0%
Humanitarian group 0.0%
Regional government 0.0%
Religious group 0.9%
Others 0.3%

Needs:
Jobs 95%
Housing 60%
Food 50%
Other 50%
Health 20%
School 10%
Water 5%
Sanitation 1%
Legal aid 1%
Hygiene 0%

Irbil

Most of the displaced in Irbil come from Baghdad 47% and Ninewa 45%. The largest amount of people came in the beginning of 2007. Around 150 Christian families have recently fled to the Ainkawa district after they were attacked in Mosul at the end of 2008. Electricity has improved over the last six months. Families average four hours a day with three extra hours every other day. Displaced in Irbil have the worst access to humanitarian aid in the region with 92.4% saying they received no assistance compared to 76.5% in Kurdistan and 36.7% in Iraq.

Statistics On The Displaced In Dohuk

Overall: Population: 1,392,093
Total pre-Feb 06 displaced: 32,813 families, approx 196,878 people
Total post-Feb 06 displaced: 6,599 families, approx 52,007 people

Background:

Religion & ethnicity of displaced:
Sunni Kurd 39.9%
Sunni Arab 29.4%
Chaldean Christian 19.3%
Assyrian Christian 4.9%
Shiite Arab 1.4%
Armenian Christian 0.9%
Other 0.4%
Christian Kurd 0.2%
Sabean Mandean 0.1%
Christian Arab 0.1%

Place of origin:
Baghdad 47.11%
Ninewa 45.12%
Tamim 2.4%
Diyala 2.08%
Anbar 0.93%
Salahaddin 0.63%
Basra 0.26%
Babil 0.15%
Muthanna 0.07%
Qadisiyah 0.07%
Karbala 0.06%
Najaf 0.04%
Maysan 0.04%

Reasons for displacement:
Fear 97.6%
Violence 53.4%
Direct Threat 9.9%
Armed Conflict 0.3%
Other 0.1%

Reason for being targeted:
Sect 59.98%
Don’t think targeted 22.84%
Ethnicity 17.27%
Social group 3.98%
Political opinion 0.13%

Intentions of displaced:
Integrate locally 18.3%
Return to place of origin 62.5%

Services And Employment:

Access to food rations:
Yes 14.5%
Sometimes 27.2%
Never 57.6%

Water source:
Municipal water 97.7%
Water tanks/trucks 1.3%
Others 0.2%
Wells 6.80.2%

Electricity access:
Four or more hours per day 98.8%
1-3 hours per day 0.0%
No electricity 0.1%

Fuel Access:
No access 68.1%
Propane 29.4%
Benzene 23.2%
Kerosene 4.5%
Diesel 0.2%
Other 0.0%

Have been visited by health worker in last 30 days?
No 73.1%
Yes 25.3%

Assistance:

Sources of aid:
No aid 92.4%
Iraqi Red Crescent 0.1%
Religious group 4.00%
Relatives 0.1%
Humanitarian group 2.2%
Other government agency 0.0%
Host community 0.0%
Other 0.0%

Food aid source:
No aid 98.9%
Federal government 0.0%
Humanitarian group 0.0%
Regional government 0.0%
Religious group 0.0%
Others 0.0%

Needs:
Jobs 90.9%
Housing 97.9%
Food 2.8%
Other 0.7%
Health 0.1%
School 28.2%
Water 0.0%
Sanitation 0.0%
Legal aid 25%
Hygiene 0%

Sulaymaniya

Most displaced in Sulaymaniya come from Baghdad 46% and Diyala 45%. The biggest surge in families to the province came during the summer of 2007. Of the three Kurdish provinces, Sulaymaniya averages the most electricity at 9 to 10 hours per day. That’s expected to go up to twelve hours when a new power station opens. It also has the best access to fuel in the region with 60% of the displaced saying they could obtain one form or another, but it is still below the national average.

Statistics For the Displaced In Sulaymaniya

Overall:
Population: 1,715,585
Total pre-Feb 06 displaced: 50,465 families, approx. 302,790 people
Total post-Feb 06 displaced: 14,585 families, approx. 80,935 people

Background:

Religion & ethnicity of displaced:
Sunni Arab 62.7%
Sunni Kurd 22.4%
Shiite Arab 10.5%
Shiite Kurd 2.7%
Sabean Mandean 0.3%
Chaldean Christian 0.2%
Assyrian Christian 0.1%
Other 0.1%
Christian Arab 0.1%

Origin of origin:
Baghdad 46.12%
Diyala 45.92%
Anbar 2.88%
Ninewa 1.88%
Salahaddin 0.95%
Tamim 0.67%
Basra 0.51%
Babil 0.40%
Wasit 0.24%
Dhi Qar 0.11%
Sulaymaniyah 0.11%
Karbala 0.07%
Muthanna 0.04%

Reasons for displacement:
Fear 90.0%
Violence 88.0%
Armed Conflict 52.7%
Direct Threat 46.2%
Other 6.3%
Forced From Home 3.8%

Reason for being targeted:
Sect 78.53%
Don’t think targeted 18.85%
Ethnicity 10.46%
Political opinion 6.28%
Social group 3.96%

Intentions of displaced:
Integrate locally 25.9%
Return to place of origin 65.7%

Services And Employment:

