The early results for the provincial elections have been released. It will probably take several weeks for the winners to work out deals with some of the other Lists to form new coalitions to rule. While that is going on it might be a good time to review how the soon to be outgoing provincial councils did in 2008. These are numbers based upon the latest quarterly report to Congress by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR). The paper includes some of the latest statistics on Iraq’s eighteen provinces.
Budget
Budget execution has been an on-going problem for the Iraqi provinces. Ninewa which is currently ruled by the Kurds did the worst in that regards spending only 7% of its budget largely due to the security situation. They were followed by the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) in Baghdad with 12%, and the Dawa-SIIC controlled Diyala with 18%. The Supreme Council did a much better job in Najaf with 95%. The Sadrist were second in Maysan with 79%, and the Islamic Party third in Anbar with 69%. Those aggregate numbers however may not mean that the councils actually accomplished much. First Iraq’s government at all levels has always spent a large amount of its operational budget that pays for wages, bills and benefits, but always lagged on its capital budget that includes investing in infrastructure and reconstruction. Second, even if a province spent most of the latter, it may not have been spent well. The Sadrists of Maysan for example, might have expended 79% of their budget, but as reported before they only finished 41 of 241 development projects in 2008.
Who Currently Rules Province And % of 2008 Budget Spent:
Kurdistan (Dohuk, Irbil, Sulaymaniya): Kurds - N/A
Ninewa: Kurds - 7%
Baghdad: SIIC - 12%
Diyala: SIIC - 18%
Qadisiyah: SIIC - 25%
Karbala: SIIC - 33%
Muthanna: SIIC - 36%
Basra: Fadhila - 37%
Dhi Qar: SIIC - 38%
Salahaddin: Kurds - 49%
Wasit: 50%
Tamim: 54%
Babil: SIIC - 58%
Anbar: Iraqi Islamic Party - 69%
Maysan: Sadrists - 79%
Najaf: SIIC - 95%
Electricity
One of the major issues in the January 2009 election was the provision of services, which are still sorely lacking in many parts of the country. Demand for electricity still outweighs supply. Wasit had the worst performance meeting only 48.1% of demand. Maysan 50.4%, Babil 51.0%, and Najaf 51.5% were almost as bad. The three provinces of Kurdistan, Dohuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniya did the best job at 83.9%, followed by Diyala 83.0%, and Tamim 82.6%.
Average Electricity Supply & Demand Per Day (Megawatts/Hour) - % Demand Met
Wasit: 2,724/5,655 – 48.1%
Maysan: 2,566/5,090 – 50.4%
Babil: 4,039/7,915 – 51.0%
Najaf: 3,594/6,973 – 51.5%
Karbala: 2,883/5,092 – 56.6%
Qadisiyah: 3,077/4,711 – 65.3%
Baghdad: 31,714/48,420 – 65.4%
Ninewa: 10,587/15,972 – 66.2%
Muthanna: 2,532/3,770 – 67.1%
Basra: 12,032/17,148 – 70.1%
Dhi Qar: 5,404/7,536 – 71.7%
Anbar: 4,589/6,206 – 73.9%
Salahaddin: 5,459/7,186 – 75.9%
Tamim: 5,094/6,162 – 82.6%
Diyala: 3,623/4,362 – 83.0%
Kurdistan (Dohuk, Irbil, Sulaymaniya): 14,627/17,426 – 83.9%
Water
Access to potable water is greatly improving in many provinces, with a few still in bad shape. Kurdistan had the worst water supply at 40%, followed by Diyala 54%, and Muthanna 65%. Tamim, Basra, Babil, Dhi Qar, and Maysan all did the best job providing their residents with water 90% of more of the time. Again, these aggregate numbers hide wide disparities within provinces.
Access To Potable Water:
Kurdistan (Dohuk, Irbil, Sulaymaniya): 40%
Diyala: 54%
Muthanna: 65%
Karbala: 71%
Ninewa: 71%
Salahaddin: 71%
Qadisiyah: 76%
Najaf: 83%
Anbar: 84%
Baghdad: 89%
Wasit: 89%
Maysan: 91%
Dhi Qar: 94%
Babil: 97%
Basra: 98%
Tamim: 98%
Poverty
Along with a lack of services, poverty is another major issue that Iraqis face. The SIGIR used numbers based upon a United Nations World Food Program report from November 2008 discussed here before. The UN broke Iraq’s population up into five income groups, and found large swaths of the country lived in the bottom two. The poorest provinces were Qadisiyah and Karbala, while the best off were Baghdad and Basra. The latter two are both the economic and political hubs of the country, which could account for their relative lack of poverty compared to the rest of the country.
% Of Families In The Poorest Of Five Income Groups
Baghdad: 5%
Basra: 11%
Najaf: 13%
Salahaddin: 14%
Maysan: 16%
Diyala: 18%
Kurdistan (Dohuk, Irbil, Sulaymaniya): 19%
Wasit: 20%
Anbar: 24%
Dhi Qar: 27%
Babil: 28%
Muthanna: 28%
Ninewa: 31%
Tamim: 31%
Karbala: 36%
Qadisiyah: 37%
SOURCES
Aswat al-Iraq, “41 out of 241 projects implemented in Missan,” 12/30/08
Knights, Michael and McCarthy, Eamon, “Provincial Politics in Iraq: Fragmentation or New Awakening?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2008
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/09
Saturday, February 7, 2009
Friday, February 6, 2009
The State Of Law List
The early returns from the provincial elections are in. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law list came in first in eight of the fourteen provinces that voted including Baghdad, second in Wasit, third in Karbala, fifth in Diyala, and tenth in Salahaddin. They did not win a majority in any province however. That will mean his List will have to form coalitions with other parties to form ruling alliances. Still it was an impressive sweep of the south. Whatever deals the List cuts to rule, Maliki will be in much a stronger position to advance his agenda afterwards.
The State of Law list is made up of the Islamic Dawa Party, Dawa Party – Iraq Organization, the Independent Bloc, the Solidarity Bloc, the Islamic Union of Iraqi Turkmen, the Kurdistan Feli Fraternity Movement, and the Shaabani Uprising Bloc 1991. The Islamic Dawa was the first Shiite Islamist party formed in Iraq in the 1950s. They were small and weak after the U.S. invasion, but were able to maneuver themselves into the middleman between the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) and the Sadrists in parliament. When those two groups could not decide upon a prime minister they selected a member of the Dawa, first Ibrahim al-Jaafari and then Nouri al-Maliki, as a compromise candidate. Since Maliki took office, he has transformed himself from a weak and ineffective politician to a leader to be reckoned with largely through his use of the security forces. He has also moved away from Dawa’s religious roots. The Dawa Party – Islamic Organization is a breakaway from the main Dawa bloc that was formed in Basra. It holds the Ministry of Education. The Independent Bloc is led by Oil Minister Hussain al-Shahristani, and is known for being close to Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. The Solidarity Bloc used to be part of the United Iraqi Alliance, but left in 2007. It is made up of independent Shiites, and led by former Minister of National Security Qasem Dawood from the interim Iraqi government. The Islamic Union of Iraqi Turkomen is led by Abbas al-Bayati, a Shiite Turkomen. His party too was once a member of the United Iraqi Alliance, and holds two seats in parliament. The Kurdish Feli Fraternity Movement is a Shiite Kurdish party formed in exile in Iran during the Saddam years. It had ministries in both the Maliki and Jaafari governments. Two Shiites that fought against Saddam in 1991 after the Gulf War formed the Shaabani Uprising Bloc 1991, hence its name. They hold one seat in parliament. Together the State of Law ran candidates in Baghdad, Babil, Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiyah, Muthanna, Wasit, Maysan, Basra, Diyala, Salahaddin, Ninewa, and Dhi Qar. They are united by a call for law and order, a strong central government, the end of militias, and opposition to the Kurds and the Supreme Council. It was formed around October 2008.
The List’s victories will allow Maliki to advance three of his goals. First he will have a strong base in the provinces to build upon before the parliamentary elections that are due towards the end of the year. Second his List will control several councils and governors that will support a strong central government with him at its head. Finally, the defeat of the Fadhila Party and the Supreme Council could mean the end of any calls for autonomous regions in the south. Maliki is probably also counting on Sunni parties to defeat the Kurds in Ninewa and Salahaddin, which will limit their plans of annexing northern regions. His main rivals will thus be weakened. He will still have to negotiate with other parties and stave off any no-confidence votes in the legislature, but he will probably be at the peak of his power.
Early Returns For State Of Law List’s Finishes In January 2009 Provincial Election
1st place:
Baghdad 38%
Basra 37%
Dhi Qar 23.1%
Qadisiyah 23.1%
Maysan 17.7%
Najaf 16.2%
Babil 12.5%
Muthanna 10.9%
2nd place:
Wasit 15.3%
3rd place:
Karbala 6.8%
5th place:
Diyala 6%
10th place:
Salahaddin 3.5%
SOURCES
Alsumaria, “Iraq elections leaks say Al Maliki ahead,” 2/2/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Maliki Leads 7 Parties Alliance in Provincial Elections – MP,” 11/13/08
- “Maliki’s List Advancing in Basra’s Initial Vote Count,” 2/2/09
International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Provincial Elections: The Stakes,” 1/27/09
Niqash, “state of law coalition,” 1/28/09
Paley, Amit, “In Iraq’s Provincial Elections, Main Issue Is Maliki Himself,” Washington Post, 1/17/09
Al-Sabah, “Maliki, Four Slates Lead in Nine Provinces, Results Say,” 2/4/09
Said, Yahia Khairi, “Political Dynamics in Iraq within the Context of the ‘Surge,’” Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 4/2/08
The State of Law list is made up of the Islamic Dawa Party, Dawa Party – Iraq Organization, the Independent Bloc, the Solidarity Bloc, the Islamic Union of Iraqi Turkmen, the Kurdistan Feli Fraternity Movement, and the Shaabani Uprising Bloc 1991. The Islamic Dawa was the first Shiite Islamist party formed in Iraq in the 1950s. They were small and weak after the U.S. invasion, but were able to maneuver themselves into the middleman between the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) and the Sadrists in parliament. When those two groups could not decide upon a prime minister they selected a member of the Dawa, first Ibrahim al-Jaafari and then Nouri al-Maliki, as a compromise candidate. Since Maliki took office, he has transformed himself from a weak and ineffective politician to a leader to be reckoned with largely through his use of the security forces. He has also moved away from Dawa’s religious roots. The Dawa Party – Islamic Organization is a breakaway from the main Dawa bloc that was formed in Basra. It holds the Ministry of Education. The Independent Bloc is led by Oil Minister Hussain al-Shahristani, and is known for being close to Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. The Solidarity Bloc used to be part of the United Iraqi Alliance, but left in 2007. It is made up of independent Shiites, and led by former Minister of National Security Qasem Dawood from the interim Iraqi government. The Islamic Union of Iraqi Turkomen is led by Abbas al-Bayati, a Shiite Turkomen. His party too was once a member of the United Iraqi Alliance, and holds two seats in parliament. The Kurdish Feli Fraternity Movement is a Shiite Kurdish party formed in exile in Iran during the Saddam years. It had ministries in both the Maliki and Jaafari governments. Two Shiites that fought against Saddam in 1991 after the Gulf War formed the Shaabani Uprising Bloc 1991, hence its name. They hold one seat in parliament. Together the State of Law ran candidates in Baghdad, Babil, Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiyah, Muthanna, Wasit, Maysan, Basra, Diyala, Salahaddin, Ninewa, and Dhi Qar. They are united by a call for law and order, a strong central government, the end of militias, and opposition to the Kurds and the Supreme Council. It was formed around October 2008.
The List’s victories will allow Maliki to advance three of his goals. First he will have a strong base in the provinces to build upon before the parliamentary elections that are due towards the end of the year. Second his List will control several councils and governors that will support a strong central government with him at its head. Finally, the defeat of the Fadhila Party and the Supreme Council could mean the end of any calls for autonomous regions in the south. Maliki is probably also counting on Sunni parties to defeat the Kurds in Ninewa and Salahaddin, which will limit their plans of annexing northern regions. His main rivals will thus be weakened. He will still have to negotiate with other parties and stave off any no-confidence votes in the legislature, but he will probably be at the peak of his power.
Early Returns For State Of Law List’s Finishes In January 2009 Provincial Election
1st place:
Baghdad 38%
Basra 37%
Dhi Qar 23.1%
Qadisiyah 23.1%
Maysan 17.7%
Najaf 16.2%
Babil 12.5%
Muthanna 10.9%
2nd place:
Wasit 15.3%
3rd place:
Karbala 6.8%
5th place:
Diyala 6%
10th place:
Salahaddin 3.5%
SOURCES
Alsumaria, “Iraq elections leaks say Al Maliki ahead,” 2/2/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Maliki Leads 7 Parties Alliance in Provincial Elections – MP,” 11/13/08
- “Maliki’s List Advancing in Basra’s Initial Vote Count,” 2/2/09
International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Provincial Elections: The Stakes,” 1/27/09
Niqash, “state of law coalition,” 1/28/09
Paley, Amit, “In Iraq’s Provincial Elections, Main Issue Is Maliki Himself,” Washington Post, 1/17/09
Al-Sabah, “Maliki, Four Slates Lead in Nine Provinces, Results Say,” 2/4/09
Said, Yahia Khairi, “Political Dynamics in Iraq within the Context of the ‘Surge,’” Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 4/2/08
Thursday, February 5, 2009
Early Returns For Provincial Elections
The early results for the January 2009 provincial elections are in. The Iraqi Election Commission claims they have counted 90% of the votes in the fourteen provinces that took part. There are two sets of differing numbers available, one from the New York Times, the other from Alsumaria TV. The numbers from the Times are used below because they seem more comprehensive.
Overall, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law list was the biggest winner. They came in first in eight provinces, Baghdad, Basra, Dhi Qar, Qadisiyah, Maysan, and Najaf, second in Wasit, third in Karbala, fifth in Diyala, and tenth in Salahaddin. The List did not win a majority in any of those governorates however. They did the best in Baghdad with 38% and Basra 37%. That will mean they will have to form coalitions with other parties to rule.
That could be the Sadrists, who lost control of Maysan, but came in second there and in Dhi Qar, Baghdad, and Babil, and third in Najaf and Wasit. Although Maliki launched military campaigns against them in early 2008, they both have a common animosity towards the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) that once ruled most of the south.
