Al Qaeda In Iraq’s Excesses That Could Eventually Cost It

 

Dr. Michael Knights of the Washington Institute for Near East Studies recently testified to a joint committee of the United States House of Representatives that Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) couldn’t help but overstep itself. During the early part of the Iraq War the Islamist organization tried to impose its foreign version of Islam upon Iraq, and intimidated and executed those that disagreed with it. It was actions such as those that eventually turned many Iraqis against it. Today, AQI is making a comeback establishing bases again within the country and carrying out a dizzying array of bombings. As the group looks to gain territory it is returning to its bad habits, which will eventually cost it sometime down the road.

As part of its Soldier’s Harvest campaign Al Qaeda is seeking to take and hold areas of Iraq. It has already established itself in regions of Anbar, Diyala, Salahaddin, and Babil provinces. There the group is not only setting up bases and training camps, but also once again trying to dictate its version of Islam upon the populace. Al-Shorfa recently interviewed several people from the village of Jura south of Samarra in Salahaddin governorate, which was temporarily under AQI control. During that period Al Qaeda began passing out flyers setting out rules on how it wanted people to act and behave. Those included not working for or cooperating with the security forces, all women had to wear the hijab, men could not wear western style clothes such as trousers, shirts, and neckties, parents should not buy PlayStations for their children, and schools had to separate boys and girls. A store that sold western clothing was bombed, and some residents were publicly whipped for breaking these strictures. These are the exact same tactics that Al Qaeda followed before that turned much of the population against them. In Anbar for example, many sheikhs complained about how the Islamists would kill anyone that disagreed with them. It murdered sheikhs, beheaded some and booby-trapped others with explosives. It dragged women and children out into the streets to discipline them and scared people into follow their orders. The Islamists went from allies of the Iraqis to their enemies. After a few years of this type of rule many locals turned against the organization. The same thing is likely to happen again as AQI moves into towns like Jura and attempts to impose its will over it.

Al Qaeda may be a successful terrorist organization, but it will never be a popular movement. Its form of Islam is too strict and foreign for Iraqis to ever accept. Its threats against men for wearing t-shirts and blowing up a store that sold them is just one example of how the group will over overstep its welcome. AQI is only just now attempting to gain territory in Iraq, and therefore has only been able to hand out its flyers in a few places. If it is able to spread its influence it will eventually anger the locals. It will then be up to the government to take advantage of the situation by reaching out to the people and offering them protection and safety from the extremists. Given Iraq’s intense divisions and the short-term thinking of its leaders it’s not clear that Baghdad is able to think in those terms. As Dr. Knights pointed out in that same Congressional hearing the security forces have purposely abandoned counterinsurgency tactics, because the central government did not want to work with the populace. If the security situation worsens it may be forced to otherwise the country will only descend further into violence, and it will be just as much the authorities fault as the insurgents.

SOURCES

Knights, Dr. Michael, testimony on “The Resurgence of al-Qaeda in Iraq” to Joint Subcommittee Hearing, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, 12/12/13

McWilliams, Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy, and Wheeler, Lieutenant Colonel Kurtis, ed., Al-Anbar Awakening Volume II, Iraqi Perspectives, From Insurgency to Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009, Virginia: Marine Corps University, 2009

Al-Qaisi, Mohammed, “Al-Qaeda in Iraq dictates men’s clothing choices,” Al-Shorfa, 12/20/13

RUSSIA TODAY VIDEO: Year of Bloodshed In Iraq Interview With Iraq Body Count

Iraqi Women Before And After The 2003 Invasion, Interview With Prof Nadje Al-Ali Univ of London

 

Professor Nadje Al-Ali is a professor of gender studies at SOAS, University of London. She has authored several books and articles on the history and present state of Iraqi women including Iraqi Women: Untold Stories From 1948 to the Present and What Kind of Liberation?: Women and the Occupation of Iraq, and was one of the editors of We Are Iraqis: Aesthetics and Politics in a Time of War. The Iraq War has given rise to a number of contradictory stories about women in Iraq. One is that Iraqi women were liberated and on the rise under Saddam, and then all that was reversed after the 2003 invasion as religious parties gained control and attempted to impose their views upon society. An opposing view was that Iraq was a typical Arab Muslim country where women had a secondary role, but then the Americans freed them from these restrictions. To try to provide a clearer picture of what women have gone through both before and after the fall of Saddam Hussein is an interview with Prof. Al-Ali.

1. The Baath took power in Iraq in the 1968 coup. It had a modernizing vision for Iraq, which Saddam Hussein partially implemented when he assumed control of the country. Part of that was opening up opportunities for women. That accelerated during the 1980s when many men were drawn into the military for the Iran-Iraq War. What exactly was the Baathist vision for women and what kind of policies did Saddam carry out during the 1970s and 1980s?