Access to food rations:
Yes 11.8%
Sometimes 9.7%
Never 78.5%

Water source:
Municipal water 77.0%
Water tanks/trucks 5.1%
Others 19.3%
Wells 3.2%
Rivers, streaks, lakes 0.2%

Electricity access:
Four or more hours per day 60.4%
1-3 hours per day 35.2%
No electricity 4.4%

Fuel access:
No access 41.3%
Propane 58.6%
Benzene 1.0%
Kerosene 15.6%
Diesel 0.7%
Other 0.2%

Have been visited by health worker in last 30 days?
No 79.8%
Yes 19.8%

Assistance:

Sources of aid:
No aid 84.0%
Iraqi Red Crescent 7.5%
Religious group 1.1%
Relatives 0.1%
Humanitarian group 5.5%
Other government agency 1.7%
Host community 4.3%
Other 0.4%

Food aid source:
No aid 94.7%
Federal government 2.8%
Humanitarian group 1.5%
Regional government 1.1%
Religious group 0.5%
Others 0.9%

Needs:
Jobs 44%
Housing 16.7%
Food 85.8%
Other 81.2%
Health 1.3%
School 32.3%
Water 0.7%
Sanitation 1.0%
Legal aid 2.2%
Hygiene 0.5%

SOURCES

International Organization for Migration, “Dahuk, Erbil & Sulaymaniyah, Governorate Profiles Post-February 2006 IDP Needs Assessments,” December 2008

National Media Center Poll Of Iraqis And Provincial Elections

The National Media Center is a government-sponsored group that recently conducted a public opinion poll of Iraqis on the upcoming provincial elections due at the end of January. It questioned 4,500 people. 73% said they intended on voting. Of those, 30% said they would do so out of national duty, 20% said because they supported a candidate, while 19% said they would cast a ballot to improve the provincial governments. 42% said they would vote for secularists, 31% said they supported religious groups, and 27% were undecided. Karbala had the most affirmatives for voting with 85%, while Najaf had the lowest at 54%.

The National Media Center’s findings were much better regarding turnout than a survey conducted by Al-Sabah newspaper in early January. They found that only 43% of those asked planned on voting in January. 32.2% said they would not vote at all. Most of those said they didn’t believe in Iraq’s politicians anymore. Of the 43% that wanted to cast ballots, 62% said they would vote for independents and democratic candidates, while 24% gave no answer.

Back in October 2008 the Iraqi Al Amal Association and the University of Baghdad conducted a survey on poverty in Iraq of 11,198 families in 10 provinces, which asked a few questions about the election. 26.3% responded that they would support independents, 23.7% said they were behind democratic-secular blocs, and 22.7% backed religious parties. 7.3% said they would vote for tribal figures, and 6.3% mentioned national blocs. By province, religious parties were strongest in Qadisiyah with 57.6%, national blocs got the most support in Tamim, 48.5%, democratic-secular parties ranked high in Sulaymaniya, 38.4%, and independents did the best in Basra, 70.2%.

The three surveys show that religious parties have dropped in popularity, while independents and secular groups have increased. Since the upcoming vote is provincial, these national polls can only show so much. The Iraqi Al Amal Association and the University of Baghdad poll was the most thorough because it broke down its finding across each province, and had the most respondents. They found religious parties were still going strong in Qadisiyah, Najaf and Salahaddin, democratic-secularists did well in Salahaddin, Anbar, Diyala, and Sulaymaniya, and independents got the highest marks in Basra, Diyala, and Baghdad. Exactly which parties represent which categories in the polls is unclear. Maliki for example, heads a religious group, the Dawa Party, but has been running on nationalist credentials. The Sadrists are a nationalist and religious organization as well. The fact that the election rules favor larger parties, who already have the most organization, money, and media outlets, is another issue that will shape the results, which the polls do not address. In a week and a half all of this will be resolved when the election actually happens in 14 of Iraq’s 18 provinces.

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “Poll: Iraqis prefer secular candidates,” 1/20/09

Middle East Online, “Poll: Iraqi Voters Prefer Secular Candidates,” 1/20/09

Al-Sabah, “43 Percent Participate in the Elections,” 1/4/09

Sachet, Khalid Hantoush, “Results of the Field Survey For Needs and Opinions of The Poor in Iraq,” Iraqi Al Amal Association, University of Baghdad, September 2008

October 2008 Defense Department Public Opinion Poll Of Iraqis On Security

The Defense Department released its latest quarterly report to Congress on Iraq in mid-January 2009. Like the August 2008 one it included a public opinion poll of Iraqis conducted in October 2008 on security. Like that previous report the Iraqi Army and police scored high in terms of confidence, 85% and 81% respectively, and winning against terrorism, 70%, and crime, 61%. At the same time, only 40% said they would go the police if they saw a crime, while 31% said they would go the Army. Also, a little over a third said that the security forces were most responsible for security in their neighborhood. The numbers for the police actually declined compared to August 2008 and November 2007 polls. The U.S. only scored 2% in that category, joining tribes 7%, Sons of Iraq 6%, neighbors 3%, religious leaders 3%, and militias 1% in single digits. Those groups did much better in terms of confidence, with 26% saying they trusted the U.S. to protect them, compared to 12% for armed groups and 12% for militias. Those polled also feel safe in their own neighborhoods, 76%, but only 28% said Iraq was calm and 45% said the country was stable. Around two-thirds of respondents trusted all levels of government from the local to national to protect them, but only 43% said that it was effective. The level of trust in government was also down from the November 2007 poll. Below are the results of the October 2008 poll compared to the August 2008 and November 2007 surveys also done by the Pentagon.