The rest of the Shiite lists had mixed results. The SIIC won no provinces, but finished second in Najaf, Qadisiyah, Basra, Wasit, Muthanna, and Babil, and third in Maysan and Dhi Qar. Former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari created the Reform Party after he left the Dawa. His best results were third in Qadisiyah, and then several fourth places in the south. Finally, the Fadhila Party lost Basra finishing sixth there. That symbolized their finish across the rest of the country.
There was also the Sunni Iraqi Accordance Front and its major party the Iraqi Islamic Party and the Kurdish Alliance. The Accordance Front came in 1st in Diyala and Salahaddin, third in Anbar, Baghdad and Ninewa, and a surprising fifth in Basra, a largely Shiite province. The Kurdish Alliance lost control of Ninewa but finished a respectable second there, and the same in Diyala. They did much worse in Salahaddin.
A few new parties and independents also emerged. The Iraq National Project, led by independent Sunni parliamentarian Salih al-Mutalk came in first in Anbar, third in Diyala and Salahaddin, fourth in Baghdad, and fifth in Ninewa. Alusi did better than former Interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi’s secular Iraqi National List. They did finish second in Salahaddin appealing to the largely Sunni population by criticizing American policies like the deBaathification law and disbanding the armed forces. Otherwise they had a lot of fourth place finishes in provinces like Diyala and Baghdad. Amongst the tribal Awakening groups in Anbar, Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha’s Awakening and National Independent List finished second, while his former ally now rival Sheikh Amid al-Hayes’ Tribes of Iraq finished a distant seventh. The mayor of Karbala City Yousef Majid al-Haddoubi carried Karbala itself, but with only 13.3% of the vote, while the Iraqi nationalist newcomers al-Hadbaa Party discussed before won in Ninewa, but with 38.4% instead of the 66% predicted by an American official earlier. That will mean they will have to join with their rivals the Kurdish Alliance to run the province. That might force al-Hadbaa to tone down their anti-Kurdish rhetoric or conversely freeze the entire process.
The next several weeks will really show what this election was about. The State of Law and every other List that took first place will have to find other parties to rule because none walked away with a majority of the votes. That could lead to joint governance where no single party will be able to impose their will, intense infighting that will incapacitate the process, or a mixture of both where parties will carve up the provincial offices much like the provinces and the central government are currently run.
The major parties and candidates:
Awakening and National Independents List – Led by Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha, one of the Anbar Awakening leaders. Aligned with Iraqi Accordance Front
Coalition Of Diyala – Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s Diyala List
Constitutional Party – Led by Interior Minister Jawa al-Bulani
Fadhila Party – Formed by Ayatollah Mohammed al-Yacoubi who claimed the legacy of Mohammed Sadeq al-Sadr’s movement, Moqtada al-Sadr’s father, after the U.S. invasion
Yousef Maid al-Habboubi – Independent Shiite mayor of Karbala
Al-Hadbaa Party – Coalition of four parties in Ninewa
Independent Free Movement List – One of two independent lists supported by the Sadrists
Iraq National Project – Led by independent Sunni Parliamentarian Salih Mutalk
Iraqi Accordance Front – Major Sunni list led by Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi’s Iraqi Islamic Party
Iraqi Communist Party – Led by Hamid Majid Mousa
Kurdish Allliance – Made up of two major Kurdish parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Kurdish President Massoud Barzani, and other smaller parties
Al-Mihrab Martyr List – Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council List
National Movement for Development and Reform – Led by Jamal al-Karbouli. Made up of former Baathists and insurgents
National Reform Party – Headed by former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari who broke away from the Dawa Party
State Of Law List – Headed by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s Islamic Dawa Party
Tribes Of Iraq – Led by Sheikh Hamid al-Hayes, one of the Anbar Awakening leaders
ANBAR
Iraqi National Project: 17.6%
Awakening and National Independents List: 17.1%
Accordance Front: 15.9%
National Movement for Reform and Development: 7.8%
Iraqi National List: 6.6%
Iraqi Unity: 4.6%
Tribes of Iraq: 4.5%
Group of Scholars And Intellectuals: 3.3%
Justice Movement: 3.2%
National Bloc: 2.3%
Constitutional Party: 2%
TURNOUT: 40%
BABIL
State of Law: 12.5%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 8.2%
Independent Free Movement List: 6.2%
National Reform Party: 4.4%
Iraqi Commission for NGOs: 4.1%
Independent Justice: 3.7%
Independent Ansar: 3.4%
Iraqi National List: 3.4%
National Unity: 3.3%
TURNOUT: 56%
BAGHDAD
State Of Law: 38%
Independent Free Movement List: 9%
Iraqi Accordance Front: 9%
Iraqi National Project: 8.6%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 5.4%
National Reform Party: 4.3%
Iraq Nation List: 1.6%
Fadhila: 1.3%
Iraqi Communist Party: 1.2%
TURNOUT: 40%
BASRA
State of Law: 37%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 11.6%
Gathering of Justice and Unity: 5.5%
Independent Free Movement List: 5%
Iraqi Accordance Front: 3.8%
Fadhila: 3.2%
Iraqi National List: 3.2%
National Reform Party: 2.5%
TURNOUT: 48%
DHI QAR
State of Law: 23.1%
Independent Free Movement List: 14.1%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 11.1%
National Reform Party: 7.6%
Fadhila: 6.1%
Constitutional Party: 3.2%
Iraqi National List: 2.8%
TURNOUT: 50%
DIYALA
Iraqi Accordance Front: 21.1%
Kurdish Alliance: 17.2%
Iraqi National Project: 15%
Iraqi National List: 9.5%
State of Law: 6%
Coalition of Diyala: 5.3%
National Reform Party: 4.3%
Independent Free Movement List: 3.1%
National Movement: 2.6%
Fadhila: 2.3%
TURNOUT: 57%
KARBALA
Yousef Majid al-Haddoubi: 13.3%
Hope of Rafidain: 8.8%
State of Law: 8.5%
Independent Free Movement List: 6.8%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 6.4%
Justice and Reform: 3.6%
National Reform Project: 2.5%
Fadhila: 2.5%
TURNOUT: 60%
MAYSAN
State of Law: 17.7%
Independent Free Movement List: 15.2%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 14.6%
National Reform Project: 8.7%
Fadhila: 3.2%
TURNOUT: 46%
MUTHANNA
State of Law: 10.9%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 9.3%
Jumhouriyoun: 7.1%
National Reform Project: 6.3%
Independent Free Movement List: 5.1%
National List: 5%
Gathering of Muthanna: 4.9%
Academics: 4.4%
Middle Euphrates: 3.9%
Fadhila: 3.7%
Iraqi National List: 3.5%
TURNOUT: 61%
NAJAF
State of Law: 16.2%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 14.8%
Independent Free Movement List: 12.2%
Loyalty to Najaf: 8.3%
National Reform Project: 7%
Union of Independent Najaf: 3.7%
Tribes and Sons of Najaf: 2.6%
TURNOUT: 55%
NINEWA
Al-Hadbaa: 38.4%
Kurdish Alliance: 25.5%
Iraqi Islamic Party: 6.7%
Turkomen Front: 2.8%
Iraqi National Project: 2.6%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 1.9%
TURNOUT: 60%
QADISIYAH
State of Law: 23.1%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 11.7%
National Reform Project: 8.2%
Iraqi National List: 8%
Independent Free Movement List: 6.7%
Islamic Loyalty: 4.3%
Fadhila: 4.1%
Development of Diwaniya: 3.4%
Iraqi National Congress: 3%
TURNOUT: 58%
SALAHADDIN
Iraqi Accordance Front: 14.5%
Iraqi National List: 13.9%
Iraqi National Project: 8.7%
Jumuaa: 8.5%
Scholars and Intellectuals: 6.6%
Turkomen Front: 4.8%
Salahaddin List: 4.6%
Taaqi List: 4.5%
Tahrir wa-Binaa: 4.5%
State of Law: 3.5%
Constitution Party: 3.2%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 2.9%
TURNOUT: 65%
WASIT
State of Law: 15.3%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 10%
Independent Free Movement List: 6%
Iraqi National List: 4.6%
Constituion Party: 3.9%
National Reform Party: 3.2%
Independence: 3%
TURNOUT: 54%
Note: The original version of this article said that the Iraqi National Project that came in first in Anbar was headed by Parliamentarian Mithal al-Alusi. According to Juan Cole at Informed Comment the List is actually led by Saleh al-Mutlaq. The piece has been changed to reflect that.
SOURCES
Abdullah, Muahmmed, “Diyala Sees Early Campaigning,” Niqash, 12/8/08
Agence France Presse, “Iraqi Shiite Factions Face Intimidation Claims,” 2/5/09
Alsumaria, “Iraq provincial elections preliminary results,” 2/5/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Dawlat al-Qanoon coalition dominates 9 of 14 provinces,” 2/5/09
- “MP accuses Kurds of ‘illegitimate’ campaigning,” 1/24/09
- “URGENT / IHEC announces 90% of election results,” 2/5/09
- “URGENT / PM’s list garners 38% of votes in Baghdad,” 2/5/09
Cole, Juan, "Religious Parties Sweep Shiite South; Sunni Arabs fragmented, mainly Secular," Informed Comment, 2/6/09
Dagher, Sam, “Tribal Rivalries Persist as Iraqis Seek Local Posts,” New York Times, 1/20/09
Daniel, Trenton, “Pro-Iran party loses big in Iraq local elections, returns show,” McClatchy Newspapers, 2/5/09
Farrell, Stephen, “Election: Preliminary Results,” Baghdad Bureau Blog, New York Times, 2/5/09
Hamid, Nirmeen, “anbar’s Islamic party and tribes vie for power,” Niqash, 12/12/08
Al-Jazeera, “Strong poll showing by Iraqi PM,” 2/5/09
Lynch, Marc, “Iraqi Sunnis after the Awakening,” Abu Aardvark Blog, 6/20/08
O’Rourke, Brian, “Prime Minister’s Bloc Wins In Baghdad, Southern Iraq,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2/5/09
Rubin, Alissa, “Iraqi Prime Minister’s Party Dominates Vote,” New York Times, 2/6/09
Rubin, Alissa and Myers, Steven Lee, “As Iraqis Tally Votes, Former Leader Re-emerges,” New York Times, 2/4/09
UPI, “Maliki’s party tops provincial election,” 2/5/09
Visser, Reidar, “The Candidate Lists Are Out: Basra More Fragmented, Sadrists Pursuing Several Strategies?,” Historiae.org, 12/22/08
Overall, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law list was the biggest winner. They came in first in eight provinces, Baghdad, Basra, Dhi Qar, Qadisiyah, Maysan, and Najaf, second in Wasit, third in Karbala, fifth in Diyala, and tenth in Salahaddin. The List did not win a majority in any of those governorates however. They did the best in Baghdad with 38% and Basra 37%. That will mean they will have to form coalitions with other parties to rule.
That could be the Sadrists, who lost control of Maysan, but came in second there and in Dhi Qar, Baghdad, and Babil, and third in Najaf and Wasit. Although Maliki launched military campaigns against them in early 2008, they both have a common animosity towards the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) that once ruled most of the south.
The rest of the Shiite lists had mixed results. The SIIC won no provinces, but finished second in Najaf, Qadisiyah, Basra, Wasit, Muthanna, and Babil, and third in Maysan and Dhi Qar. Former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari created the Reform Party after he left the Dawa. His best results were third in Qadisiyah, and then several fourth places in the south. Finally, the Fadhila Party lost Basra finishing sixth there. That symbolized their finish across the rest of the country.
There was also the Sunni Iraqi Accordance Front and its major party the Iraqi Islamic Party and the Kurdish Alliance. The Accordance Front came in 1st in Diyala and Salahaddin, third in Anbar, Baghdad and Ninewa, and a surprising fifth in Basra, a largely Shiite province. The Kurdish Alliance lost control of Ninewa but finished a respectable second there, and the same in Diyala. They did much worse in Salahaddin.
A few new parties and independents also emerged. The Iraq National Project, led by independent Sunni parliamentarian Salih al-Mutalk came in first in Anbar, third in Diyala and Salahaddin, fourth in Baghdad, and fifth in Ninewa. Alusi did better than former Interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi’s secular Iraqi National List. They did finish second in Salahaddin appealing to the largely Sunni population by criticizing American policies like the deBaathification law and disbanding the armed forces. Otherwise they had a lot of fourth place finishes in provinces like Diyala and Baghdad. Amongst the tribal Awakening groups in Anbar, Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha’s Awakening and National Independent List finished second, while his former ally now rival Sheikh Amid al-Hayes’ Tribes of Iraq finished a distant seventh. The mayor of Karbala City Yousef Majid al-Haddoubi carried Karbala itself, but with only 13.3% of the vote, while the Iraqi nationalist newcomers al-Hadbaa Party discussed before won in Ninewa, but with 38.4% instead of the 66% predicted by an American official earlier. That will mean they will have to join with their rivals the Kurdish Alliance to run the province. That might force al-Hadbaa to tone down their anti-Kurdish rhetoric or conversely freeze the entire process.
The next several weeks will really show what this election was about. The State of Law and every other List that took first place will have to find other parties to rule because none walked away with a majority of the votes. That could lead to joint governance where no single party will be able to impose their will, intense infighting that will incapacitate the process, or a mixture of both where parties will carve up the provincial offices much like the provinces and the central government are currently run.