Iraqi women at university in Iraq in the 1970s

The Baath regime came to power in 1968, and Saddam Hussein actually became president in 1979, so there was a decade when he was vice president. The Baath Party’s ideology initially was very secular, Arab socialist, and nationalist, and I think very similar to other post-colonial secular leaders in the region like Ataturk and also the Shah of Iran. In the 1950s and 60s and 70s in many countries in the region there was a push to modernize and an understanding that this process meant pushing women into education and the labor force. This process was sped up in the Iraqi context because of the economic conditions. In the early 70s there was an oil crisis, and then afterward oil prices shot up and so all the oil producing countries had their economies boom. While some of the other countries like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait dealt with this boom and expanding economy by trying to bring in foreign laborers the Iraqi government tried to mobilize its own human resources, 50% of which was women. In the 70s there was a very strong push for women’s education. Lots of schools were built, lots of universities were built, lots of scholarships were made available to women, also to study abroad to get M.A.’s and PhD’s. There were systems in place that allowed women to have families and children and work. For example childcare was free, and transportation to work and school was free. Those were the kinds of systems put in place that allowed women to have active working lives. And when I say women I mean mainly the urban women, although in the countryside there were also literacy campaigns. There was also something called the General Federation of Iraqi Women that was like the female branch of the Baath Party, and it was responsible for implementing some of the state’s modernizing policies. For instance, it had a big campaign to raise awareness about health and hygiene, how to feed children, and it also had a very successful literacy campaign. At the end of the 70s Iraq actually received a prize from UNESCO for being the country that managed to raise its female literacy the quickest.

Saddam posing with Iraqi school girls in the 1970s

You can speak about the ideology of the Baath, which was secular and socialist in outlook with a centralized state and wanting to modernize. In other ways it was just being pragmatic. It was responding to the situation on the ground and decided that it had human resources and it should take advantage of them. Lots of Iraqi women, even those who were in opposition to the regime and who might have suffered under the regime, who I have talked to think with nostalgia about the 70s when there was an expanding economy, social-economic rights, and the state was quite generous. In my mind, it is not true that Saddam Hussein and the Baath Party lasted so long just because they brutally repressed the population. I think they also bought off the expanding middle class. In terms of social-economic rights, in terms of access to education, health care, having a house, a freezer, a car, people could do quite well if they didn’t open up their mouths. This was all in the 1970s

Than in the 1980s there was the Iran-Iraq War. During that period things changed drastically. Lots of the state funding, instead of channeling it into education, health care, and child care, it got channeled into the military, and that’s when things started to shift. But because it was such a long war where thousands and thousands of men fought and died that also meant that over a long period of time women started taking over many of the roles that men initially played not only in terms of different jobs in the labor force, but also in the state bureaucracy and administration. So women became very visible in the 80s.

There was also a shift in state ideology. It wasn’t about the good Iraqi woman being the educated, working woman like in the 70s, but in the 80s the good Iraqi woman became the mother of future soldiers. At some point, Saddam Hussein said that every good Iraqi woman should have five children. The government made abortion illegal, contraception illegal, and it gave very generous subsidies to baby foods, and things like that.

2. In 1989 the Iran-Iraq War ended and there was a demobilization of the military, and then shortly afterwards Iraq invaded Kuwait and faced international sanctions. How did those changes affect the status of women?

What really had a devastating affect upon Iraqi women was not the Gulf War in 1991, but the 13 years of economic sanctions. To my mind I feel that part of history should not be forgotten. You can’t actually understand contemporary Iraq without understanding the impact that the sanctions had on society. Lots has been written and talked about the humanitarian crisis that occurred during that period in terms of health care and education. When it came to women it really triggered a shift to greater social conservatism. That had different causes. One was that when people are fighting and struggling over resources and over jobs there is often a call for women to go back home and look after the children. That happened in Iraq where in some parts you had up to 70% unemployment. The state couldn’t afford all these generous welfare policies anymore or pay salaries. A large percentage of Iraqi women who had been in the public sector were suddenly told the state couldn’t afford them to work anymore, because they couldn’t pay for child care, transportation, and salaries. The other thing was that by the 1990s there was a huge demographic imbalance between men and women because more men had been killed in the Iran-Iraq War and Saddam’s political persecution had driven more men to flee the country. By the 90s there was 55-60% women, with many female-headed households and many widows. Before there was an extended family network that would support people, but by the 90s each nuclear family was just busy surviving.