Security In Neighborhood

• 76% said security in their neighborhood was calm, compared to 73% in Aug. 08 and 61% in Nov. 07
• 57% said security was calm in their province
• 89% said security stayed the same or improved in their neighborhood over the last 6 months, which was a decrease from 91% in Aug. 08, but up from 82% in Nov. 07
• 42% said they feel safe traveling outside of their neighborhoods, a 3% increase from Nov. 07

Security Across Iraq

• 28% said Iraq was calm across the country, up from 21% in Aug. 08 and 23% in Nov. 07
• 83% said security was the same or improved in the country, up from 79% in Aug. 08 and 81% in Nov. 07
• 45% said Iraq was stable, up from 41% in Aug. 08 and 28% in Nov. 08

Opinions On Iraqi Security Forces

• 65% said they feel secure around the Iraqi Army in their neighborhood, same as in Aug. 08, and up 14% from Nov. 07
• 61% said feel secure around police in their neighborhood, the same as Aug. 08, and up 8% from Nov. 07
• 85% said they trust the Iraqi Army to protect them, up from 84% in Aug. 08
• 81% said they trust the police to protect, the same as Aug. 08
• 70% said the Iraqi Army was winning the war against terrorists, up from 68% in Aug. 08, and 52% in Nov. 07
• 61% said the police were winning against crime, up from 58% in Aug. 08 and 60% in Nov. 07
• 37% said the Iraqi Army was most responsible for security in their neighborhood, compared to 35% in Aug. 08, and 25% in Nov. 07
• 36% said the police were most responsible for security in their neighborhood, down from 38% in Aug. 08 and 43% in Nov. 07
• 40% said they would go to the police if they witnessed a crime
• 31% said they would go to the Army if they saw a crime

Opinions On The Government Providing Security

• 68% said they trust the provincial government to protect them, the same as Aug 08, but a decrease from 77% in Nov. 07
• 66% said they trust the national government to protect them, up from 63% in Aug. 08, but down from 68% in Nov. 07
• 64% said they trust the local government to protect them, up from 62% in Aug. 08, but down from 79% in Nov. 07
• 43% said the government was effective in providing security, up 5% from Nov. 07

Opinions Of Other Groups And Security

• 7% said tribes were most responsible for security, up from 5% in Aug. 08
• 6% said the Sons of Iraq were most responsible for security, down from 7% in Aug. 08, but up from 2% in Nov. 07
• 3% said neighbors were most responsible for security, the same as Aug. 08
• 3% said religious leaders were most responsible for security, up 1% from Aug. 08
• 2% said the Multi-National Forces were most responsible for security, down from 3% in Aug. 08
• 1% said militias were most responsible for security
• 26% said they trust the Multi-National Force to protect them, up from 24% in Aug. 08
• 12% said they trust armed groups to protect them, down from 13% in Aug. 08 and 29% in Nov. 07
• 12% said they trust militias to protect them, same as Aug. 08, but down from 16% in Nov. 07

For more on Iraqi public opinion see:

Iraqi Al-Amal Association and Baghdad University’s Public Opinion Poll On Poverty In Iraq

Iraq Center for Research & Strategic Studies’ Survey Of Iraqis

Pentagon Public Opinion Poll of Iraqis

SOURCES

Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” September 2008
- “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” December 2008

Who Speaks For The Sunnis?

Yesterday, January 14, the major Sunni bloc the Iraqi Accordance Front (IAF) boycotted parliament. They claimed that it was illegal to hold sessions without a speaker. The real reason was because they have been unable to fill the position as their coalition has collapsed and opposition parties have challenged their right to the spot.

The Accordance Front began disintegrating last month. As reported earlier, on December 24 the Iraqi National Dialogue Council and the Independents Bloc left the Accordance Front, charging that the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) was attempting to monopolize power within the coalition. On January 12, four parliamentarians from the Independent Democratic Gathering also departed for the same reason. The Front that once had 44 seats in parliament, and the majority of Sunni lawmakers, was reduced to just 25. The Islamic Party held 22 of those seats, with the remaining 3 coming from Adnan Dulaimi’s General Council for the People of Iraq Party. There are a total of 69 Sunnis in the 275-member parliament.