The major parties and candidates:
Awakening and National Independents List – Led by Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha, one of the Anbar Awakening leaders. Aligned with Iraqi Accordance Front
Coalition Of Diyala – Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s Diyala List
Constitutional Party – Led by Interior Minister Jawa al-Bulani
Fadhila Party – Formed by Ayatollah Mohammed al-Yacoubi who claimed the legacy of Mohammed Sadeq al-Sadr’s movement, Moqtada al-Sadr’s father, after the U.S. invasion
Yousef Maid al-Habboubi – Independent Shiite mayor of Karbala
Al-Hadbaa Party – Coalition of four parties in Ninewa
Independent Free Movement List – One of two independent lists supported by the Sadrists
Iraq National Project – Led by independent Sunni Parliamentarian Salih Mutalk
Iraqi Accordance Front – Major Sunni list led by Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi’s Iraqi Islamic Party
Iraqi Communist Party – Led by Hamid Majid Mousa
Kurdish Allliance – Made up of two major Kurdish parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Kurdish President Massoud Barzani, and other smaller parties
Al-Mihrab Martyr List – Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council List
National Movement for Development and Reform – Led by Jamal al-Karbouli. Made up of former Baathists and insurgents
National Reform Party – Headed by former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari who broke away from the Dawa Party
State Of Law List – Headed by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s Islamic Dawa Party
Tribes Of Iraq – Led by Sheikh Hamid al-Hayes, one of the Anbar Awakening leaders
ANBAR
Iraqi National Project: 17.6%
Awakening and National Independents List: 17.1%
Accordance Front: 15.9%
National Movement for Reform and Development: 7.8%
Iraqi National List: 6.6%
Iraqi Unity: 4.6%
Tribes of Iraq: 4.5%
Group of Scholars And Intellectuals: 3.3%
Justice Movement: 3.2%
National Bloc: 2.3%
Constitutional Party: 2%
TURNOUT: 40%
BABIL
State of Law: 12.5%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 8.2%
Independent Free Movement List: 6.2%
National Reform Party: 4.4%
Iraqi Commission for NGOs: 4.1%
Independent Justice: 3.7%
Independent Ansar: 3.4%
Iraqi National List: 3.4%
National Unity: 3.3%
TURNOUT: 56%
BAGHDAD
State Of Law: 38%
Independent Free Movement List: 9%
Iraqi Accordance Front: 9%
Iraqi National Project: 8.6%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 5.4%
National Reform Party: 4.3%
Iraq Nation List: 1.6%
Fadhila: 1.3%
Iraqi Communist Party: 1.2%
TURNOUT: 40%
BASRA
State of Law: 37%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 11.6%
Gathering of Justice and Unity: 5.5%
Independent Free Movement List: 5%
Iraqi Accordance Front: 3.8%
Fadhila: 3.2%
Iraqi National List: 3.2%
National Reform Party: 2.5%
TURNOUT: 48%
DHI QAR
State of Law: 23.1%
Independent Free Movement List: 14.1%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 11.1%
National Reform Party: 7.6%
Fadhila: 6.1%
Constitutional Party: 3.2%
Iraqi National List: 2.8%
TURNOUT: 50%
DIYALA
Iraqi Accordance Front: 21.1%
Kurdish Alliance: 17.2%
Iraqi National Project: 15%
Iraqi National List: 9.5%
State of Law: 6%
Coalition of Diyala: 5.3%
National Reform Party: 4.3%
Independent Free Movement List: 3.1%
National Movement: 2.6%
Fadhila: 2.3%
TURNOUT: 57%
KARBALA
Yousef Majid al-Haddoubi: 13.3%
Hope of Rafidain: 8.8%
State of Law: 8.5%
Independent Free Movement List: 6.8%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 6.4%
Justice and Reform: 3.6%
National Reform Project: 2.5%
Fadhila: 2.5%
TURNOUT: 60%
MAYSAN
State of Law: 17.7%
Independent Free Movement List: 15.2%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 14.6%
National Reform Project: 8.7%
Fadhila: 3.2%
TURNOUT: 46%
MUTHANNA
State of Law: 10.9%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 9.3%
Jumhouriyoun: 7.1%
National Reform Project: 6.3%
Independent Free Movement List: 5.1%
National List: 5%
Gathering of Muthanna: 4.9%
Academics: 4.4%
Middle Euphrates: 3.9%
Fadhila: 3.7%
Iraqi National List: 3.5%
TURNOUT: 61%
NAJAF
State of Law: 16.2%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 14.8%
Independent Free Movement List: 12.2%
Loyalty to Najaf: 8.3%
National Reform Project: 7%
Union of Independent Najaf: 3.7%
Tribes and Sons of Najaf: 2.6%
TURNOUT: 55%
NINEWA
Al-Hadbaa: 38.4%
Kurdish Alliance: 25.5%
Iraqi Islamic Party: 6.7%
Turkomen Front: 2.8%
Iraqi National Project: 2.6%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 1.9%
TURNOUT: 60%
QADISIYAH
State of Law: 23.1%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 11.7%
National Reform Project: 8.2%
Iraqi National List: 8%
Independent Free Movement List: 6.7%
Islamic Loyalty: 4.3%
Fadhila: 4.1%
Development of Diwaniya: 3.4%
Iraqi National Congress: 3%
TURNOUT: 58%
SALAHADDIN
Iraqi Accordance Front: 14.5%
Iraqi National List: 13.9%
Iraqi National Project: 8.7%
Jumuaa: 8.5%
Scholars and Intellectuals: 6.6%
Turkomen Front: 4.8%
Salahaddin List: 4.6%
Taaqi List: 4.5%
Tahrir wa-Binaa: 4.5%
State of Law: 3.5%
Constitution Party: 3.2%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 2.9%
TURNOUT: 65%
WASIT
State of Law: 15.3%
Al-Mihrab Martyr List: 10%
Independent Free Movement List: 6%
Iraqi National List: 4.6%
Constituion Party: 3.9%
National Reform Party: 3.2%
Independence: 3%
TURNOUT: 54%
Note: The original version of this article said that the Iraqi National Project that came in first in Anbar was headed by Parliamentarian Mithal al-Alusi. According to Juan Cole at Informed Comment the List is actually led by Saleh al-Mutlaq. The piece has been changed to reflect that.
SOURCES
Abdullah, Muahmmed, “Diyala Sees Early Campaigning,” Niqash, 12/8/08
Agence France Presse, “Iraqi Shiite Factions Face Intimidation Claims,” 2/5/09
Alsumaria, “Iraq provincial elections preliminary results,” 2/5/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “Dawlat al-Qanoon coalition dominates 9 of 14 provinces,” 2/5/09
- “MP accuses Kurds of ‘illegitimate’ campaigning,” 1/24/09
- “URGENT / IHEC announces 90% of election results,” 2/5/09
- “URGENT / PM’s list garners 38% of votes in Baghdad,” 2/5/09
Cole, Juan, "Religious Parties Sweep Shiite South; Sunni Arabs fragmented, mainly Secular," Informed Comment, 2/6/09
Dagher, Sam, “Tribal Rivalries Persist as Iraqis Seek Local Posts,” New York Times, 1/20/09
Daniel, Trenton, “Pro-Iran party loses big in Iraq local elections, returns show,” McClatchy Newspapers, 2/5/09
Farrell, Stephen, “Election: Preliminary Results,” Baghdad Bureau Blog, New York Times, 2/5/09
Hamid, Nirmeen, “anbar’s Islamic party and tribes vie for power,” Niqash, 12/12/08
Al-Jazeera, “Strong poll showing by Iraqi PM,” 2/5/09
Lynch, Marc, “Iraqi Sunnis after the Awakening,” Abu Aardvark Blog, 6/20/08
O’Rourke, Brian, “Prime Minister’s Bloc Wins In Baghdad, Southern Iraq,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2/5/09
Rubin, Alissa, “Iraqi Prime Minister’s Party Dominates Vote,” New York Times, 2/6/09
Rubin, Alissa and Myers, Steven Lee, “As Iraqis Tally Votes, Former Leader Re-emerges,” New York Times, 2/4/09
UPI, “Maliki’s party tops provincial election,” 2/5/09
Visser, Reidar, “The Candidate Lists Are Out: Basra More Fragmented, Sadrists Pursuing Several Strategies?,” Historiae.org, 12/22/08
Wednesday, February 4, 2009
Ninewa’s al-Hadbaa Party
One of the few new parties to come out victorious in the January 2009 provincial elections could be the al-Hadbaa party of Ninewa province. A U.S. official told Reuters that he thought the Hadbaa list would get around 66% of the vote there. The province is one of the most divided and violent in the country due to the simmering dispute between the majority Arabs who are ruled by the Kurds. There are also a large number of minorities such as Christians, Yazidis, Shabaks, and Turkomen who reside there that are caught in the middle. The province had one of the highest voter turnouts in the country at 60%, which could be the result of the power struggle between all these various groups. If al-Hadbaa does come out the winner, it may increase the tensions in Ninewa as it ran on an Arab-nationalist, anti-Kurdish ticket.
While there were twenty-five other entities running in Ninewa, the election was really between Al-Hadbaa and the Kurdish Ninewa Brotherly List. The al-Hadbaa National List was formed in 2007. It is made up of four parties, Al-Hadbaa National United Assembly, the Patriotic and National Forces Assembly, the Iraqi and Kurdistani Party for Freedom and Equality, and Al-Qasat Iraqi Assembly. Atheel Nujafi who comes from a rich and famous Mosul pedigree heads the List. He and other well-known families and tribes form the backbone of the Al-Hadbaa National United Assembly, which was put together in 2007. The Patriotic Union and National Forces Assembly was founded by Isam Aead Sheat al-Jubouri. The Assembly is itself a coalition of the Democratic Reform and Justice Party, the Justice and Reform Iraqi Movement, the Arab Socialist Movement, the Nasserite Avant-Garde Socialist Party, and the Iraqi Arab Party. The Iraqi and Kurdistani Party for Freedom and Equality was also founded in 2007 by Arshad Ahmed al-Zebari. They oppose Kurdish independence. Al-Qasat Iraqi Assembly was started in Mosul in 2005 by engineer Fares Abdul Azeez al-Sanjari. They want an end to the U.S. occupation, freeing of prisoners, and decentralized rule.
Together the List called for Iraqi unity as an Arab and Islamic country, an end to the U.S. presence and militias, women’s rights, the development of the province, and claim they will help end the insurgency. They were most noted however for their attacks on the Kurds, who currently control the provincial council because of the Sunni boycott in January 2005. They opposed the Kurds’ aspirations to annex northern sections of the province, accused them of cheating in the voting, manipulating the security forces, blamed them for raids on their offices, and said they would remove Kurds from leadership positions. Atheel Nujafi went as far as to claim that the Kurds tried to assassinate him.
The Kurdish List is made up of the two main Kurdish parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani, along with many other smaller entities Those include the Kurdistan Islamic Union, the Assyrian National Congress, the Iraqi Communist Party, the Kurdistan Communist Party, and the Kurdistan Socialist Party. The Kurds want a federal system that will ensure their autonomy, and the annexation of areas they lay historical claim to. One Kurdish member of the Ninewa council for example, said that the election would prove that the people in the disputed territories in the northern region of the province want to join Kurdistan, and a Kurdish Army officer claimed that Mosul would eventually be part of an independent Kurdistan as well. The Kurds also accused the al-Hadbaa list of being Baathists, and having ties to Al Qaeda in Iraq.
The Kurds held no illusion about their chances heading into 2009. In 2005 because of the Sunni boycott, only 14% of the province voted. This time they were expecting a heavy Arab turnout, which apparently happened. They were therefore cold about holding the elections in the first place, and tried to delay the passage of the provincial election law in parliament in 2008. In December, the Kurds on the Ninewa council attempted to delay the vote there unsuccessfully to hold off the inevitable.
As the campaign started, electioneering was difficult because of the lack of security. Much of the work was done secretly as a result. One researcher at Mosul University thought the 2005 election was actually more open with more parties participating, but with fewer voters because of the Sunni boycott. Al-Hadbaa was expected to take the southern Arab portions of Ninewa, and most of Mosul, while the Brotherly List had support in the north and west, and northern Mosul. The rural areas were considered up for grabs
American officials have often said that they hope the elections could help solve the problems in Ninewa. Right after the voting was completed for example, the U.S. general in command of Mosul said this could be a turning point. That may be wishful thinking, as the campaigning between the Kurds and Hadbaa was anything but cordial. If the U.S. official was correct and al-Hadbaa gets two-thirds of the seats they will be able to rule the province on their own, which could lead to a direct confrontation with the outgoing Kurds. Al-Hadbaa’s campaign promises of removing Kurds from positions of authority and asserting Arab identity will be rejected by the Kurdish List. Unfortunately, that is the way Iraqi nationalism is increasingly being formulated. Al-Hadbaa’s demands on the Kurds closely mirror statements and moves made by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki since 2008 as he has tried to establish himself as a national leader of the country. What is needed is reconciliation and power sharing in Ninewa, but none of the sides, nor Baghdad is proposing that. That means the divide between Arabs and Kurds will continue, but the big question now is whether it will still be as violent or become more political.
SOURCES
Al-Ansary, Khalid, “Election friction flares in Iraq’s violent north,” Reuters, 1/2/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “MP accuses Kurds of ‘illegitimate’ campaigning,” 1/24/09
- “Ninewa council votes for postponing local elections,” 12/18/08
Cocks, Tim, “Vote sows seeds of greater calm in Iraq’s north,” Reuters, 2/2/09
Farrell, Stephen, “Election Turnout: Early Figures,” Baghdad Bureau Blog, New York Times, 2/1/09
Garcia-Navarro, Lourdes, “Iraq’s Election Campaign Especially Bitter In Mosul,” Morning Edition, NPR, 1/30/09
International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Provincial Elections: The Stakes,” 1/27/09
Kamal, Adel, “violence threatens mosul elections,” Niqash, 12/11/08
Kukis, Mark, “Is Mosul on the Mend?” Time, 3/9/08
Londono, Ernesto, “In Iraq’s north, Vote Tallies To Define Loyalties,” Washington Post, 2/2/09
Niqash, “the hadbaa national list,” 1/28/09
- “Kurdistan alliance,” 1/28/09
Parker, Ned, “Iraq looks ahead to provincial, national elections,” Los Angeles Times, 11/5/08
Parker, Ned and Redha, Usama, “Arabs, Kurds take their fight to polls,” Los Angeles Times, 1/25/09
Visser, Reidar, “Pushing the Limits of Decentralization: Kurdish Parties ‘Decide’ to Postpone Local Elections in Mosul,” Historiae.org, 12/18/08
While there were twenty-five other entities running in Ninewa, the election was really between Al-Hadbaa and the Kurdish Ninewa Brotherly List. The al-Hadbaa National List was formed in 2007. It is made up of four parties, Al-Hadbaa National United Assembly, the Patriotic and National Forces Assembly, the Iraqi and Kurdistani Party for Freedom and Equality, and Al-Qasat Iraqi Assembly. Atheel Nujafi who comes from a rich and famous Mosul pedigree heads the List. He and other well-known families and tribes form the backbone of the Al-Hadbaa National United Assembly, which was put together in 2007. The Patriotic Union and National Forces Assembly was founded by Isam Aead Sheat al-Jubouri. The Assembly is itself a coalition of the Democratic Reform and Justice Party, the Justice and Reform Iraqi Movement, the Arab Socialist Movement, the Nasserite Avant-Garde Socialist Party, and the Iraqi Arab Party. The Iraqi and Kurdistani Party for Freedom and Equality was also founded in 2007 by Arshad Ahmed al-Zebari. They oppose Kurdish independence. Al-Qasat Iraqi Assembly was started in Mosul in 2005 by engineer Fares Abdul Azeez al-Sanjari. They want an end to the U.S. occupation, freeing of prisoners, and decentralized rule.