One of the things that happened was that there was an increase in prostitution. That was also partly pushed by the regime and a class of nouveau rich and war profiteers who made lots of money from smuggling. The big impact wasn’t that suddenly there was so much more prostitution, but that there was an awareness that there was more prostitution. Eventually the regime crackdown on prostitution, because although it was initially behind creating the market for it the regime got very embarrassed when the Jordanian government complained about the number of Iraqi women who came to Jordan to work as prostitutes. Afterwards it was a matter of protecting the honor of the nation, so Saddam’s son Uday brutally cracked down on a number of prostitutes and pimps and publicly beheaded them. In the aftermath there was a panic and lots of families became very protective of their daughters, sisters, and wives. Lots of Iraqi women told me that in previous decades, female students had been able to go after school or university for coffee or ice cream with their friends, but during the 90s, they weren’t able to do that anymore. They had to dress much more conservatively. Mobility became more difficult. The dress code became much more constrained. Even more seriously polygamy increased during the sanctions period. As families were struggling to survive some families agreed to have their daughters get married to older men who had more money as a kind of survival strategy.

This shift towards greater social conservatism in the 90s is an important background in order to understand what happened after 2003. Also, lots of people had left by 2003 including many secular, educated, and middle class people, and this has had an impact on what’s going on today. 

3. After the 2003 invasion the Coalition Provisional Authority said that it attempted to make some changes to the country that would empower women as part of transforming the society. They set up a quota system for example that reserved 25% of the seats in parliament for women. Do you think the Americans were able to make any progress for women?

First we need to challenge the idea that the United States installed the quota system. The quota system was enshrined in the constitution and previously in the Transitional Administrative Law despite objections from the CPA, particularly Paul Bremer. In the spring of 2004 a delegation of Iraqi women’s rights activists went to see Paul Bremer, and asked for 40% representation in the parliament saying that women actually make up the majority of the Iraqi population. They told him that Iraqi women had played an important role in keeping the country together during the dictatorship and the Iran-Iraq War, and now women wanted a piece of the new Iraq. Bremer looked at them and said “We don’t do quotas.” It was only due to intense lobbying on behalf of Iraqi women’s rights activists and transnational women’s solidarity by international organizations and media coverage of this lobbying that the Transitional Administrative Law and later the constitution included a compromise 25% of seats quota for women in parliament. This was due to pressure from Iraqis and international groups, not because the Americans put it together.

Secondly, I personally think that a quota can be a positive thing, but not in and of itself. If a quota is the only thing there is then it is not doing that much to represent women. What has happened in Iraq is that the 25% of parliament who are women are to a large extent the wives, sisters, and daughters of male politicians. They are also often very conservative male politicians. One should say that it has allowed some outspoken women into the parliament, but that is just a small number. It’s also complicated because over a period of time women who initially looked towards how the men were voting before they put up their own hand started to develop their own views and voices and sometimes work across religious and ethnic lines with other women on some issues that are less controversial like access to health care for example or education.

On the other hand without the quota there probably would be hardly any women in the parliament. If you have conservative Islamist members of parliament you might as well have some of them be women. But that doesn’t mean they protect women’s rights, and we need to be clear about that.

Another thing to be said about the quota is that it is not applied consistently. It is applied in parliament, but not in the ministries or within any of the important committees that decide things, so it is quite inconsistently applied. A quota only really works if it is linked to other measures and policies, so if it is just a quota and everything else is gender blind then it is really only cosmetic.

4. There are many religious parties that run the country such as the Dawa, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, the Sadrists, the Iraqi Islamic Party, etc. What kind of impact have those parties had?

I think we need to distinguish between an Islamic view, which many Iraqis were ready for because after all they had experienced a brutal dictatorship for several decades, which was secular. So as a reaction to that many people thought that a more Islamic government would be the solution. I think that the Islamist parties that have come to power post-2003 are not just Islamists but sectarian. I hold the politicians who lived outside of Iraq for a long time and were in the opposition partly responsible for the increase in sectarianism. I don’t think it’s right to say that sectarianism didn’t exist before 2003, and certainly Saddam Hussein played on sectarianism and he did stir up sectarian sentiments, but these new political parties helped by the CPA, which based the Iraqi Governing Council on ethnic and sectarian divisions, and then the first elections institutionalized sectarian politics. So it’s not only Islamism, which is already problematic, but its Islamist-sectarianism imposed from above. I think right now on one hand many people are really fed up with the Islamist-sectarian politicians, and on the other hand I think sectarianism is really deep and engrained, much more so than it was during the height of sectarian tensions in 2007.

Speaking more specifically about women clearly they are getting it from both sides. On the one hand they have now been exposed to a government that’s largely been based upon Islamist politics, which is either ignoring issues related to women or the laws around like the Personal Status Code, which is a set of laws that governs divorce, marriage, and inheritance. There is a strong push to create one that is a more conservative interpretation of Sharia law as opposed to the one before that has been in place since 1959. That one was also  based upon Sharia law, but it was a progressive reading. I think women are now being used by the Islamist government to show that they are different from the previous regime, which was secular. At the same time, women are being used by insurgents and various militia groups to show resistance to western imperialism. So women are being crushed by both sides by these conservative Islamist forces. 