With their weakened position, the IAF has not been able to build consensus over a replacement for the speaker of parliament. The former speaker, Mahmoud al-Mashhadani was forced to resign on December 23 after his comments about shoe throwing journalist Muntadar al-Zaidi. Since then the Iraqi National Dialogue Council as well as the secular Iraqi National List (INL) of former Interim Prime Minister Ilyad Alawi have presented candidates, to compete with the Islamic Party’s two. The National List actually put up three parliamentarians, a woman, a Shiite, and a Sunni. Both they and the Dialogue Council, which are now both part of the loosely connected opposition, are challenging the sectarian and big party quotas that have dominated the body since its creation after the U.S. invasion. Under this system, the prime minister was to be a Shiite from the United Iraqi Alliance, the president was a Kurd from the Kurdish Alliance, and the speaker was a Sunni from the Accordance Front. The Dialogue Council claims that since Mashhadani came from their party, they are entitled to the position, while the National List is saying it doesn’t even have to be a Sunni. The INL also took up the position of the defecting Sunni parties by criticizing the Islamic Party for holding the speakership, one vice president, one deputy premier, and a number of ministers. The Iraqi paper Azzaman also reported that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki might have also objected to the IIP’s domination of most of the Sunni offices in government. Shocked by this turn of events, the United Iraqi Alliance and Kurds have tried to stand by the Accordance Front by saying they deserve the speaker position.

From the beginning the Islamic Party was always the strongest of the Sunni parties. It was formed in 1960 modeled after the Muslim Brotherhood. It was quickly outlawed by the government and became largely an underground opposition group. After the U.S. invasion the party’s secretary general Mohsen Abdel Hamid was named to the Iraqi Governing Council. In 2005 they were the only major party to defy the Sunni boycott and were elected to several provincial councils. It later helped form the Iraqi Accordance Front and went on to win the largest single number of seats in parliament of any Sunni party. Heading into the January 2009 provincial elections they were initially predicted to lose control of Anbar province, but have since been able to break apart the tribal Awakening probably meaning they will have joint rule there. They have also built up ties with Sons of Iraq groups in Baghdad, are part of the main Sunni coalition in Diyala, and are running in Ninewa.

The battle over the speaker of parliament and the break-up of the Accordance Front is largely about who will speak for the Sunnis. Right now, no one can say. The Islamic Party is still the best organized, and appears to be well positioned in the provincial elections. They may come out the winners with the Accordance Front existing only in name. This also happened with the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance, as the Fadhila Party and Sadrists left in 2007, and the Dawa Party and Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council are running against each other. These two coalitions were created at a time of extreme sectarianism and fighting. That is now changing. That may still leave the Islamic Party as a winner after elections as Iraqis tend to vote by sect, but they also benefit from their size, breadth, and money, as the old coalitions past by the wayside.

For more on the break up of the Iraqi Accordance Front see:

Accordance Front Breaks Apart

SOURCES:

Abdullah, Muahmmed, “Diyala Sees Early Campaigning,” Niqash, 12/8/08

Alsumaria, “Accordance Front boycotts Parliament session,” 1/14/09
- “Iraq Parliament speaker post under debate,” 1/8/08

Aswat al-Iraq, “2 IIP candidates for parliament speaker post – MP,” 1/2/09
- “Democratic Grouping quits IAF,” 1/10/09
- “IAF represents only IIP – MP,” 1/8/09
- “INDC puts forward candidates for parliament’s speakership,” 12/24/08
- “INL nominates 3 MPs for parliament’s speakership,” 1/13/09
- “NDF puts forward candidate for speaker,” 1/13/09
- “Lawmaker announces nomination for parliamentary speakership,” 1/6/09
- “Parliament’s speaker position for IAF – VP,” 12/31/08
- “Parliament’s speaker should be IAF nominee – Kurdish MP,” 1/6/09
- “UIA, KA agree to IAF’s candidate for speaker,” 1/11/09

BBC, “Iraqi Governing Council members,” 7/14/03

Dagher, Sam, “Dispute Weakens Iraqi Sunni Coalition,” New York Times, 1/11/09

Dalli, Hussein, “Iraq Awakening Councils form party,” Al Jazeera, 4/14/08

IraqSlogger.com, “Iraq Papers Tue: 124,000 Bodyguards in Iraq!” 12/29/08

Niqash, “irqai Islamic party (iip),” 11/7/05

Parker, Ned, “Iraq looks ahead to provincial, national elections,” Los Angeles Times, 11/5/08

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Iraq To Replace Parliament Speaker Deemed Offensive,” 1/9/09

Reuters, “Iraq’s main Sunni Arab bloc splinters,” 12/24/08

UPI, “Sunnis marginalized in Iraqi politics,” 1/8/09

Yoshino, Kim and Hameed, Ali, “More Iraq parliament members pull out of Sunni bloc,” Los Angeles Times, 1/12/09

Iraq’s Closed Factories

The head of the Iraqi Union of Industries recently said that 90% of the country’s industries had closed since 2003. He claimed that 36,000 small and medium sized companies had gone out of business for a variety of reasons. Those included cheap imports, the lack of tariffs, electricity shortages, banks not giving out loans, and skilled workers leaving for other countries. While he didn’t mention it, the violence in the country also played a role.

Iraq’s factories have been endangered since the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) tried to privatize the economy. The leaders and administrators of the CPA believed in a rapid privatization program for Iraq. They had ideological reasons working for a conservative Republican administration, and also believed crash courses in capitalism were successful in Eastern Europe after the fall of the Iron Curtain. In September 2003 the CPA announced its plan. This came as a shock to Iraqis and the Governing Council as they had never been consulted. At the time there were about 200 hundred state-owned businesses. None of them could operate on their own however. Some had no money, the looting after the invasion had destroyed some, while others had aging and out of date equipment. Just as important, there were no buyers for any of them. The plan proved so unpopular that in November the CPA canceled its plan. Instead of helping these struggling businesses however, the U.S. simply ignored them believing the market would determine whether they should stay in business or not. The result was most of them closed, and around 500,000 Iraqis were laid off. In the process, important businesses for reconstruction and transportation went under such as the railroad, fertilizer and cement industries.