Together the List called for Iraqi unity as an Arab and Islamic country, an end to the U.S. presence and militias, women’s rights, the development of the province, and claim they will help end the insurgency. They were most noted however for their attacks on the Kurds, who currently control the provincial council because of the Sunni boycott in January 2005. They opposed the Kurds’ aspirations to annex northern sections of the province, accused them of cheating in the voting, manipulating the security forces, blamed them for raids on their offices, and said they would remove Kurds from leadership positions. Atheel Nujafi went as far as to claim that the Kurds tried to assassinate him.
The Kurdish List is made up of the two main Kurdish parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani, along with many other smaller entities Those include the Kurdistan Islamic Union, the Assyrian National Congress, the Iraqi Communist Party, the Kurdistan Communist Party, and the Kurdistan Socialist Party. The Kurds want a federal system that will ensure their autonomy, and the annexation of areas they lay historical claim to. One Kurdish member of the Ninewa council for example, said that the election would prove that the people in the disputed territories in the northern region of the province want to join Kurdistan, and a Kurdish Army officer claimed that Mosul would eventually be part of an independent Kurdistan as well. The Kurds also accused the al-Hadbaa list of being Baathists, and having ties to Al Qaeda in Iraq.
The Kurds held no illusion about their chances heading into 2009. In 2005 because of the Sunni boycott, only 14% of the province voted. This time they were expecting a heavy Arab turnout, which apparently happened. They were therefore cold about holding the elections in the first place, and tried to delay the passage of the provincial election law in parliament in 2008. In December, the Kurds on the Ninewa council attempted to delay the vote there unsuccessfully to hold off the inevitable.
As the campaign started, electioneering was difficult because of the lack of security. Much of the work was done secretly as a result. One researcher at Mosul University thought the 2005 election was actually more open with more parties participating, but with fewer voters because of the Sunni boycott. Al-Hadbaa was expected to take the southern Arab portions of Ninewa, and most of Mosul, while the Brotherly List had support in the north and west, and northern Mosul. The rural areas were considered up for grabs
American officials have often said that they hope the elections could help solve the problems in Ninewa. Right after the voting was completed for example, the U.S. general in command of Mosul said this could be a turning point. That may be wishful thinking, as the campaigning between the Kurds and Hadbaa was anything but cordial. If the U.S. official was correct and al-Hadbaa gets two-thirds of the seats they will be able to rule the province on their own, which could lead to a direct confrontation with the outgoing Kurds. Al-Hadbaa’s campaign promises of removing Kurds from positions of authority and asserting Arab identity will be rejected by the Kurdish List. Unfortunately, that is the way Iraqi nationalism is increasingly being formulated. Al-Hadbaa’s demands on the Kurds closely mirror statements and moves made by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki since 2008 as he has tried to establish himself as a national leader of the country. What is needed is reconciliation and power sharing in Ninewa, but none of the sides, nor Baghdad is proposing that. That means the divide between Arabs and Kurds will continue, but the big question now is whether it will still be as violent or become more political.
SOURCES
Al-Ansary, Khalid, “Election friction flares in Iraq’s violent north,” Reuters, 1/2/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “MP accuses Kurds of ‘illegitimate’ campaigning,” 1/24/09
- “Ninewa council votes for postponing local elections,” 12/18/08
Cocks, Tim, “Vote sows seeds of greater calm in Iraq’s north,” Reuters, 2/2/09
Farrell, Stephen, “Election Turnout: Early Figures,” Baghdad Bureau Blog, New York Times, 2/1/09
Garcia-Navarro, Lourdes, “Iraq’s Election Campaign Especially Bitter In Mosul,” Morning Edition, NPR, 1/30/09
International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Provincial Elections: The Stakes,” 1/27/09
Kamal, Adel, “violence threatens mosul elections,” Niqash, 12/11/08
Kukis, Mark, “Is Mosul on the Mend?” Time, 3/9/08
Londono, Ernesto, “In Iraq’s north, Vote Tallies To Define Loyalties,” Washington Post, 2/2/09
Niqash, “the hadbaa national list,” 1/28/09
- “Kurdistan alliance,” 1/28/09
Parker, Ned, “Iraq looks ahead to provincial, national elections,” Los Angeles Times, 11/5/08
Parker, Ned and Redha, Usama, “Arabs, Kurds take their fight to polls,” Los Angeles Times, 1/25/09
Visser, Reidar, “Pushing the Limits of Decentralization: Kurdish Parties ‘Decide’ to Postpone Local Elections in Mosul,” Historiae.org, 12/18/08
Tuesday, February 3, 2009
International Crisis Group Report On Iraq’s Provincial Elections
Four days before Iraq’s January 31 provincial elections, the International Crisis Group released a report on the power struggles, perceptions, and institutions that would shape the vote. The provincial councils can set local agendas, spend money, direct reconstruction, and collect taxes. Their budgets however are set by Baghdad, which complicates their work, as they don’t have full control over the purse. The current councils are not always representative of their populations because of a Sunni and Sadrist boycott. That has caused ethnic divisions between Arabs and Kurds in Salahaddin, Diyala, and Ninewa. Since their election in 2005, many of the councils have also done a poor job governing, because they are largely untrained, incompetent, sectarian, and corrupt. Many Iraqis are disillusioned by their rule. The new candidates will have to maneuver through the institutional and political barriers to getting elected, and then prove that they can do a better job than their predecessors.
Battleground Provinces
Ninewa is one of the most troubled provinces in Iraq that has suffered as a result of the 2005 provincial elections. It is divided between the Sunni Arab majority and the Kurdish minority that resides in eastern Mosul, western Sinjar, and northern and eastern strips along the Kurdistan border. There are also many smaller minorities such as Turkomen, Yazidis, Christians, and Shabaks, who are caught in the crossfire between the Arabs and Kurds. This ethnic conflict has caused Ninewa to be one of the most violent in the country with a still active Al Qaeda in Iraq and other insurgents. In 2005 55.7% of the voting population participated in provincial elections, but only 14% in Ninewa. This was largely due to the Sunni boycott. As a result, the Kurdistan Nationalist Democratic List comprising the Kurdistan Democratic Party and several smaller parties took 31 of the 41 provincial seats. As a result, the Kurds gained control of the local government as well as the security forces that has been greatly resented by the Arabs to this day. Their dispute with the Arabs has led them to block the formation of Sons of Iraq (SOI) units because they see them as a threat to their power. They were eventually created, but only in three Arab majority areas. The Kurds also have aspirations to annex northern sections of the province. Several military campaigns have been carried out in Ninewa, which might have made the situation worse. In 2008 Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki also became involved when he launched his own offensive in Mosul, and then began concentrating on the Kurds. As reported before, he placed his brother-in-law in charge of the Army division in control of Mosul, and began rotating Kurdish officers and units out, to be replaced by Arab ones. He also tried to win the Arabs over by offering them reconstruction projects. Future peace in the province depends not only upon Sunnis gaining representation, but reconciliation between them, the Kurds, and the province’s minorities.
Diyala is another mixed province with many Shiite Arabs. It also has Kurds and Turkomen in the north. Like Ninewa, the Kurds want to annex northern portions of the province. Many of the tribes there are mixed Sunni-Shiite. In 2005 only about 33% of the province voted. As a result, the council was divided between the SIIC-Dawa coalition that received 20 seats, the Iraqi Islamic Party that got 14, and the Kurds’ seven. The SIIC gained the governorship and control of the security forces, the Islamic Party got the deputy governor, and the Kurds the head of the council. Many Sunnis resented the Islamic Party’s participation since they violated the boycott. These divisions contributed to violence, a dysfunctional council, little reconstruction, and up to 27,000 families fleeing their homes. Eight of the 41 council members were assassinated, leading to many others living in other parts of the country for protection. In 2007 the first Sons of Iraq (SOI) unit was formed, which helped quell violence in some areas, but not all, and they also clashed with the provincial police who were mostly Shiite and Kurds. In 2008 Maliki launched a security operation in Diyala as well. At first the security forces went after the insurgents, but later trained their sights on the SOI, members of the provincial council, and then the Kurds in the disputed Khanaqin district. Like in Ninewa, Maliki made the situation worse in Diyala by increasing tensions.
Anbar was once the heart of the Sunni insurgency. In 2005 only around 3,800 out of approximately 574,000 voters participated. The Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) ran almost unopposed winning 34 of the province’s 41 council seats. The IIP acted almost unilaterally afterwards, cutting deals to maintain power that were illegal. First, in August 2006 they replaced thirteen council members with people that were not elected. This was due to the fact that four council members were killed, seven never took office out of fear, one became an aide to the governor, and one was elected to parliament. Then at the end of 2006, they added eight additional seats to the council in an attempt to appease and co-opt the Anbar Awakening, who was seen as a threat to the IIP’s rule. That didn’t work, and the Awakening began pushing for elections as soon as possible hoping to sweep the IIP out.
Baghdad was the center of the violence in Iraq and only 48% voted in 2005. The SIIC won 28 of 51 seats, and gained control of the governorship and the head of the council. Dawa won 11 seats, the Fadhila party six, and a group of pro-Sadrist independents three. The Sunnis were virtually absent from power due to their boycott, and gave no legitimacy to the council. After the sectarian war and the massive displacement that ensued, the council now almost represents the demographics of the capital.
The last province the Crisis Group discussed was Basra. In 2005 the Supreme Council-Dawa coalition won 20 seats, the Fadhila Party twelve, the secular Iraqi National List of former Interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi five, the Islamic Dawa – Iraq Organization three, and the Future Iraq Gathering of the former oil minister Ibrahim Bahr al-Ulum two. After the election, Fadhila formed a coalition with those last three groups to take the governor position. The Fadhila Party controls the province’s administration, the SIIC the security forces, and the Sadrists once ran the streets and port. The rivalry between these groups led to open warfare between their competing militias. That wasn’t quelled until Maliki’s offensive there in March 2008.
The Major Political Parties
The parties participating in the 2009 elections are divided between the current ruling ones made up of the SIIC, the Kurdish Alliance, the Iraqi Islamic Party, and the Dawa Party, and the opposition consisting of the Sadrists, the Fadhila Party, the Iraqi National List, the Iraqi Communist Party, and the Awakening/SOI forces. The parties now in power have the advantage of controlling the facts on the ground, offering patronage, friendly mosques, and links with the tribes.
The Supreme Councils is one of the largest parties in Iraq. It was formed in Iran in the 1980s. In 2005 they largely ran under the banner of Grand Ayatollah Sistani. Since then they have raised the ire of almost every party in the country that hopes to unseat them. The SIIC controls most of the local governments in the south, along with Baghdad, which they will use to win votes. In many provinces they run the security forces, and also have a large number of friendly clerics and mosques. In 2009 they are running the Martyr of the Mihrab and Independent Forces List, which includes the Shahid al-Mihrab Gathering, the Badr Organization, Vice President Adel Abd al-Mahdi’s Independent Gathering, the Hezbollah Movement, and the Sayyed al-Shuhada Movement. They want to maintain control, and establish a Shiite nine province autonomous region in the south.
The Kurdish Alliance is made up of Massoud Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party, Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and several smaller parties. They have proven to be the most disciplined and organized of all of Iraq’s coalitions. They are unified by Kurdish nationalism, and the call for a federal system that will allow them greater autonomy. They also wish to annex several northern areas that they claim are historically Kurdish. They have worked through the constitution and government to accomplish these goals. Kurdish politicians interviewed by the Crisis Group expected defeat in 2009, but wanted to lose as few seats as possible.
The Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) was helped by the country’s turn to religion after the U.S. invasion, and the sectarian-ethnic quota system created by the Americans. They were also an established party, having been one of the first Sunni Islamist groups in the country. In 2005 they ran largely unopposed and gained seats in several provinces. They later formed the Iraqi Accordance Front with two other Sunni parties. They have had a difficult relationship with the other ruling parties, and boycotted the cabinet for several months. They have basically been included to provide the image of national unity, while given no real power or responsibility other than the ministries they control. The other ruling parties have also been upset that they have not been able to stop the insurgency. When the Awakening and Sons of Iraq forces emerged, they were put on the defensive by their own community that questioned their running in 2005 provincial elections. In December 2008 the Accordance Front also broke up when the National Dialogue Council left. They could lose seats as a result, but still have urban support, and are counting on the tribal forces splitting apart and dividing the Sunni vote to the IIP’s advantage.
The Dawa Party was the smallest and weakest of the major parties after the election, but may come out the biggest winner in 2009. Dawa was the first Shiite Islamic party founded in Iraq back in the 1950s. It gained control of the premiership due to the rivalry between the SIIC and Sadrists who blocked each other’s grab for power. They ended up selecting first Ibrahim al-Jaafari and then Nouri al-Maliki as compromise candidates for Prime Minister so their rival couldn’t have the post. Maliki replaced Jaafari, and was at first seen as weak and ineffectual, but has since then proven to be an adept politician able to negotiate a path between the United States, Iran, and the other ruling parties. Since his moves against the Mahdi Army, insurgents, and Kurds, he has fashioned himself into a nationalist leader. He has also argued for a strong central government, and opposed the SIIC’s and Kurds’ regional aspirations. As Prime Minister he has put Dawa members in key positions throughout the government, and centralized control of the security forces in his office. For the 2009 elections Maliki put together the State of Law list made up of his Dawa Party, Islamic Dawa – Iraq Organization, Oil Minister Hussain al-Shahristani’s Independents List, the Solidarity List, al-Intifadha al-Shaabaniya Pact, the Fayli Kurds’ Brotherhood Movement, and the Turkomen Islamic Union. As noted before, they may come away with more than half of the fourteen provinces that held elections this month.
There are also several opposition parties that are hoping to gain in the provincial elections. They are made up of the Sadrists, the Anbar Awakening and Sons of Iraq, the National Reform Party, the Fadhila Party, the Iraqi National List, and the Iraqi Communist Party. They all favor Iraqi nationalism, reject federalism, and oppose the SIIC. They were largely responsible for having elections this year over the protests of the ruling parties. Two major problems with all of them are that they are not running as a unified list, and are largely driven by their individual leaders’ personalities.