Children heading to school in Baghdad (NY Times)

5. You talked about how woman had a lot more opportunities in the 1970s and 80s, and how that changed during the sanctions period. How about today because most U.N. reports that talk about women in terms of schooling and work force participation show very low numbers?

One big issue is security. Sending your children to school in general is scary for many parents. For girls, parents worry even more, especially in neighborhoods that are not safe. There are threats in terms of kidnapping, forced prostitution, and trafficking. Lots of young women are being trafficked out of Iraq. Those kinds of risks and threats and lack of security negatively impact young women’s education as well as labor force participation, because parents worry about sending their daughters out. Women do work, but there is a lot of unemployment in Iraq generally so there is competition for jobs. I have a lot of contacts in universities, and women work there, but their opportunities are very limited.

6. Looking into the future Iraq is a country that has a lot of potential. Do you see opportunities for women opening up for them in the coming years?

Defintely. Iraqi women have been extremely resourceful, creative and courageous over these past decades, and they will continue to be so in the future. There is a very active women’s movement across central and southern Iraq as well as in Iraqi Kurdistan. Women are not only lobbing for more equality and women’s rights, but they are also at the forefront of the opposition against authoritarianism, sectarianism, and corruption. I have been very impressed by some young women who are determined to educate themselves and make a difference in Iraq. However, I think that short-term, or even the next decade, will be extremely tough for women as they are squeezed between Islamists, corrupt politicians, a police and judiciary that is not very sympathetic to women’s plights, such as various forms of gender-based violence, mafia-type gangs and militia, as well as a revival of conservative tribal leaders and practices.

VIDEO: The Life Of Women In Iraq

HEBREW UNIVERSITY VIDEO: Sectarianism And Politics: The Cases of Iraq and Lebanon 2009

Understanding Anbar Before & After the Awakening Pt. VIII Sheikh Majid al-Sulaiman

 

Sheikh Majid Abdul al-Razzaq Ali al-Sulaiman is one of the two elder sheikhs of the Dulaim tribe, one of the largest in Anbar province. He is the uncle of Sheikh Ali Hatem Sulaiman, and both were leaders in the Awakening movement. The elder Sulaiman has an interesting story because he fled to Jordan in the 1990s after he took part in a failed coup against Saddam Hussein and become involved in opposition politics. After 2003 he quickly became disillusioned with the American occupation and retreated to Anbar. There he became a target of Al Qaeda in Iraq, and that was what led Sulaiman to join the Awakening. That movement quickly became divided by personal rivalries and broke up into different factions. Sheikh Sulaiman’s story therefore covers the gamut of changes that took place in Anbar both before and after the 2003 invasion.

Sheikh Majid al-Sulaiman got involved in the Iraqi opposition movement in the 1990s. He was suspected in a failed coup against Saddam Hussein that led him to flee to Amman, Jordan. There he became involved in the various exile groups that were against the Baathist regime. That put him in contact with people like Iyad Allawi, Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim, Massoud Barzani, Ahmed Chalabi, Jalal Talabani, and the Americans. He went to two major meetings of the opposition in London, one in 2000 and another in 2003. There they argued about what to do with Baath Party members, the army, and other issues in a post-Saddam Iraq, but came to no agreement as there were deep divisions between the different leaders. Instead, Allawi got the sheikh involved with the Americans. After a number of meetings with U.S. officials in the United Arab Emirates and Jordan, Sulaiman was convinced to contact several generals in Anbar, and even returned to Iraq where he handed out satellite phones in Ramadi, Fallujah, and Abu Ghraib to sources that would collect intelligence for Washington. Sulaiman highlights the diversity of the opposition to Saddam. There were religious parties like the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, there were ethnic parties like the two Kurdish ones, and there were nationalists and former Baathists like the Iraqi National List, along with sheikhs like Sulaiman. Ultimately the wide range of groups and personalities meant that the opposition could never come to any kind of consensus.