The lack of security, services, and protectionist barriers has also hampered business. Military operations, attacks by insurgents, checkpoints, roadblocks, etc. have all strangled trade and commerce in Iraq. Many companies had to hire security guards to protect themselves. The supply of electricity has also been inconsistent forcing businesses to buy their own personal generators. Fuel costs have also skyrocketed since the invasion, meaning more bills. All three have added costs to Iraqi goods, which make them less competitive in the world market. Iraq also has few tariffs on manufactured goods, which has led to a flood of cheap foreign imports. All of these together have led to factories shutting down.

During the Surge, the Pentagon and Baghdad both tried and failed to revive Iraq’s industries. The Defense Department appropriated $50 million for the project, believing that the jobs created would help decrease the draw of the insurgency. Baghdad contributed $400 million as well. The military hoped that they could get American companies to buy the Iraqi manufactured goods, but they found no takers. Only around twenty factories were re-opened, the initiative got caught in a bureaucratic struggle between the State and Defense Departments, and the U.S. officials in charge of the project came under investigation for mismanagement and waste. Later, the Ministry of Minerals and Industry planned to sell off engineering, construction, textile, chemical, petrochemical, food and medicine plants to foreign investors, but found no bidders.

Before the invasion, Iraq was already a poor country because of the Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf War, and international sanctions. After 2003 Iraq ran into a slew of new problems including a failed privatization program by the Americans, cheap imports, lack of electricity and fuel, and a security vacuum. All contributed to the closing of the vast majority of the country’s factories, which were major employers, and largely unsustainable without state support. As reported before, the entire economy has suffered under these conditions. Iraq has a 60% unemployment/underemployment rate as a result. Some of these factories were doomed, but others could’ve been better managed and kept in business for the rebuilding that lay ahead. Firing hundreds of thousands of workers also did not help the country in anyway. The problem that lies ahead is reviving Iraq’s industries, which face massive structural problems beginning with the lack of tariffs and foreign investment.

For more see:

Iraq’s Troubled Economy

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “Imported products subvert Iraqi economy,” 2/24/08

Fairweather, Jack, “Iraqi state enterprises warily reopen,” Financial Times, 6/16/08

Gunter, Frank, “Economic Development During Conflict: The Petraeus-Crocker Congressional Testimonies,” Strategic Insights, December 2007

Henderson, Anne Ellen, “The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience with Economic Reconstruction in Iraq: Lessons Identified,” United States Institute of Peace, April 2005

Iraq Directory, “More than 90% of Iraqi industries are halted,” 1/10/09

Looney, Robert, “Half Full of Half Empty? An Assessment of the Crocker Report on Iraqi Economic Conditions,” Strategic Insights, December 2007

Al-Sadawi, Ahmad, “Iranian products win the market,” Niqash, 6/13/08

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 7/30/08
- “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/08

White, Josh, “U.S. Falters In Bid to Boost Iraqi Business,” Washington Post, 8/24/07

Yacoub, Sameer, “United Arab Emirates to name ambassador to Baghdad,” Associated Press, 6/5/08

Human Rights First Report On What To Do About Iraq’s Refugees

At the end of December 2008 Human Rights First released an excellent report on Iraq’s refugees entitled “How to Confront the Iraqi Refugee Crisis.” It noted that the refugee crisis is still on going. The United Nations Refugee Agency UNHCR for example, recorded 12,500 Iraqis entering Syria in 2008. Surveys show that one-third of Iraqis fled the general violence in the country, while the other two-third left because they felt directly targeted. Most of the displacement occurred after the February 2006 Samarra bombing that set off the sectarian war. This can be seen in the fact that Sunnis were only about 20% of the population, but represent 55% of the U.N. registered refugees. Iraq’s minorities such as Christians, Mandeans, Yazidis, Turkomen, Shabaks, and others have also greatly suffered, comprising 18-20% of the U.N. refugees, but only 3-4% of Iraq. The result has been a less diverse country and more homogenous neighborhoods, especially in Baghdad, which has seen the most displacement. The UNHCR, the U.N. Assistance Mission for Iraq, and the State Department all believe that Iraq’s refugees still need help. The Human Rights First report was notable for its up to date numbers, and analysis of the current situation in Iraq. It not only went through the current refugee crisis, but also made suggestions for the in coming Obama administration as well.

The forces directly responsible for Iraq’s displacement are many. Insurgents, terrorist groups, and militias all took part in violence aimed at the country’s population. What is often overlooked is that the Iraqi government was also directly involved. The media usually talks about how militias had infiltrated the security forces during this period, but refugees told Human Rights Watch that they believed the ruling parties had a plan to force out certain groups. The police, National Police, Ministry of Interior, and Ministry of Health all took part in sectarian attacks. As reported before, Shiite parties like the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and its Badr Brigade and Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army were directly enrolled into the security forces, and took control of specific ministries. They carried out a systematic campaign to cleanse certain areas of Sunnis. Iraq’s minorities were caught in the middle of this bloodbath. This has repercussions today, as many displaced still do not trust their government.