The Sadrists have been on the defensive since 2007. They were blamed for much of the violence as the sectarian war died down, were targeted by the U.S. and Maliki, went through Sadr’s cease-fire, then disbanded their militia, and now are trying to form a new social group. They still control many mosques, which are crucial to turn out and motivate voters. Sadrist politicians interviewed by the Crisis Group said they didn’t expect to win power in any province, but rather were wanted to stop the major parties from having a monopoly over them. Due to threats by Maliki to ban any party from running that had a militia, the Sadrists are instead backing two independent groups, the Integrity and Construction List and the Liberals Independent Trend.
The Awakening and SOIs are some of the newest groups on Iraq’s political scene. They forged an alliance with the U.S. aimed at kicking out Al Qaeda in Iraq, and gaining power. They oppose both the Shiite led government, and the Iraqi Accordance Front. The Awakening is based in Anbar, while SOIs have formed political parties in Baghdad and Diyala. They have not created a unified list however, and have increasingly been splintering along tribal lines. The Anbar Awakening for example, split in late 2008 with Abu Risha, the brother of the slain founder of the Awakening, and at least one other sheikh forming an alliance with the ruling Islamic Party. Maliki has also attempted to weaken the SOI in Baghdad and Diyala by arresting and harassing them.
Former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari was once one of the leaders of the Dawa Part, but became increasingly dissatisfied after he was replaced by Maliki. He eventually left to form his own National Reform Party that includes his wing of the Dawa. He has also looked to form links with the Sadrists, and appears to have had lots of money to spend electioneering.
The Fadhila Party is based out of Basra, and was created by Muhammad al-Yaqoubi. He claimed the mantle of Ayatollah Muhammaed Sadeq al-Sadr’s movement, the father of Moqtada al-Sadr, after the invasion. They support an autonomous Basra region, which was defeated just before the January 31 provincial elections. They have not governed Basra well, and have been accused of corruption and oil smuggling. They will probably lose control there, but are hoping to gain seats in the rest of the south.
Last there is former Interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi’s secular Iraqi National List. They received massive support from the Americans in the 2005 election but did extremely poorly. They have formed an alliance with the Iraqi Communist Party and the Sunni Iraqi Front for National Dialogue.
Forces Shaping the 2009 Election
Besides the political parties, the 2009 elections will also be shaped by several structural issues within Iraqi society. Those include the performance of the current ruling councils, public perceptions, institutions, political manipulation, mosques, and the tribes.
Performance and perceptions might prove to be the most important factors in the 2009 election. In 2005 violence, boycotts, sectarian divisions, and a mix of confusion and excitement were major factors in the voting. As a result, many Iraqis stuck with parties from their own sect. Exile groups that had moved back to the country after the U.S. invasion had an advantage over others because they were established parties. The Shiite ones had clerics and mosques, and claimed Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani supported them. This gained them votes, but perhaps not legitimacy. They had to earn that, but have largely failed due to their bad governance. Many provinces suffered during the sectarian war, but even in the south that didn’t have as much violence the provincial politicians were not able to provide law and order, fight corruption, overcome inexperience, provide development, or spend their budgets. The councils have mostly blamed the lack of security and Baghdad for their problems, but many Iraqis blame them personally. The Crisis Group predicted this might depress the vote, which might be one major reason why only 51% of Iraqis decided to come out to the polls this time.
The ruling parties also tried to exploit their control of local governments to win votes. Government jobs are a massive source of employment in the country and are given out as a form of patronage. They may have also used their positions and control of the security forces to intimidate voters. Maliki for one actively used the government to promote his State of Law List.
Because of the plethora of new political groupings, the established ones have also resorted to political manipulation by forming their own independent parties to fool and divide voters. Many of these new independents are simply branches of the major political parties. In Anbar for example, the Islamic Party is running on its own, but also has the National Future Gathering and the Independent National Tribal Gathering. The SIIC created the Independent Gathering, which is supposed to be a less religious branch of the movement.
Mosques and clerics will also play a role in the vote. The leading Shiite ayatollahs have said they do not support any party this time around. Grand Ayatollah Sistani has implied that he is deeply upset with the current provincial governments, but that didn’t stop the SIIC from using his image and name repeatedly in their campaign events. The SIIC and Sadrists also control many local mosques and preachers that called for their followers to vote.
Iraq’s tribes also re-emerged in 2006 due to the Anbar Awakening at first, but then as tools of Maliki’s Dawa Party. In 2008 Maliki began creating Tribal Support Councils across Iraq. They were first started in his drive against the Sadrists with many southern tribes joined because they felt that the Mahdi Army was taking away their followers. Since then they have been created as a vote getter for Maliki. Each is controlled by a member of the Dawa Party, and gets $25,000 a month from Maliki’s office. Each member is allowed to hire several people, which creates a strong patronage system for both the tribal sheikhs and Maliki. The sheikhs were expected to turn out their tribesman on January 31 for the State of Law List. This was bitterly opposed by both the SIIC and Kurds who rightly saw them as challenges to their rule. Several tribes have also formed their own parties seeking a piece of the political and reconstruction pie.
Possible Results
The Crisis Group paper focused exclusively on the battleground provinces they identified at the beginning. For some reason they did not include Salahaddin, which is also divided between Arabs and Kurds. In Ninewa the newly formed al-Hadbaa party, which is the largest Arab coalition was expected to win. They oppose both the Kurds and the Islamic Party. The Kurds tried to postpone the election there to stave off their inevitable defeat, but were unsuccessful. A Kurdish official said they expected to lose control of Ninewa, and get between nine to 12 seats compared to their current 31. In Diyala the ruling Shiite and Kurdish parties also tried to delay the vote in anticipation of a strong Sunni turnout. The Kurdish head of the provincial council predicted that the Kurds would only have four seats compared to their current seven, and thought the Sunnis would walk away with twenty of the twenty-nine seats. Just who that would be was unknown as Maliki has created Tribal Support Councils in Diyala, and there are also various SOI groups competing with the Islamic Party. The fracturing of the Anbar Awakening will probably lead to joint rule between them and the Islamic Party. That could work if the two sides can negotiate a power sharing agreement. Baghdad was seen as up in the air since there were so many parties, Maliki’s State of Law, the SIIC, the Sadrists, the SOI, Allawi’s Iraqi National List to name just a few, competing there. Basra was a battle between Fadhila, the SIIC, the Sadrists, and Dawa.
Conclusion
The Crisis Group concluded by saying the greatest barriers to an effective vote in January 2009 that could bring about change was voter apathy, corrupt and incompetent councils, and political manipulation. Many parties ran on nationalism and the provision of services. The problem is more and more Iraqis are growing cynical about the political process due to the actions of the ruling parties that have failed to improve their daily lives. The Crisis Group thought that even if there were a successful January vote that would not mean that the underlying problems in the country would be solved. They could bring about new politicians that are more nationalist and support central control, but the ultimate test of the elections will be if the new politicians can gain popularity and legitimacy by doing a good job governing.
SOURCES
Fadel, Leila, “Low turnout in Iraq’s election reflects a disillusioned nation,” McClatchy Newspapers, 2/2/09
International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Provincial Elections: The Stakes,” 1/27/09
Parker, Sam, “Guest Post: Behind the Curtain in Diyala,” Abu Muqawama Blog, 8/20/08
Rubin, Alissa, “Ahead of Election, Iraq’s Leader Pushes for Gains,” New York Times, 1/26/09
Battleground Provinces
Ninewa is one of the most troubled provinces in Iraq that has suffered as a result of the 2005 provincial elections. It is divided between the Sunni Arab majority and the Kurdish minority that resides in eastern Mosul, western Sinjar, and northern and eastern strips along the Kurdistan border. There are also many smaller minorities such as Turkomen, Yazidis, Christians, and Shabaks, who are caught in the crossfire between the Arabs and Kurds. This ethnic conflict has caused Ninewa to be one of the most violent in the country with a still active Al Qaeda in Iraq and other insurgents. In 2005 55.7% of the voting population participated in provincial elections, but only 14% in Ninewa. This was largely due to the Sunni boycott. As a result, the Kurdistan Nationalist Democratic List comprising the Kurdistan Democratic Party and several smaller parties took 31 of the 41 provincial seats. As a result, the Kurds gained control of the local government as well as the security forces that has been greatly resented by the Arabs to this day. Their dispute with the Arabs has led them to block the formation of Sons of Iraq (SOI) units because they see them as a threat to their power. They were eventually created, but only in three Arab majority areas. The Kurds also have aspirations to annex northern sections of the province. Several military campaigns have been carried out in Ninewa, which might have made the situation worse. In 2008 Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki also became involved when he launched his own offensive in Mosul, and then began concentrating on the Kurds. As reported before, he placed his brother-in-law in charge of the Army division in control of Mosul, and began rotating Kurdish officers and units out, to be replaced by Arab ones. He also tried to win the Arabs over by offering them reconstruction projects. Future peace in the province depends not only upon Sunnis gaining representation, but reconciliation between them, the Kurds, and the province’s minorities.
Diyala is another mixed province with many Shiite Arabs. It also has Kurds and Turkomen in the north. Like Ninewa, the Kurds want to annex northern portions of the province. Many of the tribes there are mixed Sunni-Shiite. In 2005 only about 33% of the province voted. As a result, the council was divided between the SIIC-Dawa coalition that received 20 seats, the Iraqi Islamic Party that got 14, and the Kurds’ seven. The SIIC gained the governorship and control of the security forces, the Islamic Party got the deputy governor, and the Kurds the head of the council. Many Sunnis resented the Islamic Party’s participation since they violated the boycott. These divisions contributed to violence, a dysfunctional council, little reconstruction, and up to 27,000 families fleeing their homes. Eight of the 41 council members were assassinated, leading to many others living in other parts of the country for protection. In 2007 the first Sons of Iraq (SOI) unit was formed, which helped quell violence in some areas, but not all, and they also clashed with the provincial police who were mostly Shiite and Kurds. In 2008 Maliki launched a security operation in Diyala as well. At first the security forces went after the insurgents, but later trained their sights on the SOI, members of the provincial council, and then the Kurds in the disputed Khanaqin district. Like in Ninewa, Maliki made the situation worse in Diyala by increasing tensions.
Anbar was once the heart of the Sunni insurgency. In 2005 only around 3,800 out of approximately 574,000 voters participated. The Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) ran almost unopposed winning 34 of the province’s 41 council seats. The IIP acted almost unilaterally afterwards, cutting deals to maintain power that were illegal. First, in August 2006 they replaced thirteen council members with people that were not elected. This was due to the fact that four council members were killed, seven never took office out of fear, one became an aide to the governor, and one was elected to parliament. Then at the end of 2006, they added eight additional seats to the council in an attempt to appease and co-opt the Anbar Awakening, who was seen as a threat to the IIP’s rule. That didn’t work, and the Awakening began pushing for elections as soon as possible hoping to sweep the IIP out.
Baghdad was the center of the violence in Iraq and only 48% voted in 2005. The SIIC won 28 of 51 seats, and gained control of the governorship and the head of the council. Dawa won 11 seats, the Fadhila party six, and a group of pro-Sadrist independents three. The Sunnis were virtually absent from power due to their boycott, and gave no legitimacy to the council. After the sectarian war and the massive displacement that ensued, the council now almost represents the demographics of the capital.
The last province the Crisis Group discussed was Basra. In 2005 the Supreme Council-Dawa coalition won 20 seats, the Fadhila Party twelve, the secular Iraqi National List of former Interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi five, the Islamic Dawa – Iraq Organization three, and the Future Iraq Gathering of the former oil minister Ibrahim Bahr al-Ulum two. After the election, Fadhila formed a coalition with those last three groups to take the governor position. The Fadhila Party controls the province’s administration, the SIIC the security forces, and the Sadrists once ran the streets and port. The rivalry between these groups led to open warfare between their competing militias. That wasn’t quelled until Maliki’s offensive there in March 2008.
The Major Political Parties
The parties participating in the 2009 elections are divided between the current ruling ones made up of the SIIC, the Kurdish Alliance, the Iraqi Islamic Party, and the Dawa Party, and the opposition consisting of the Sadrists, the Fadhila Party, the Iraqi National List, the Iraqi Communist Party, and the Awakening/SOI forces. The parties now in power have the advantage of controlling the facts on the ground, offering patronage, friendly mosques, and links with the tribes.
The Supreme Councils is one of the largest parties in Iraq. It was formed in Iran in the 1980s. In 2005 they largely ran under the banner of Grand Ayatollah Sistani. Since then they have raised the ire of almost every party in the country that hopes to unseat them. The SIIC controls most of the local governments in the south, along with Baghdad, which they will use to win votes. In many provinces they run the security forces, and also have a large number of friendly clerics and mosques. In 2009 they are running the Martyr of the Mihrab and Independent Forces List, which includes the Shahid al-Mihrab Gathering, the Badr Organization, Vice President Adel Abd al-Mahdi’s Independent Gathering, the Hezbollah Movement, and the Sayyed al-Shuhada Movement. They want to maintain control, and establish a Shiite nine province autonomous region in the south.
The Kurdish Alliance is made up of Massoud Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party, Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and several smaller parties. They have proven to be the most disciplined and organized of all of Iraq’s coalitions. They are unified by Kurdish nationalism, and the call for a federal system that will allow them greater autonomy. They also wish to annex several northern areas that they claim are historically Kurdish. They have worked through the constitution and government to accomplish these goals. Kurdish politicians interviewed by the Crisis Group expected defeat in 2009, but wanted to lose as few seats as possible.
The Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) was helped by the country’s turn to religion after the U.S. invasion, and the sectarian-ethnic quota system created by the Americans. They were also an established party, having been one of the first Sunni Islamist groups in the country. In 2005 they ran largely unopposed and gained seats in several provinces. They later formed the Iraqi Accordance Front with two other Sunni parties. They have had a difficult relationship with the other ruling parties, and boycotted the cabinet for several months. They have basically been included to provide the image of national unity, while given no real power or responsibility other than the ministries they control. The other ruling parties have also been upset that they have not been able to stop the insurgency. When the Awakening and Sons of Iraq forces emerged, they were put on the defensive by their own community that questioned their running in 2005 provincial elections. In December 2008 the Accordance Front also broke up when the National Dialogue Council left. They could lose seats as a result, but still have urban support, and are counting on the tribal forces splitting apart and dividing the Sunni vote to the IIP’s advantage.