When the U.S. invasion finally came, Sulaiman was quickly disappointed with its aftermath. He along with Iyad Allawi were taken to the Iraq-Jordan border by the United States to enter after the fall of the regime. He found the Trebil border crossing abandoned and being looted. Then after being greeted by his Dulaim tribe in Ramadi he was called for a meeting in Baghdad with Jay Garner the head of the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) on April 28, which was the first American-led group in charge of post-war Iraq. This was a famous meeting where 300-400 Iraqis asked who was in charge of Iraq, who would provide services, etc. and Garner told them that they were. The attendees then exploded in rage, and the conference ended in discord. Paul Bremer and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) quickly replaced the ORHA and Garner. Sulaiman was just as unhappy with them as with the ORHA. The sheikh was opposed to dissolving both the military and the Baath Party, and believed that the border was being left unguarded allowing Al Qaeda and the Iranians to flow into the country. Sulaiman then met with Adnan Pachachi, Barzani, Chalabi, Hakim, Allawi’s representative Nouri Badra, and Hoshyar Zebari in the Green Zone with Bremer. All of them had complaints about what the CPA was doing, but Bremer would not budge from his policies. When it came to forming the Iraqi Governing Council Sulaiman was asked to join, but he declined, because he was so upset with the CPA. He also complained that the Americans were trying to form a new Iraqi leadership along ethnosectarian lines. The sheikh became so upset with what was happening with the U.S. occupation that he gave up on trying to play a role in Baghdad, and returned to Anbar. Many other Iraqis were just as angry at this period. Some decided that they were better served staying in the capital and working with the Americans to attempt to gain power. Sulaiman however was so disillusioned that he returned to his home in Anbar.

Sulaiman’s time in Anbar didn’t turn out well either. A new provisional government had been set up, and the new Governor Abdul Karim Burjis al-Rawi was trying to get the administration up and running. He sold some government stock to pay public employees, found jobs for 2,000 Anbaris in Baghdad as guards, and got the Americans to pay some civil servants as well such as teachers. That move towards stability was quickly ended when Sulaiman’s house was bombed. He then went for a meeting in Baghdad when Al Qeada in Iraq (AQI) ambushed his entourage. The Islamists quickly became the major issue in Anbar beheading people, banning certain practices, and attempting to assert their control over businesses. Sulaiman believed that Al Qaeda was actually working for Iran. This was an idea shared by many Anbaris who tried to explain the chaotic post-war situation by blaming an enemy they knew, Tehran, for nearly everything that was happening. Anbar quickly became a hotbed of insurgent activity. That disrupted all of the attempts to put the province back together, and those early positive moves were replaced by more and more chaos and violence.

The excesses of Al Qaeda eventually turned the tribes against it and led to the rise of the Awakening. In Amman, Jordan, Sheikh Abdul Abu Risha held a conference of several prominent Anbar sheikhs to discuss putting together a tribal force to fight AQI. Sulaiman knew Abu Risha from before, and had a low opinion of him. Sulaiman called him a highwayman and a gangster, and thought that actually made him the right person to fight the Islamists. That led the sheikh to sign on to the Awakening and get his Dulaim tribe to support it. Many others in Anbar felt the same way. Al Qaeda came to Iraq claiming that it was there to help the Iraqis expel the Americans, but it came with its own foreign agenda, which did not sit well with Anbaris. Their killing of everyone who did not disagree with them was a perfect example of their excesses.

The Awakening turned out to be an effective fighting force, but a failure at politics. After security was turned around in Anbar, the tribes tried their hand at local and national politics. Sulaiman however claimed that some sheikhs were only concerned about their own personal gain, and that led to the dissolution of the movement. He was also critical of the Americans, stating that they were just like Saddam creating their own sheikhs by handing out money and weapons to them. Sulaiman didn’t say it outright, but he was talking about Sheikh Abu Risha. He came from a very small tribe in Anbar, and became the governorates most prominent individual meeting with General Petraues, President Bush, and others. Like the Iraqi exile opposition the Awakening had too many personalities with their own agendas. When the common threat of Al Qaeda was vanquished those differences came out, and the Awakening broke up into various groups, which were nothing more than personal vehicles for their leaders like Abu Risha and Sulaiman.

Sheikh Sulaiman’s story highlighted the fracturing of Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein. Before the 2003 invasion the sheikh participated in the exile movement, then worked with both the ORHA and CPA, and eventually joined the Anbar Awakening. The opposition couldn’t agree on what to do about Saddam. The ORHA and CPA didn’t have a plan for the country, and the Iraqis that attempted to cooperate with it didn’t agree with much of what the Americans did. Even when Sulaiman joined something successful like the Awakening those good times didn’t last. The opposition, the U.S., and the Awakening could not unify the different groups and individuals that wanted power after the fall of the Baathist regime. Instead there were always too many voices something that still plagues the country to this day.

SOURCES

McWilliams, Chief Warrant Officer-4 Timothy, and Wheeler, Lieutenant Colonel Kurtis, ed., Al-Anbar Awakening Volume II, Iraqi Perspectives, From Insurgency to Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004-2009, Virginia: Marine Corps University, 2009

PBS Frontline, “”We want a Government and We Want It Now,”” Truth, War and Consequences, 10/9/03

Low Level Attacks Characterize Violence In Iraq’s Ninewa November 2013

 

According to the United Nations Iraq’s Ninewa has been the second deadliest province for most of 2013. That’s because the governorate capital Mosul is the major urban base for the insurgency. Al Qaeda in Iraq, the Baathist Naqshibandi and others have been able to assert control over wide swaths of the city and surrounding area. Unlike places like Baghdad where mass casualty bombings are the norm, in Ninewa violence consists mostly of low-level shootings and roadside bombs but with no less deadly results.