Iraq’s refugees have been both greeted and rejected in the countries they have moved to. Most can’t work legally, which leads to exploitation. Children are not going to school because they need to support their families, while some Iraqi women have gone into prostitution to make money. Many have run through their savings, while their cost of living expenses have risen. That has led to increasing dependence upon U.N. aid. Syria and Jordan are increasingly growing weary of the large number of Iraqis in their country. This is problematic since many Iraqis don’t seem to want to return anytime soon. Many who register with the UNHCR hope to be repatriated to a third country. 64,500 have applied for asylum in 2007 and the first six months of 2008, the highest amount in the world. Most want to go to Sweden, Germany, Greece or the United States.

Iraq’s internally displaced are facing tougher conditions as well. Many provinces have stopped movement of the displaced into their areas. Some want them to leave. Lack of jobs, access to services, and assistance from either the government or non-government organizations is chronic. The International Organization for Migration in its monthly reports have recorded dozens of cases of displaced families living in mud huts with no access to jobs, clean water, and sewage systems.

All of these hardships and the improvement in security have begun the process of return. By September 2008 the International Organization for Migration and the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration counted 38,401 families who had come back, amounting to approximately 230,406 people. That was around 5% of the displaced. Most of these were internal refugees moving within Baghdad. Surveys say that 80% of the displaced in their own provinces want to go back to their homes while only around 50% of the displaced in other provinces want to. Many still feel their original areas are unsafe. Very few refugees have come back from other countries however.

Baghdad has also been pushing for Iraqis to return, but Human Rights First believes it actually might be detrimental. In late 2007 the government began to encourage Iraqis to come back. In 2008 they created a national policy on refugees and the displaced written with the help of the United Nations, and conforming to international norms. They called on Iraqis to return because the country was safe, and they could be protected. The plan allows the displaced to vote in elections, provides aid, and includes the eviction of squatters to resolve property issues. At the same time, Baghdad also tried to force refugees to come back from other countries. In 2007 Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki told Syria and Jordan to tighten their visa requirements to stem the flow of Iraqis to those two countries. In early 2008 the government talked Germany out of taking in minorities. Iraqi, Syrian and U.N. sources told Human Rights First that the Iraqi leadership was against helping the displaced because they believe the displacement crisis made the country look bad. They also thought that refugees who refused to go back were traitors.

Human Rights First also found that the refugee policy was not being applied evenly. In August 2008 the International Organization for Migration reported that militias were selling houses illegally that they had seized from people in Baghdad, Diyala, Tamim, and Ninewa with the help of local security forces. Some refugees said they believed the government was still sectarian. The government for example, was supposed to create two centers to assist returns in Baghdad, one in the Shiite east and one in the Sunni west. Only the center in the Shiite area was opened. Other refugees thought the return program was part of campaigning for the upcoming elections. In general, many did not trust the government.

This was why Human Rights First did not think that Baghdad’s refugee program was good. It thought that it was important that the government began an eviction process, but dealing with property issues was not the only thing that would help the displaced. It believes that Baghdad needs to provide the rule of law, punish those that carry out attacks and abuses, get rid of sectarianism, protect minorities, expel militias, and deal with Kirkuk and other disputed territories. Minorities especially, are still being targeted, while violence against women is increasing. Some refugees have also been attacked and intimidated after their returns. None of this is helping with the situation. Overall, Human Rights First believed that the Maliki government lacked earnestness when dealing with the plight of refugees.

The U.S. has also not had a real strategy to deal with this problem. President Bush and Secretary of State Rice hardly talk about the issue. The 2008 and 2009 budgets for example, had no funds for Iraq’s refugees. It was because of Congress that $500 million was set aside for fiscal year 2008 and $350 million in 2008 for Iraq’s displaced. This has meant a dramatic increase in aid and programs. The U.S. has also taken in more Iraqis. In 2006 202 Iraqis were admitted, followed by 1,608 in 2007 and 13,823 in 2008. There is still no real U.S. leadership however. The Bush White House has argued that returns are the solution, and this will happen when security improves.

Human Rights First believes that the Obama administration needs to make a real commitment to this crisis. They need to help those that want to go back, and those that don’t. It recommended setting benchmarks for the Iraqi government to meet. If they are not met, the U.S. should withdraw support form the Ministry of Displacement and Migration, and focus upon non-government organizations and direct aid to Iraqis. The U.S. should also encourage Prime Minister Maliki to provide accurate information on the situation within Iraq to refugees so that their returns are voluntary. The Americans also have to provide aid to host countries like Syria and Jordan, convince them to ease their visa restrictions on Iraqis, as well as facilitate the immigration of those Iraqis that have no plans to go home. Finally, a property claims/compensation program needs to be started even if the families never return. In order to ensure that this will be carried out, Human Rights First calls for a high level official to be appointed by the incoming president solely to focus upon Iraq’s refugees.