The Dawa Party was the smallest and weakest of the major parties after the election, but may come out the biggest winner in 2009. Dawa was the first Shiite Islamic party founded in Iraq back in the 1950s. It gained control of the premiership due to the rivalry between the SIIC and Sadrists who blocked each other’s grab for power. They ended up selecting first Ibrahim al-Jaafari and then Nouri al-Maliki as compromise candidates for Prime Minister so their rival couldn’t have the post. Maliki replaced Jaafari, and was at first seen as weak and ineffectual, but has since then proven to be an adept politician able to negotiate a path between the United States, Iran, and the other ruling parties. Since his moves against the Mahdi Army, insurgents, and Kurds, he has fashioned himself into a nationalist leader. He has also argued for a strong central government, and opposed the SIIC’s and Kurds’ regional aspirations. As Prime Minister he has put Dawa members in key positions throughout the government, and centralized control of the security forces in his office. For the 2009 elections Maliki put together the State of Law list made up of his Dawa Party, Islamic Dawa – Iraq Organization, Oil Minister Hussain al-Shahristani’s Independents List, the Solidarity List, al-Intifadha al-Shaabaniya Pact, the Fayli Kurds’ Brotherhood Movement, and the Turkomen Islamic Union. As noted before, they may come away with more than half of the fourteen provinces that held elections this month.
There are also several opposition parties that are hoping to gain in the provincial elections. They are made up of the Sadrists, the Anbar Awakening and Sons of Iraq, the National Reform Party, the Fadhila Party, the Iraqi National List, and the Iraqi Communist Party. They all favor Iraqi nationalism, reject federalism, and oppose the SIIC. They were largely responsible for having elections this year over the protests of the ruling parties. Two major problems with all of them are that they are not running as a unified list, and are largely driven by their individual leaders’ personalities.
The Sadrists have been on the defensive since 2007. They were blamed for much of the violence as the sectarian war died down, were targeted by the U.S. and Maliki, went through Sadr’s cease-fire, then disbanded their militia, and now are trying to form a new social group. They still control many mosques, which are crucial to turn out and motivate voters. Sadrist politicians interviewed by the Crisis Group said they didn’t expect to win power in any province, but rather were wanted to stop the major parties from having a monopoly over them. Due to threats by Maliki to ban any party from running that had a militia, the Sadrists are instead backing two independent groups, the Integrity and Construction List and the Liberals Independent Trend.
The Awakening and SOIs are some of the newest groups on Iraq’s political scene. They forged an alliance with the U.S. aimed at kicking out Al Qaeda in Iraq, and gaining power. They oppose both the Shiite led government, and the Iraqi Accordance Front. The Awakening is based in Anbar, while SOIs have formed political parties in Baghdad and Diyala. They have not created a unified list however, and have increasingly been splintering along tribal lines. The Anbar Awakening for example, split in late 2008 with Abu Risha, the brother of the slain founder of the Awakening, and at least one other sheikh forming an alliance with the ruling Islamic Party. Maliki has also attempted to weaken the SOI in Baghdad and Diyala by arresting and harassing them.
Former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari was once one of the leaders of the Dawa Part, but became increasingly dissatisfied after he was replaced by Maliki. He eventually left to form his own National Reform Party that includes his wing of the Dawa. He has also looked to form links with the Sadrists, and appears to have had lots of money to spend electioneering.
The Fadhila Party is based out of Basra, and was created by Muhammad al-Yaqoubi. He claimed the mantle of Ayatollah Muhammaed Sadeq al-Sadr’s movement, the father of Moqtada al-Sadr, after the invasion. They support an autonomous Basra region, which was defeated just before the January 31 provincial elections. They have not governed Basra well, and have been accused of corruption and oil smuggling. They will probably lose control there, but are hoping to gain seats in the rest of the south.
Last there is former Interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi’s secular Iraqi National List. They received massive support from the Americans in the 2005 election but did extremely poorly. They have formed an alliance with the Iraqi Communist Party and the Sunni Iraqi Front for National Dialogue.
Forces Shaping the 2009 Election
Besides the political parties, the 2009 elections will also be shaped by several structural issues within Iraqi society. Those include the performance of the current ruling councils, public perceptions, institutions, political manipulation, mosques, and the tribes.
Performance and perceptions might prove to be the most important factors in the 2009 election. In 2005 violence, boycotts, sectarian divisions, and a mix of confusion and excitement were major factors in the voting. As a result, many Iraqis stuck with parties from their own sect. Exile groups that had moved back to the country after the U.S. invasion had an advantage over others because they were established parties. The Shiite ones had clerics and mosques, and claimed Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani supported them. This gained them votes, but perhaps not legitimacy. They had to earn that, but have largely failed due to their bad governance. Many provinces suffered during the sectarian war, but even in the south that didn’t have as much violence the provincial politicians were not able to provide law and order, fight corruption, overcome inexperience, provide development, or spend their budgets. The councils have mostly blamed the lack of security and Baghdad for their problems, but many Iraqis blame them personally. The Crisis Group predicted this might depress the vote, which might be one major reason why only 51% of Iraqis decided to come out to the polls this time.
The ruling parties also tried to exploit their control of local governments to win votes. Government jobs are a massive source of employment in the country and are given out as a form of patronage. They may have also used their positions and control of the security forces to intimidate voters. Maliki for one actively used the government to promote his State of Law List.
Because of the plethora of new political groupings, the established ones have also resorted to political manipulation by forming their own independent parties to fool and divide voters. Many of these new independents are simply branches of the major political parties. In Anbar for example, the Islamic Party is running on its own, but also has the National Future Gathering and the Independent National Tribal Gathering. The SIIC created the Independent Gathering, which is supposed to be a less religious branch of the movement.
Mosques and clerics will also play a role in the vote. The leading Shiite ayatollahs have said they do not support any party this time around. Grand Ayatollah Sistani has implied that he is deeply upset with the current provincial governments, but that didn’t stop the SIIC from using his image and name repeatedly in their campaign events. The SIIC and Sadrists also control many local mosques and preachers that called for their followers to vote.
Iraq’s tribes also re-emerged in 2006 due to the Anbar Awakening at first, but then as tools of Maliki’s Dawa Party. In 2008 Maliki began creating Tribal Support Councils across Iraq. They were first started in his drive against the Sadrists with many southern tribes joined because they felt that the Mahdi Army was taking away their followers. Since then they have been created as a vote getter for Maliki. Each is controlled by a member of the Dawa Party, and gets $25,000 a month from Maliki’s office. Each member is allowed to hire several people, which creates a strong patronage system for both the tribal sheikhs and Maliki. The sheikhs were expected to turn out their tribesman on January 31 for the State of Law List. This was bitterly opposed by both the SIIC and Kurds who rightly saw them as challenges to their rule. Several tribes have also formed their own parties seeking a piece of the political and reconstruction pie.
Possible Results
The Crisis Group paper focused exclusively on the battleground provinces they identified at the beginning. For some reason they did not include Salahaddin, which is also divided between Arabs and Kurds. In Ninewa the newly formed al-Hadbaa party, which is the largest Arab coalition was expected to win. They oppose both the Kurds and the Islamic Party. The Kurds tried to postpone the election there to stave off their inevitable defeat, but were unsuccessful. A Kurdish official said they expected to lose control of Ninewa, and get between nine to 12 seats compared to their current 31. In Diyala the ruling Shiite and Kurdish parties also tried to delay the vote in anticipation of a strong Sunni turnout. The Kurdish head of the provincial council predicted that the Kurds would only have four seats compared to their current seven, and thought the Sunnis would walk away with twenty of the twenty-nine seats. Just who that would be was unknown as Maliki has created Tribal Support Councils in Diyala, and there are also various SOI groups competing with the Islamic Party. The fracturing of the Anbar Awakening will probably lead to joint rule between them and the Islamic Party. That could work if the two sides can negotiate a power sharing agreement. Baghdad was seen as up in the air since there were so many parties, Maliki’s State of Law, the SIIC, the Sadrists, the SOI, Allawi’s Iraqi National List to name just a few, competing there. Basra was a battle between Fadhila, the SIIC, the Sadrists, and Dawa.
Conclusion
The Crisis Group concluded by saying the greatest barriers to an effective vote in January 2009 that could bring about change was voter apathy, corrupt and incompetent councils, and political manipulation. Many parties ran on nationalism and the provision of services. The problem is more and more Iraqis are growing cynical about the political process due to the actions of the ruling parties that have failed to improve their daily lives. The Crisis Group thought that even if there were a successful January vote that would not mean that the underlying problems in the country would be solved. They could bring about new politicians that are more nationalist and support central control, but the ultimate test of the elections will be if the new politicians can gain popularity and legitimacy by doing a good job governing.
SOURCES
Fadel, Leila, “Low turnout in Iraq’s election reflects a disillusioned nation,” McClatchy Newspapers, 2/2/09
International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Provincial Elections: The Stakes,” 1/27/09
Parker, Sam, “Guest Post: Behind the Curtain in Diyala,” Abu Muqawama Blog, 8/20/08
Rubin, Alissa, “Ahead of Election, Iraq’s Leader Pushes for Gains,” New York Times, 1/26/09
Monday, February 2, 2009
Early Election Predictions
The results of the January 31, 2009 provincial elections will not be known for weeks, but there are already a slew of reports predicting the winners. The biggest victor is Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki whose State of Law list could come away with more than half of the fourteen provinces that held elections. Former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, while not winning any governorates could have a strong showing as well. The Sadrists and Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council look to be the losers, but are still on the scene. New parties like the Awakening in Anbar and the Hadbaa party in Ninewa have also appeared. In the larger picture, the vote is a correction for some of the problems created by the 2005 one, it shows that the idea of a southern autonomous region is probably dead, that Maliki’s drive for a strong central government is on its way to becoming a reality, and that sectarian and ethnic divides still exist in Iraq. The biggest question is whether any of these new politicians will do any better at actual governing than the ones that they are replacing.
Who Could Be The Winners?
Six parties have apparently taken the lion’s share of votes in the January election. According to the government Al-Sabah paper those are Maliki’s State of Law list, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s list, the Iraqi National List of former Prime Minister Allawi, the Sadrists’ Independent Trend of the Noble Ones, the National Project, and the Iraqi Accordance Front of Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi. The State of Law coalition is made up of Maliki’s Islamic Dawa Party, the offshoot Dawa Party Iraqi Organization, the Independent Blog, the Solidarity Bloc, the Islamic Union of Iraqi Turkmen, Kurdish Feli Fraternity Movement, and the Shaabani Uprising Bloc 1991. They call for law and order, getting rid of militias and corruption, and a strong central government. It is a Shiite list, but includes Arabs, Kurds, and Turkomen. The Martyr of the Pulpit is made up of four branches of the Supreme Council, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, the Shaheed al-Mihrab Bloc, the Badr Organization, and the Independent Bloc. They advocate an autonomous Shiite region in the south, job creation, oppose the return of Baathists, and want compensation for crimes during Saddam’s rule. The Iraqi Accordance Front also put together a coalition consisting of the Iraqi Islamic Party, the Reform Bloc of Diyala Province, the Iraqi Legation for Independent Organization of Civil Society, the Arabic Iraqi Congregation, and the General Conference of Iraqi People. They advocate the unity of Iraq, Arab and Islamic identity, an end to the U.S. occupation, the freeing of all prisoners held by the Americans, amending the constitution, maintaining Diyala’s borders, and reforming the government and justice system. The National Project is an opposing Sunni coalition led by Salih al-Mutlaq and former speaker of parliament Mahmoud Mashadani. They are both from the Iraqi Natioanl Dialogue Council who recently split from the Accordance Front. They along with the Iraqi National List and Sadrists have all worked together in parliament as the loosely organized opposition. Iraqi nationalism, a call for a strong central government, and opposition to the ruling parties are what unite them.
Of those six, Maliki’s State of Law could walk away with the majority of Iraq’s provinces. Two papers Al-Sabah and Al-Sharq al-Awsat say that Maliki’s State of Law has come in first in six southern provinces. All are not known yet, but reports point to Basra, Dhi Qar, Muthanna, Wasit, Maysan, and one other. A government source said the list could come away with all nine southern provinces, the five already mentioned plus Karbala, Najaf, Babil, and Qadisiyah. That seems like wishful thinking. In Basra, which was the beginning of Maliki’s turnaround from a weak ineffectual leader to a strong one, his coalition has 50% of the vote. In second is the Supreme Council with 20%. The State of Law may also come away with Baghdad, having won the Shiite east, including Sadr City. That could leave the Prime Minister’s list in control of seven provinces, and be a major blow to the Supreme Council and the Sadrists that are now in power.
Some new parties such as the al-Hadbaa National List in Ninewa may also be victorious. The List is made up of the al-Hadbaa National United Assembly, the Patriotic and National Forces Assembly, the Iraqi and Kurdsitani Party for Freedom and Equality, and the Al-Wasat Iraqi Assembly. The party is led by Atheel al-Nujaifi, and has run on an explicitly anti-Kurdish and pro-security ticket. They oppose Kurdish rule and designs on the province. Currently Kurds control 31 of the 41 council seats, and wish to annex northern sections of the province. Al-Hadbaa has accused the Kurdish controlled security forces and their militia the peshmerga of harassing them. They also claim that if they are elected they will help bring an end to the insurgency in Ninewa, which is largely fueled by the ethnic divide between Arabs and Kurds. This conflict could be the reason why 60% of the province turned out to vote, one of the highest in the country. A U.S. official said that the party could have up to 66% of the vote. If true that would mean they could rule the province without the need of a larger coalition or joint rule with the Kurds. The U.S. general in command of Mosul said he hoped the election would lead to reconciliation, and an end to the violence in one of the country’s most volatile areas. However al-Hadbaa’s anti-Kurdish campaign could lead to more divisions instead.
In other Sunni areas, the Anbar Awakening and Accordance Front list are battling it out. According to Al-Sabah, the tribal Awakening is winning in Anbar. A parliamentarian from the Accordance Front claimed his list is taking in Anbar however, along with Diyala and Salahaddin. He also said they are coming in third in Babil and Basra, a surprise if true since they are Shiite majority provinces.
Another newcomer is Yousef Majid al-Haddoubi, who could walk away with Karbala. Al-Haddoubi is a secular Shiite independent who heads the Brigade List. He was the governor of the province under Saddam, and then became the mayor of Karbala City after the U.S. invasion.
Larger coalitions to rule provinces are also emerging. In Najaf, the Sadrists, the Iraqi National List, the Reform Movement, and the Iraqi National Congress announced that they would form an alliance to try to take the province.
What Does It All Mean?