November 2013 saw the most reported attacks in Ninewa since the beginning of the year. According to the Iraqi press there were a total of 142 security incidents last month averaging out to 4.73 per day. The previous highs were in September and July when there were 114 attacks each. As usual, Mosul was the center of insurgent activity with 99 attacks, 69% of the total. To show how much the city has dominated violence Qayara had the second most incidents for the month with only six. For the year the provincial capital has accounted for 69%-87% of all attacks in Ninewa. 

Reported Attacks In Ninewa 2013

Month	Attacks	Avg. Attacks Per Day	Attacks In Mosul	Bombings	Shootings
Jan	65	2.09	57	28	34
Feb	78	2.78	62	48	32
Mar	100	3.22	73	54	50
Apr	74	2.46	55	41	29
May	110	3.54	89	50	58
Jun	98	3.26	68	53	41
Jul	114	3.67	85	63	55
Aug	107	3.45	83	68	45
Sep	114	3.80	85	93	52
Oct	89	2.87	74	53	41
Nov	142	4.73	99	65	81

For the third straight month there have been nearly 200 deaths recorded in the province. In November there were 195 killed. That compared to 218 in October and 193 in September. The number of deaths has been slowly climbing up since the beginning of the year. The make up of those casualties has changed as well. At the start of 2013 nearly half or more of the dead were members of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). In January for example 39 of the 69 killed were from the ISF, in February 58 of 113 were from the police and army, and in March 60 of the 102 were security force members. In October and November however only 37% and 38% of the fatalities have been from the ISF respectively. The same trend can be seen in the wounded with 52% of the 57 wounded in January, 78% of the 65 in February and 56% of the 119 in March were from the police and army. Starting in June however more civilians have been wounded. In November, there were 251 wounded with 73 coming from the ISF, 29% of the total, and 176 civilians, 70%. The change in emphasis from the police and army to civilians is likely due to the fact that insurgents feel like they have intimidated the ISF enough that now they are trying to impose their will over the general population.

Reported Deaths In Ninewa 2013

Month	Killed	ISF Killed	Civilians Killed	Wounded	ISF Wounded	Civilians Wounded
Jan	69	39	30	57	30	27
Feb	113	58	55	65	51	14
Mar	102	60	40	119	67	52
Apr	85	61	23	94	75	19
May	128	80	48	182	116	66
Jun	122	61	61	228	105	123
Jul	180	103	74	223	99	124
Aug	128	85	41	150	59	89
Sep	193	98	94	236	78-112	135
Oct	218	81	137	339	92	247
Nov	195	76	116	251	73	176

When analyzed by type the vast majority of the attacks in Ninewa for November were low-level. Most were shootings or bombings with just 1-4 killed in each. November 1 for instance a police checkpoint was fired upon killing four officers in Mosul. November 10 a truck carrying members of the Federal Police was shot at leading to one dead and seven wounded in Mosul. November 15 a civilian car was hit by a roadside bomb in Mosul killing three and wounding 4. November 27 two teachers in Mosul were shot down. There were a few exceptions. The deadliest incident of the month occurred on November 8 when a restaurant in Mosul was bombed resulting in 11 killed and 49 wounded. November 10 a café in Mosul was bombed leading to four dead and 16 wounded. November 25 a SWAT base was hit by a suicide car bomb in Mosul with 6 deaths and 23 wounded. The first two incidents might have been retaliation for owners of the businesses refusing to pay protection money to insurgents. Intimidation of the ISF was another major focus of insurgents. November 2 two policemen were kidnapped in Baaj, a third on November 26 in Shura, and a fourth south of Mosul on the same day. Houses of police officers and soldiers have consistently been bombed as well. Two were blown up in Mosul and one in Qaraya on November 8, two soldier’s houses were destroyed in Jihla on November 10, another in Mosul on November 11, and two more in Mosul on November 17, followed by two police officer’s houses on November 26 also in that city. The goal of these attacks is to cow and cajole the populace and security forces. Insurgents are trying to show that not only can the police and army be attacked while they are doing their daily job, but that their families and homes can be targeted as well. Regular people are being hit as well to intimidate them and keep them quite about insurgent activity. The result is that the ISF might be scared to do more than just man checkpoints, and civilians will give in to the extortion and bribery rings that Al Qaeda and others run in Mosul.