“How to Confront the Iraqi Refugee Crisis” provides not only a good synopsis of the causes and effects of Iraq’s displacement, but analysis as well, in a short and to the point report. It shows that Iraqi refugees outside the country and displaced within it are still suffering major problems providing for themselves and obtaining support. Although some Iraqis have begun to return, Baghdad is not doing a good job dealing with them, and in fact, may be making the situation worse because it is more interested in image than implementation. Those that are coming back are mostly the displaced, with Iraq’s two million refugees staying in their new homes. This is probably due to the fact that they are largely Sunni and minorities who have been the victims of the Shiite parties and militias that now run Iraq. Until there is more trust and effective government it is unlikely that large numbers of refugees will ever return to Iraq. That places a large onus on the U.S. and international community to provide for these people, and the countries where they reside. That is the main point of the report, Iraq’s refugee crisis is an on-going event that is getting worse for many Iraqis, and needs the full attention of the new American administration.

SOURCES

Ferris, Elizabeth, “The Real Challenge of Internal Displacement in Iraq: The Future,” Brookings Institution, 12/6/07

Human Rights First, “How to Confront the Iraqi Refugee Crisis,” December 2008
Overview

International Organization for Migration, “Anbar, Baghdad & Diyala, Governorate Profiles,” December 2008

Ministry of Displacement and Migration & International Organization for Migration, “Returnee Monitoring and Needs Assessments Tabulation Report,” September 2008

Brookings-University of Bern report on Iraq’s Minorities

In late December 2008 the Brookings Institution and the University of Bern, Germany released a report on Iraq’s minorities and refugees entitled “Minorities, Displacement and Iraq’s Future.” Although the paper was meant to be about all of Iraq’s minority groups, it largely focused upon the country’s Christians. It’s major findings were that Iraq’s small religious and ethnic groups have been targeted and attacked relentlessly since the U.S. invasion, driving a disproportionate amount from their homes, and out of the country. Unless these groups are re-integrated Iraq will be less diverse and tolerant, and a largely segregated country due to the sectarian war.

Estimates On Iraq’s Minorities:
Christians: 2003: 1-1.4 million, Today, 600,000-800,000
Jews: 2003: a few hundred, Today: 10-15
Mandeans: 2003: 30,000, Today: Fewer than 13,000
Palestinians: 2003: 35,000, Today: 15,000
Turkomen: 2003: 800,000 claimed, Today: as few as 200,000
Yazidis: 2003: No known, Today: around 550,000

The Brookings Institution and the University of Bern defined Iraq’s minorities as the country’s smallest religious and ethnic groups. These consist of the Armenian, Syriac, and Chaldo-Assyrian Christian, Bahai, Jewish, Mandean, and Yazidi religions, along with the Faili Kurds, Palestinians, Shabaks, and Turkomen. Many of these groups have lived in Iraq for over 1,000 years. All of them were treated differently under the Saddam Hussein regime. The Bahais and Fayli Kurds were persecuted, while the Palestinians were given special treatment. Since the U.S. invasion they have all faced similar situations. These include a lack of power, persecution, and attacks. The country’s Jews for example have mostly disappeared, having fled Iraq, while the Palestinians are trapped with nowhere to go.

The religious and ethnic parties studied in the report are different from the Sunnis and Kurds who each are numerical minorities. The Sunnis ran the country under Saddam, have large numbers of politicians, and are a junior partner in the ruling coalition behind Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. They have also conducted a bloody insurgency that still continues in parts of Iraq. The Kurds on the other hand, were attacked and persecuted under Saddam, but since the Gulf War have gained more and more autonomy. Under the old regime, Kurds faced Saddam’s Arabization program and Operation Anfal that pushed out over 100,000 from northern Iraq, and killed around the same amount. After 2003, the Kurds were able to form the Kurdistan Regional Government incorporating the provinces of Dohuk, Irbil, and Sulamaniyah. The Kurds were also one of the major groups that drafted the constitution, and got Article 140 included that provides a mechanism for them to annex disputed areas such as Kirkuk. They are also the second largest bloc in parliament after the Shiites. Most of the Kurdish refugees have also resettled in Kurdistan rather than in other countries. Only 1% of Iraqis living in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt and Turkey are Kurds. Many have also been able to resettle in areas of northern Iraq where Saddam forced them out. None of these experiences are the same as the minorities looked at by Brookings and the University of Bern.

All of Iraq’s minorities have been singled out for discrimination and attacks. Christians and Yazidis were prominent in the alcohol industry, which has brought on attacks by both Shiite and Sunni Islamists. Christians were seen as a symbol of the West, and killed by both Al Qaeda in Iraq and the Mahdi Army. In October 2008, Christians in Mosul were attacked riving out over 2,000 families. Only one-third has returned since then. As a result of this violence, a large number of each group has been displaced or fled to other countries. The Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration estimates that about half of Iraq’s minorities have left the country. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) believes 30% of Iraqi refugees are minorities. The Mandeans fear that this displacement might mean their end because they won’t be able to find marriage partners. You can only be a member of their religion by being born into it.

Because many of Iraq’s minorities live in the north, they are also caught in the middle of the political battle between the Arabs and Kurds. This is especially true in places like Mosul and Kirkuk. In those areas and others Kurds have aspirations to annex large swaths of territory, which Arabs generally oppose. Many feel pressed to assimilate to one of the larger groups for protection and patronage. The minorities lack tribal affiliations, large numbers of politicians, and some are pacifists. The smaller minorities then either have to align with a larger group or leave because of the relentless pressure upon them.