Many of the parties that came to power in 2005 were not representative of their populations. This could account for most of them being swept from office. The Supreme Council won Babil, Baghdad, Dhi Qar, Karbala, Muthanna, Najaf and Qadisiyah in the previous vote because they were the largest Shiite party, the best organized, had the most money, were founded by an established clerical family the Hakims, had the backing of Iran, said Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani supported them, and the Sadrists largely stayed away from the polls. The SIIC also won in Diyala, the Iraqi Islamic Party in Anbar, and the Kurds in Ninewa and Salahaddin because of the Sunni boycott. The Islamic Party for example, only got 2,692 votes out of 3,775 in Anbar as a result because it ran largely uncontested. Those disparities are now over, although Anbar may still be up for grabs.
There have also been several articles stating that the 2009 vote is a rejection of the religious parties, but this is only partly true. The two main parts of Maliki’s State of Law list are Shiite religious groups, the Islamic Dawa and the Dawa Party Iraq Organization. The Supreme Council might have lost control of the south, but are still present, the same thing with the Sadrists. The Iraqi Islamic Party is also Islamist. Many stressed nationalism and backed independents, but that doesn’t invalidate their pasts. What the lists found is that they had to address issues more to get elected rather than just their religion, and that is an important shift in Iraqi politics. At the same time, Sunnis continued to mostly vote for Sunni parties, Shiites for Shiites, Kurds for Kurds. Sectarianism still exists in Iraq, it’s just more political than violent today.
For the south, the January election probably marks the end of any autonomous region there. The Supreme Council promoted a nine province Shiite region after the U.S. invasion, but largely dropped it. Right before the vote, a member of the Hakim family said they would revive the idea after January 31. That won’t happen now because the SIIC may not control a single province after everything is said and done. The defeat of the Basra autonomous plan and polls show little support for the idea anyway.
Instead, Iraq could be moving towards a stronger central government based in Baghdad. Maliki consistently called for this as he was campaigning across the country. His military actions against the Sadrists, insurgents, and Kurds were all part of his strategy. Now he could have control of both Baghdad, and friendly governors in the south to further his plan.
Finally, the most important question is whether any of the State of Law candidates or any of the other new lists coming to power will be any better at governing than the current ones. Many voted for the State of Law list because of the Prime Minister, not the actual politicians running. The current provincial councils are known for being incompetent, sectarian, corrupt, and suffer from a slow paper based bureaucracy and a centralized state where Baghdad and the individual ministers have all the power. The new councils will also have to deal with half the money as their predecessors due to the dramatic drop in the price of oil. That will make their job even more difficult. They will have to do a much better job to keep the loyalty of their followers, and not alienate more Iraqis from the political system that has not served them well on the local and provincial level.
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Iraqi PM Calls for Strong Central Government,” 1/22/09
Alsumaria, “Iraq elections leaks say Al Maliki ahead,” 2/2/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “IAF realizes progress in Salah el-Din, Diala, Anbar, - MP,” 2/2/09
- “No decrease in salaries because of oil prices – planning minister” 12/19/08
- “Sadrists in one bloc with INL, reform movement,” 2/2/09
Cocks, Tim, “Vote sows seeds of greater calm in Iraq’s north,” Reuters, 2/2/09
Farrell, Stephen, “Election: What The Papers Say,” Baghdad Bureau Blog, New York Times, 2/2/09
Hendawi, Hamza and Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Momentum builds for a self-ruled southern Iraq,” Associated Press, 1/16/09
Ibrahim, Waleed, “’Surprise’ poll victories strengthen Iraq’s Maliki,” Reuters, 2/1/09
International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Provincial Elections: The Stakes,” 1/27/09
Knights, Michael and McCarthy, Eamon, “Provincial Politics in Iraq: Fragmentation or New Awakening?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2008
Londono, Ernesto, “In Iraq’s north, a defining vote,” Washington Post, 2/2/09
Niqash, “accord and reform bloc,” 1/28/09
- “the hadbaa national list,” 1/28/09
- “the shaheed al-mihrab list,” 1/28/09
- “state of law coalition,” 1/28/09
Who Could Be The Winners?
Six parties have apparently taken the lion’s share of votes in the January election. According to the government Al-Sabah paper those are Maliki’s State of Law list, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s list, the Iraqi National List of former Prime Minister Allawi, the Sadrists’ Independent Trend of the Noble Ones, the National Project, and the Iraqi Accordance Front of Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi. The State of Law coalition is made up of Maliki’s Islamic Dawa Party, the offshoot Dawa Party Iraqi Organization, the Independent Blog, the Solidarity Bloc, the Islamic Union of Iraqi Turkmen, Kurdish Feli Fraternity Movement, and the Shaabani Uprising Bloc 1991. They call for law and order, getting rid of militias and corruption, and a strong central government. It is a Shiite list, but includes Arabs, Kurds, and Turkomen. The Martyr of the Pulpit is made up of four branches of the Supreme Council, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, the Shaheed al-Mihrab Bloc, the Badr Organization, and the Independent Bloc. They advocate an autonomous Shiite region in the south, job creation, oppose the return of Baathists, and want compensation for crimes during Saddam’s rule. The Iraqi Accordance Front also put together a coalition consisting of the Iraqi Islamic Party, the Reform Bloc of Diyala Province, the Iraqi Legation for Independent Organization of Civil Society, the Arabic Iraqi Congregation, and the General Conference of Iraqi People. They advocate the unity of Iraq, Arab and Islamic identity, an end to the U.S. occupation, the freeing of all prisoners held by the Americans, amending the constitution, maintaining Diyala’s borders, and reforming the government and justice system. The National Project is an opposing Sunni coalition led by Salih al-Mutlaq and former speaker of parliament Mahmoud Mashadani. They are both from the Iraqi Natioanl Dialogue Council who recently split from the Accordance Front. They along with the Iraqi National List and Sadrists have all worked together in parliament as the loosely organized opposition. Iraqi nationalism, a call for a strong central government, and opposition to the ruling parties are what unite them.
Of those six, Maliki’s State of Law could walk away with the majority of Iraq’s provinces. Two papers Al-Sabah and Al-Sharq al-Awsat say that Maliki’s State of Law has come in first in six southern provinces. All are not known yet, but reports point to Basra, Dhi Qar, Muthanna, Wasit, Maysan, and one other. A government source said the list could come away with all nine southern provinces, the five already mentioned plus Karbala, Najaf, Babil, and Qadisiyah. That seems like wishful thinking. In Basra, which was the beginning of Maliki’s turnaround from a weak ineffectual leader to a strong one, his coalition has 50% of the vote. In second is the Supreme Council with 20%. The State of Law may also come away with Baghdad, having won the Shiite east, including Sadr City. That could leave the Prime Minister’s list in control of seven provinces, and be a major blow to the Supreme Council and the Sadrists that are now in power.
Some new parties such as the al-Hadbaa National List in Ninewa may also be victorious. The List is made up of the al-Hadbaa National United Assembly, the Patriotic and National Forces Assembly, the Iraqi and Kurdsitani Party for Freedom and Equality, and the Al-Wasat Iraqi Assembly. The party is led by Atheel al-Nujaifi, and has run on an explicitly anti-Kurdish and pro-security ticket. They oppose Kurdish rule and designs on the province. Currently Kurds control 31 of the 41 council seats, and wish to annex northern sections of the province. Al-Hadbaa has accused the Kurdish controlled security forces and their militia the peshmerga of harassing them. They also claim that if they are elected they will help bring an end to the insurgency in Ninewa, which is largely fueled by the ethnic divide between Arabs and Kurds. This conflict could be the reason why 60% of the province turned out to vote, one of the highest in the country. A U.S. official said that the party could have up to 66% of the vote. If true that would mean they could rule the province without the need of a larger coalition or joint rule with the Kurds. The U.S. general in command of Mosul said he hoped the election would lead to reconciliation, and an end to the violence in one of the country’s most volatile areas. However al-Hadbaa’s anti-Kurdish campaign could lead to more divisions instead.
In other Sunni areas, the Anbar Awakening and Accordance Front list are battling it out. According to Al-Sabah, the tribal Awakening is winning in Anbar. A parliamentarian from the Accordance Front claimed his list is taking in Anbar however, along with Diyala and Salahaddin. He also said they are coming in third in Babil and Basra, a surprise if true since they are Shiite majority provinces.
Another newcomer is Yousef Majid al-Haddoubi, who could walk away with Karbala. Al-Haddoubi is a secular Shiite independent who heads the Brigade List. He was the governor of the province under Saddam, and then became the mayor of Karbala City after the U.S. invasion.
Larger coalitions to rule provinces are also emerging. In Najaf, the Sadrists, the Iraqi National List, the Reform Movement, and the Iraqi National Congress announced that they would form an alliance to try to take the province.
What Does It All Mean?
Many of the parties that came to power in 2005 were not representative of their populations. This could account for most of them being swept from office. The Supreme Council won Babil, Baghdad, Dhi Qar, Karbala, Muthanna, Najaf and Qadisiyah in the previous vote because they were the largest Shiite party, the best organized, had the most money, were founded by an established clerical family the Hakims, had the backing of Iran, said Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani supported them, and the Sadrists largely stayed away from the polls. The SIIC also won in Diyala, the Iraqi Islamic Party in Anbar, and the Kurds in Ninewa and Salahaddin because of the Sunni boycott. The Islamic Party for example, only got 2,692 votes out of 3,775 in Anbar as a result because it ran largely uncontested. Those disparities are now over, although Anbar may still be up for grabs.
There have also been several articles stating that the 2009 vote is a rejection of the religious parties, but this is only partly true. The two main parts of Maliki’s State of Law list are Shiite religious groups, the Islamic Dawa and the Dawa Party Iraq Organization. The Supreme Council might have lost control of the south, but are still present, the same thing with the Sadrists. The Iraqi Islamic Party is also Islamist. Many stressed nationalism and backed independents, but that doesn’t invalidate their pasts. What the lists found is that they had to address issues more to get elected rather than just their religion, and that is an important shift in Iraqi politics. At the same time, Sunnis continued to mostly vote for Sunni parties, Shiites for Shiites, Kurds for Kurds. Sectarianism still exists in Iraq, it’s just more political than violent today.
For the south, the January election probably marks the end of any autonomous region there. The Supreme Council promoted a nine province Shiite region after the U.S. invasion, but largely dropped it. Right before the vote, a member of the Hakim family said they would revive the idea after January 31. That won’t happen now because the SIIC may not control a single province after everything is said and done. The defeat of the Basra autonomous plan and polls show little support for the idea anyway.
Instead, Iraq could be moving towards a stronger central government based in Baghdad. Maliki consistently called for this as he was campaigning across the country. His military actions against the Sadrists, insurgents, and Kurds were all part of his strategy. Now he could have control of both Baghdad, and friendly governors in the south to further his plan.
Finally, the most important question is whether any of the State of Law candidates or any of the other new lists coming to power will be any better at governing than the current ones. Many voted for the State of Law list because of the Prime Minister, not the actual politicians running. The current provincial councils are known for being incompetent, sectarian, corrupt, and suffer from a slow paper based bureaucracy and a centralized state where Baghdad and the individual ministers have all the power. The new councils will also have to deal with half the money as their predecessors due to the dramatic drop in the price of oil. That will make their job even more difficult. They will have to do a much better job to keep the loyalty of their followers, and not alienate more Iraqis from the political system that has not served them well on the local and provincial level.
SOURCES
Agence France Presse, “Iraqi PM Calls for Strong Central Government,” 1/22/09
Alsumaria, “Iraq elections leaks say Al Maliki ahead,” 2/2/09
Aswat al-Iraq, “IAF realizes progress in Salah el-Din, Diala, Anbar, - MP,” 2/2/09
- “No decrease in salaries because of oil prices – planning minister” 12/19/08
- “Sadrists in one bloc with INL, reform movement,” 2/2/09
Cocks, Tim, “Vote sows seeds of greater calm in Iraq’s north,” Reuters, 2/2/09
Farrell, Stephen, “Election: What The Papers Say,” Baghdad Bureau Blog, New York Times, 2/2/09
Hendawi, Hamza and Abdul-Zahra, Qassim, “Momentum builds for a self-ruled southern Iraq,” Associated Press, 1/16/09
Ibrahim, Waleed, “’Surprise’ poll victories strengthen Iraq’s Maliki,” Reuters, 2/1/09
International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Provincial Elections: The Stakes,” 1/27/09
Knights, Michael and McCarthy, Eamon, “Provincial Politics in Iraq: Fragmentation or New Awakening?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2008
Londono, Ernesto, “In Iraq’s north, a defining vote,” Washington Post, 2/2/09
Niqash, “accord and reform bloc,” 1/28/09
- “the hadbaa national list,” 1/28/09
- “the shaheed al-mihrab list,” 1/28/09
- “state of law coalition,” 1/28/09
Sunday, February 1, 2009
Comparing The January 2009 to January 2005 Provincial Elections (REVISED)
The results of the January 2009 elections will not be known for weeks, but the early returns show a lower turnout than the last time Iraqis voted on provincial councils in January 2005. At that time, 58% of Iraqis, over 8 million out of approximately 14 million people cast ballots. That included out-of-country voting in fourteen nations where 280,303 Iraqis registered. It also included a massive Sunni boycott, where only around 2% showed up. The first counts for the 2009 vote have 51% turnout with around 7.5 million out of 14.9 million registered voters participating. If those numbers hold it could be a disappointing finish. In Anbar for example where the Awakening tribes were having a heated campaign against the Iraqi Islamic Party for control only 40% voted. There were many early reports of widespread apathy amongst Iraqis who felt that politics had not improved their daily lives, that could be proving true. There are also growing reports of voters either being left off of roles or being confused about where their election centers were.
Here are the early returns for the January 31 vote compared to the January 2005 election.
January 31, 2009 Provincial Election Early Voter Turnout By Province
Anbar: 40%
Babil: 56%
Baghdad: Still pending, expected 39-40%
Basra: 48%
Dhi Qar: 50%
Diyala: 57%
Karbala: 60%
Maysan: 46%
Muthanna: 61%
Najaf: 55%
Ninewa: 60%
Qadisiyah: 58%
Salahaddin: 65%
Wasit: 54%
January 2005 Provincial Election Voter Turnout By Province
Anbar 2%
Babil 71%
Baghdad 48%
Dhi Qar 67%
Diyala 34%
Dohuk 89%
Karbala 73%
Maysan 59%
Muthanna 61%
Najaf 73%
Ninewa 17%
Qadisiyah 69%
Salahaddin 29%
Sulaymaniya 80%
Wasit 66%
Who Currently Rules Iraq’s Provinces
ANBAR
Governor: Mamoun Sami Rashid al-Awani
BABIL
Governor: Salim al-Mesalmaoui
BAGHDAD
Governor: Hussein al-Tahan, Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council
BASRA
Governor: Muhmmad al-Waili, Islamic al-Fadhila Party
Al-Waili became governor because the Supreme Council ran two candidates and split their vote.