Insurgent violence varies across Iraq. In the south there are only a few bombings a month aimed at major cities. In Baghdad mass casualty bombings are the main type of operation using suicide and car bombs. In other governorates like Anbar and Salahaddin militants are going after not only the security forces, but launching major attacks upon city centers, police stations, and government offices. In Ninewa it appears that militants have such sway that they are moving on to intimidation and raising money and don’t feel the need to carry out such headline grabbing acts as they do in the rest of the country. At the same time the number of dead and wounded are mounting in the province. The government has no real solution to this situation. The provincial government is run by the Nujafi family, which has an up and down relationship with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Parts of Mosul and the northern section of the governorate is controlled by the Kurds who rarely coordinate with Baghdad on security. The result is that insurgents will continue to be able to enforce their will in parts of Ninewa.

SOURCES

AIN, "2 civilians killed, injured eastern Mosul," 11/26/13

- "2 teachers killed southern Mosul," 11/27/13

- "5 family members injured southern Mosul," 11/8/13

- "8 IFP elements, civilian wounded in Mosul," 11/10/13

- "Border guard killed eastern Mosul," 11/19/13

- "Border Security Officer killed in Mosul," 11/20/13

- "Child wounded in Mosul," 11/14/13

- "Civilian injured by car bomb explosion southeastern Mosul," 11/11/13

- "Civilian killed in southern Mosul," 11/27/13

- "Civilian killed northern Mosul," 11/12/13

- "Civilian killed northern Mosul," 11/25/13

- "Farmer killed southern Mosul," 11/28/13

- "Former judge assassinated in Mosul," 11/4/13

- "House detonated western Mosul," 11/9/13

- "IA element killed southern Mosul," 11/9/13

- "IA element killed western Mosul," 11/12/13

- "IA postman killed in Mosul," 11/20/13

- "IA soldier killed western Mosul," 11/30/13

- "IA soldiers' houses detonated in southern Mosul," 11/10/13

- "IP injured southern Mosul," 11/14/13

- "IP killed western Mosul," 11/16/13

- "Man, son injured western Mosul," 11/18/13

- "Mayor killed in southern Mosul," 11/30/13

- "Mayor killed western Mosul," 11/26/13

- "Officer, soldier injured western Mosul," 11/21/13

- "Security official survives assassination in Mosul," 11/9/13

- "Shabak citizen killed eastern Mosul," 11/19/13

- "Traffic police officer gunned down eastern Mosul," 11/24/13

- "Urgent…7 gunmen killed while attacking border checkpoint of western Anbar," 11/18/13

- "Urgent…7 Security elements killed, wounded north of Mosul," 11/25/13

- "Urgent…29 Persons killed, wounded in Mosul," 11/25/13

- "Urgent … Former official assassinated in Mosul," 11/12/13

- "Urgent…Nineveh's Governor survives assassination," 11/25/13

- "Woman killed southern Mosul," 11/17/13

Buratha News, "The death of a teacher and wounding two policemen separate two incidents in Mosul," 11/23/13

- "Killed in clashes during the terrorist attack on the house of one of the terrorists elements of the security forces south of Mosul," 11/23/13

Iraq Body Count

Iraq Times, "The bombing of two houses under construction belonging to police east of Mosul," 11/26/13

Al-Mada, "Civilian killed in armed attack west of Mosul," 11/27/13

- "Director of the killing hand bath and fresh when a roadside bomb south of Mosul," 11/29/13

- "Injury to a civilian armed attack east of Mosul," 11/26/13

- "Killed armed attack east of Mosul," 11/26/13

- "Killing and wounding six civilians, when a car bomb west of Mosul," 11/25/13

- "The killing of a college student armed attack east of Mosul," 11/30/13

- "The killing of a member of the organizing pro-owners of an armed attack southeast of Mousl," 11/27/13

- "Mokhtar killed in armed attack in central Mosul," 11/26/13

National Iraqi News Agency, "2 Soldiers killed, 4 wounded south Mosul," 11/17/13

- "2 Soldiers killed in Mosul," 11/25/13

- "2 Soldiers killed west of Mosul," 11/19/13

- "2 Suicide attackers driving 2 car bombs killed west of Mosul," 11/3/13

- "3 Civilians killed in Mosul," 11/27/13

- "3 Policemen killed south of Mosul," 11/12/13

- "/3/ rockets landed in Tall Afar, west of Mosul," 11/21/13

- "4 Policemen killed in Mosul," 11/1/13

- "7 Civilians wounded in Mosul," 11/21/13

- "Badush Prison inspector assassinated," 11/15/13

- "BREAKING NEWS 6 Peshmerga, soldiers killed, wounded north of Mosul," 11/25/13

- "BREAKING NEWS 24 SWAT members, civilians killed, wounded in Mosul," 11/25/13

- "BREAKING NEWS 60 Persons killed, wounded in blowing a restaurant in Mosul," 11/8/13