The Kurds especially in places like Ninewa province have been playing on these fears. They provide aid, security, housing and funding for churches to Christians, but many believe this is to win over their votes and form a patronage system with them so that they become dependent upon the Kurds.There are reports that Christians can’t get jobs unless they join one of the major Kurdish parties for example. Their policy has apparently worked as the Christian community is split over the future of Ninewa. The largest Assyrian Christian Party, the Assyrian Democratic Movement, has supported the central government against the Kurds, but the three smaller Christian parties have joined with the Kurds and called for the annexation of northern sections of Ninewa to Kurdistan believing that they would be safer with the Kurds than with Baghdad.

The Provincial Election Law shows how minorities are caught up in this larger power struggle between Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis. When the act was finally passed it dropped a provision to provide quotas for minority seats on provincial councils. Later, an amendment was added, but it only gave six out of 440 seats for minorities when the United Nations had asked for 12. Christians got one seat each in Baghdad, Ninewa, and Basra, Yazidis got one seat in Ninewa, the Sabeans one in Baghdad, and the Shabaks a seat in Ninewa. Minorities can run for other seats, but Iraqis have tended to vote along sectarian lines. The law was heralded as another step towards reconciliation, but not for the country’s minorities. They felt slighted, and believed this was another way to keep them marginalized and powerless.

The reason why their numbers were reduced in the final election amendment was because of the conflict between Arabs and Kurds. The Arabs believed that most of these minorities would vote with the Kurds, and support their plans for expansion. The Kurds on the other hand did not want many of these groups designated as minorities because they consider them Kurds. With minority quotas they were afraid they would not get as many votes. Many Yazidis for example do consider themselves Kurds. Both sides also believed that with no quota minorities would be more dependent upon them to get government assistance.

In order to resolve this issue the Brookings Institution and the Bern University say that the thousands of minorities that have fled the country need to return, be re-integrated, and be protected. A small portion of Iraq’s four million plus refugees have begun going back to their homes and provinces. The UNHCR has recorded no minorities coming back however. In order for this to happen, they have to be assured of their safety first. This has not happened for those still in the country. The government also needs to deal with property disputes. Baghdad has started some policies on evicting squatters, but they are not being applied evenly. There is also not enough evidence yet that this is having any influence on whether Iraqis come back or not. The election law was also not something that would encourage minorities. If they don’t come back, then Iraq will be a less diverse and tolerant country the paper warns. When minorities leave, those left behind are often victimized making the whole situation worse.

If minorities do come back they need to be able to return to their original communities as well. This would be part of the process of reversing the sectarian cleansing that occurred from 2006 to 2007. If minorities, along with all the Sunnis and Shiites can’t return to their neighborhoods than Iraq will be a segregated nation. Families will be internally displaced living with friends or relatives where their group is the majority. Iraq could end up like Bosnia where international effort has led to a country that still has hundreds of thousands of displaced thirteen years after the Dayton Peace Accords.

Finally, the report ends with six suggestions to help relieve this problem. First, Baghdad needs to prevent future displacement, which is the basic job of any government to protect its citizens. This also includes providing jobs and services. Second, Brookings and Bern believe the government and the international community shouldn’t focus just upon specific groups, but all minorities in general. This will make for more equitable policies. Third, a property resolution system needs to be created. Fourth, the international community needs to consult with the minorities about their needs. Fifth, the host countries where many of these minorities have fled need to receive aid to help support them. Last, because some people may never go back to Iraq they need to be repatriated to Europe and the United States.

The Brookings Institution and the University of Bern provide a general overview of the problems facing Iraq’s minorities. All of the country’s small religious and ethnic groups have been victimized since the U.S. invasion. Thousands have fled their homes, and the country as a result. This has placed entire communities in jeopardy. In fact, some of the smaller groups like the Mandeans fear that they will go extinct if this continues. Many of those still in the country are concentrated in the north where they are trapped in the rivalry between the Arabs and Kurds. As the Provincial Election Law amendment on quotas shows, without strong representation minorities are open to political manipulation, which again does not bode well for their future in Iraq as the larger and more powerful groups can largely determine their future. The major problem with the report is that it only really gives evidence of the Christians, without really telling what’s happening to the other groups in any detail. Providing the larger structural problems is not all bad however. In the end, given their position, it doesn’t appear that Iraq’s minorities will have a safe future in Iraq any time soon. Iraq has to overcome all of its major divisions first, before it can even deal with the smaller groups. Until then, the country’s minorities will most likely continue to be pawns in the larger struggles between Arabs and Kurds, while still being attacked for being different.

SOURCES

Ferris, Elizabeth and Stoltz, Kimberly, “Minorities, Displacement and Iraq’s Future,” Brookings Institution-University of Bern, December 2008

Hanna, Michael Wahid, “Through the cracks,” The National, 12/19/08

Paley, Amit, “Strip of Iraq ‘on the Verge of Exploding,’” Washington Post, 9/13/08

Timmerman, Kenneth, “Christians Face Extinction in Northern Iraq,” Newsmax.com, 4/24/08