- "BREAKING NEWS Commander Personalities' Protection Force in Niniveh escapes assassination attempt," 11/14/13

- "BREAKING NEWS Mayor of Hamam Aleel district killed," 11/29/13

- "BREAKING NEWS Regiment commander, 2 policemen, 6 civilians wounded in Mosul," 11/5/13

- "BREAKING NEWS. Senior army officer killed in clashes with gunmen in western Mosul," 11/19/13

- "A civilian killed and three policemen wounded in eastern Mosul," 11/19/13

- "Civilian killed in Mosul," 11/1/13

- "Dawa Party member, 2 soldiers killed in Mosul," 11/24/13

- "An element of Peshmerga killed in eastern Mosul," 11/21/13

- "An employee in IHCE killed in Mosul," 11/3/13

- "Five gunmen killed in clashes with army troops south of Mosul," 11/13/13

- "Five policemen Killed and wounded, west of Mosul," 11/21/13

- "Four houses, belonging to Shabak, blown up in Mosul," 11/14/13

- "Four soldiers killed and wounded, eastern Mosul," 11/14/13

- "Gunmen assassinated two civilians north of Mosul," 11/7/13

- "Gunmen blow up houses of a tribal Sheikh and a Colonel rank police officer in Nineveh," 11/8/13

- "Gunmen kill four officers in Mosul," 11/4/13

- "Gunmen kill three civilian from Azidiah minority in Mosul," 11/28/13

- "Gunmen kill two brothers in Mosul," 11/3/13

- "Gunmen kill two soldiers in Mosul," 11/16/13

- "Gunmen storm high school, kill an employee in Mosul," 11/24/13

- "Imam of a mosque injured,northern Mosul," 11/26/13

- "Killing and wounding six soldiers and civilians in second bombing in Mosul," 11/7/13

- "Mayor of Shabak's village killed southeastern Mosul," 11/22/13

- "Officer and soldier killed, south of Mosul," 11/20/13

- "A photographer killed in Mosul," 11/24/13

- "Police in Mosul killed 2 gunmen who assassinated mosque's imam, preacher," 11/21/13

- "Police officer killed, 5 persons wounded south Mosul," 11/22/13

- "Policeman, civilian killed in Mosul," 11/30/13

- "Policeman, detainee wounded in attack on police station in Mosul," 11/27/13

- "Policeman kidnapped in Mosul," 11/26/13

- "Policeman kidnapped in Mosul," 11/26/13

- "A policeman killed, another one wounded south of Mosul," 11/23/13

- "A policeman killed, another wounded, west of Mosul," 11/28/13

- "Policeman killed, three injured in Mosul," 11/18/13

- "Policeman killed, two civilians wounded in two separate incidents in Mosul," 11/24/13

- "Policeman, Shabak citizen killed in Mosul," 11/18/13

- "Policeman's son killed, his wife injured in Mosul," 11/14/13

-  “Senior police officer, 11 police wounded in Mosul," 11/18/13

- "A soldier killed ,his wife wounded, west of Mosul," 11/11/13

- "Soldier killed, seven police and army wounded in separate incidents in Mosul," 11/2/13

- "Three employees killed, fourth wounded in Mosul," 11/4/13

- "Three police killed, two wounded in Mosul," 11/13/13

- "Three soldiers, a civilian killed and a woman and another civilian wounded," 11/7/13

- "Three soldiers and a policeman wounded in two separate incidents in Mosul," 11/14/13

- "Two local officials escape assassination attempt in Mosul," 11/4/13

- "Two members of facilities Protection assassinated in Mosul," 11/19/13

- "Two policemen killed, a third one wounded ,eastern and central Mosul," 11/13/13

- "Two soldiers killed, four others wounded in Mosul," 11/7/13

- "Unidentified gunmen raid a village and killed two policemen in western Mosul," 11/2/13

- "A woman killed and /6/ people wounded, western Mosul," 11/15/13

- "Young girl killed, 8 family members wounded north of Mosul," 11/19/13

Radio Nawa, "The end of the outcome of the bombing of Tal Afar, when four people dead and 19 injured," 11/23/13

- "Killing one of the elders of the tribe flames and injuring his son, an armed attack south of Mosul," 11/30/13

Al Rayy, "The death of two soldiers led to the fall of the missile south of Mosul," 11/29/13

- "Hijacker killed minutes after he was kidnapped west of Mosul," 11/23/13

- "Found the body of a woman in her twenties with gunshot wounds in eastern Mosul," 11/26/13

- "Gunmen killed a woman and a house south of Mosul," 11/29/13

- "Gunman killed one policeman and wounded after an attack on a police station west of Mosul," 11/27/13

- "Wounding six people, including two policemen in central Mosul blast," 11/21/13