In April 2007 the Supreme Council had a no confidence vote against al-Waili that was ratified by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in July, but al-Waili is still in office.
Al-Waili was temporarily placed under house arrest during the government offensive in Basra in March 2008.
DHI QAR
Governor: Aziz Kadum Alwan al-Ogheli, Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council
DIYALA
Governor: Raad Hameed al-Mula al-Tamimi, Badr Brigade, Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council
DOHUK
Governor: Tamar Ramadan, Kurdistan Democratic Party
IRBIL
Governor: Ali Nikzad, Kurdistan Democratic Party
KARBALA
Governor: Uqeil al-Khazaali, Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council
MAYSAN
Governor: Adil Mahwadar Radi, Sadrist
MUTHANNA
Governor: Muhammad ali-Hassan Abbas al-Hassani, Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council
Al-Hassani was assassinated in August 2007
Ahmad Marzouq Salal of the Dawa Party who was head of the provincial council took his place.
NAJAF
Governor: Asad Abu Gilel al-Taie, Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council
NINEWA
Governor: Usama Yousif Kashmula, Independent
Kashmula was assassinated in July 2004
Duraid Kashmoula, his brother, took his place
QADISIYAH
Governor: Khalil Jalil Hamza, Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council
Hamza was assassinated in August 2007
Hamid al-Khodairi of the Supreme Council replaced him
SALAHADDIN
Governor: Hamed Hamood Shekti al-Qaisi
SULAYMANIYA
Governor: Dana Ahmed Majid, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
TAMIM
WASIT
Governor: Latif Hamid Turfa, Sadrist
NOTES
Allawi = Former Interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi of the Iraqi National List, aka Iraqi National Accord
Hashemi = Vice President Tariq Hashemi of the Iraqi Islamic Party that is part of the Iraqi Accordance Front
SOURCES
BBC, “Q&A: Iraqi election,” 2/13/05
Biddle, Stephen, Nasr, Vali, Nash, William, “Political and Security Developments in Iraq and the Region,” Council on Foreign Relations, 6/12/08
Chon, Gina and Naji, Zaineb, “Iraq Drive for Voters Lags,” Wall Street Journal, 9/18/08
Cordesman, Anthony, “The Shi’ite Gamble: Rolling The Dice For Iraq’s Future,” Center for Strategic And International Studies, 4/21/08
Dagher, Sam, “Basra strike against Shiite militias also about oil,” Christian Science Monitor, 4/9/08
Dreyfuss, Robert, “Iraq’s Election: What to Watch For,” The Nation, 1/28/09
Farrell, Stephen, “Election Turnout: Early Figures,” Baghdad Bureau Blog, New York Times, 2/1/09
International Mission for Iraqi Elections, “Final Report: Assessment of the January 30, 2005, Election Process,” August 2005
IRIN, “IRAQ: Year in Review 2005 – Iraqis go to the polls,” 1/9/06
Knights, Michael and McCarthy, Eamon, “Provincial Politics in Iraq: Fragmentation or New Awakening?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2008
Naji, Zaineb and Salman, Daud, “Iraq: Political Dynamics in Advance of Parliamentary Elections,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 2005
Najm, Hayder, “Poor Election Turnout Feared,” Niqash, 12/5/08
Nation Master.com, “Encyclopedia > National Independent Cadres and Elites”
Susman, Tina, “IRAQ: Low turnout mars Iraqi election,” Babylon & Beyond Blog, Los Angeles Times, 2/1/09
Here are the early returns for the January 31 vote compared to the January 2005 election.
January 31, 2009 Provincial Election Early Voter Turnout By Province
Anbar: 40%
Babil: 56%
Baghdad: Still pending, expected 39-40%
Basra: 48%
Dhi Qar: 50%
Diyala: 57%
Karbala: 60%
Maysan: 46%
Muthanna: 61%
Najaf: 55%
Ninewa: 60%
Qadisiyah: 58%
Salahaddin: 65%
Wasit: 54%
January 2005 Provincial Election Voter Turnout By Province
Anbar 2%
Babil 71%
Baghdad 48%
Dhi Qar 67%
Diyala 34%
Dohuk 89%
Karbala 73%
Maysan 59%
Muthanna 61%
Najaf 73%
Ninewa 17%
Qadisiyah 69%
Salahaddin 29%
Sulaymaniya 80%
Wasit 66%
Who Currently Rules Iraq’s Provinces
ANBAR
Governor: Mamoun Sami Rashid al-Awani
| Party | Votes | Seats |
| Iraqi Islamic Party (Hashemi) | 2,692 | 29 |
| Independent Iraqi Group | 755 | 8 |
| Reconciliation and Liberation Bloc | 328 | 4 |
| TOTAL VALID BALLOTS | 3,775 | 41 |
| INVALID BALLOTS | 28 |
Governor: Salim al-Mesalmaoui
| Party | Votes | Seats |
| Faithful Iraqis Association (Supreme Council) | 192,643 | 25 |
| Al-Rasul Association | 43,226 | 6 |
| Imam Ali Society | 41,607 | 6 |
| Security & Reconstruction | 17,295 | 2 |
| Babil Independent Association | 15,779 | 2 |
| TOTAL VALID BALLOTS | 494,054 | 41 |
| INVALID AND BLANK BALLOTS | 21,786 |
Governor: Hussein al-Tahan, Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council
| Party | Votes | Seats |
| Baghdad Nation (Supreme Council) | 694,800 | 28 |
| Baghdad Peace (Dawa) | 264,130 | 11 |
| Islamic al-Fadhila Party | 156,229 | 6 |
| National Democratic Alliance | 46,265 | 2 |
| Iraqi Communist Party | 36,713 | 2 |
| National Independent Cadres and Elites (Sadrists) | 35,441 | 1 |
| Iraqi Independent al-Bayan Gathering | 34,366 | 1 |
| TOTAL VALID BALLOTS | 1,750,772 | 51 |
| INVALID BALLOTS | 21,600 |
Governor: Muhmmad al-Waili, Islamic al-Fadhila Party
Al-Waili became governor because the Supreme Council ran two candidates and split their vote.
In April 2007 the Supreme Council had a no confidence vote against al-Waili that was ratified by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in July, but al-Waili is still in office.
Al-Waili was temporarily placed under house arrest during the government offensive in Basra in March 2008.
| Party | Votes | Seats |
| Islamic Basra (Supreme Council) | 235,704 | 20 |
| Islamic al-Fadhila Party | 150,823 | 12 |
| Iraqi National List (Allawi) | 49,005 | 4 |
| Islamic Dawa Party | 37,997 | 3 |
| Iraqi Independent List | 21,236 | 2 |
| TOTAL VALID BALLOTS | 713,271 | 41 |
| INVALID BALLOTS | 7,733 |
Governor: Aziz Kadum Alwan al-Ogheli, Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council
| Party | Votes | Seats |
| Islamic Al-Fadhila Party | 103,114 | 11 |
| Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council | 100,237 | 11 |
| Islamic Dawa – Iraq Organization | 89,263 | 10 |
| Iraqi National List (Allawi) | 20,767 | 2 |
| Islamic Movement of the 15th of Shaaban | 19,709 | 2 |
| Iraqi Communist Party | 18,769 | 2 |
| Iraqi Independent Gathering | 15,531 | 2 |
| Independent Coalition for the Care of Democracy | 13,880 | 1 |
| TOTAL VALID BALLOTS | 522,271 | 41 |
| INVALID BALLOTS | 4,707 |
Governor: Raad Hameed al-Mula al-Tamimi, Badr Brigade, Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council
| Party | Votes | Seats |
| Coalition of Islamic & National Forces in Diyala (Dawa & Supreme Council) | 84,390 | 20 |
| Iraqi Islamic Party (Hashemi) | 55,960 | 14 |
| Kurdish Arabic Turkmen Democratic Coalition – Diyala Governorate | 30,268 | 7 |
| TOTAL VALID BALLOTS | 210,574 | 41 |
| INVALID BALLOTS | 3,283 |
Governor: Tamar Ramadan, Kurdistan Democratic Party
| Party | Votes | Seats |
| Kurdistan Democratic Party | 302,133 | 33 |
| Kurdistan Islamic Union | 35,675 | 4 |
| Patriotic Union of Kurdistan | 35,483 | 4 |
| TOTAL VALLID BALLOTS | 383,265 | 41 |
| INVALID BALLOTS | 5,273 |
Governor: Ali Nikzad, Kurdistan Democratic Party
| Party | Votes | Seats |
| Democratic Voice of Kurdistan List (Kurdistan Democratic Party) | 347,772 | 23 |
| Patriotic Union of Kurdistan | 244,343 | 16 |
| Kurdistan Islamic Union | 22,523 | 1 |
| Islamic Group of Kurdistan | 18,781 | 1 |
| TOTAL VALID BALLOTS | 647,994 | 41 |
| INVALID BALLOTS | 16,622 |
Governor: Uqeil al-Khazaali, Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council
| Party | Votes | Seats |
| Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council | 101,932 | 21 |
| Islamic al-Fadhila Party | 22,085 | 5 |
| Shiite Political Council | 10,655 | 2 |
| Democratic Progressive Gathering | 9,698 | 2 |
| Independent Council of Tribal Sheikhs & Notables of Karbala Governorate | 9,647 | 2 |
| Iraqi Democratic Current | 9,161 | 2 |
| Independent Unified List for the Governorate of Holy Karbala | 8,719 | 2 |
| Dr. Abbas al-Hasnawi | 8,621 | 1 |
| Democratic Meeting for Holy Karbala | 7,605 | 2 |
| Independent Intellectuals Gathering | 7,233 | 2 |
| TOTAL VALID BALLOTS | 297,201 | 41 |
| INVALID BALLOTS | 3,168 |
Governor: Adil Mahwadar Radi, Sadrist
| Party | Votes | Seats |
| Al-Hussayni Thought Forum (Sadrists) | 78,859 | 15 |
| Islamic Unified Front (Supreme Council) | 28,211 | 6 |
| Islamic Dawa – Iraq Organization | 25,388 | 5 |
| Islamic al-Fadhila Party | 20,379 | 4 |
| Al-Rida Center for Culture & Guidance | 13,410 | 3 |
| Gathering of the Independent Sons of Maysan | 9,674 | 2 |
| Iraqi Republican Group | 7,560 | 2 |
| Islamic Dawa Party | 7,006 | 1 |
| Maysan Democratic Coalition | 6,833 | 1 |
| Shiite Political Council | 6,558 | 1 |
| Independent National Islamic Congregation | 6,201 | 1 |
| TOTAL VALID BALLOTS | 246,957 | 41 |
| INVALID BALLOTS | 1,559 |
Governor: Muhammad ali-Hassan Abbas al-Hassani, Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council
Al-Hassani was assassinated in August 2007
Ahmad Marzouq Salal of the Dawa Party who was head of the provincial council took his place.
| Party | Votes | Seats |
| Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council | 23,918 | 8 |
| Islamic al-Fadhila Party | 18,206 | 6 |
| Al-Furat al-Awsat Assembly | 17,924 | 6 |
| Islamic Independent Society | 14,550 | 5 |
| Islamic Dawa Party | 13,354 | 4 |
| Gathering for al-Muthanna | 12,687 | 4 |
| Allegiance Coalition | 10,221 | 3 |
| Iraqi National List (Allawi) | 7,530 | 3 |
| Iraqi Communist Party | 5,602 | 2 |
| TOTAL VALID BALLOTS | 173,155 | 41 |
| INVALID BALLOTS | 2,004 |
Governor: Asad Abu Gilel al-Taie, Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council
| Party | Votes | Seats |
| Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council | 133,676 | 19 |
| Loyalty to Al-Najaf | 64,837 | 9 |
| Banner of the Independents | 26,585 | 4 |
| Iraqi National List (Allawi) | 23,663 | 3 |
| Islamic al-Fadhila Party | 15,999 | 2 |
| Allegiance Coalition | 13,464 | 2 |
| Iraq Future Gathering | 11,513 | 2 |
| TOTAL VALID BALLOTS | 359,268 | 41 |
| INVALID BALLOTS | 3,079 |
Governor: Usama Yousif Kashmula, Independent
Kashmula was assassinated in July 2004
Duraid Kashmoula, his brother, took his place
| Party | Votes | Seats |
| Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan (Kurdistan Democratic Party & Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) | 109,295 | 31 |
| Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council | 17,255 | 5 |
| Iraqi Islamic Party (Hashemi) | 7,065 | 2 |
| Council of the United Clans of Mosul | 6,624 | 2 |
| National Rafidain List | 4,650 | 1 |
| TOTAL VALID BALLOTS | 165,934 | 41 |
| INVALID BALLOTS | 864 |
Governor: Khalil Jalil Hamza, Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council
Hamza was assassinated in August 2007
Hamid al-Khodairi of the Supreme Council replaced him
| Party | Votes | Seats |
| Martyr of the Sanctuary Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim (Supreme Council) | 102,005 | 20 |
| Shiite Political Council | 26,898 | 5 |
| Islamic Dawa Party | 15,446 | 3 |
| Iraqi National List (Allawi) | 15,396 | 3 |
| Islamic al-Fadhila Party | 14,606 | 3 |
| Independent Brotherhood (Sadrists) | 14,485 | 3 |
| Islamic Dawa Party – Iraq Organization | 10,854 | 2 |
| Loyalty to Iraq Coalition (Sadrists) | 8,052 | 2 |
| TOTAL VALID BALLOTS | 337,220 | 41 |
| INVALID BALLOTS | 3,898 |
Governor: Hamed Hamood Shekti al-Qaisi
| Party | Votes | Seats |
| List of the Unified Democratic Coalition in Salahaddin Governorate (Kurdish Democratic Party & Patriot Union of Kurdistan) | 22,160 | 8 |
| Liberation & Reconciliation Gathering | 17,017 | 6 |
| Iraqi Turkmen Front | 14,917 | 5 |
| Coalition of the Iraqi National Unity | 13,321 | 5 |
| Unified List | 12,815 | 4 |
| Iraqi National List (Allawi) | 10,215 | 3 |
| Islamic Dawa Party | 8,691 | 3 |
| National Iraqi Gathering | 8,641 | 3 |
| National al-Resalyoon List (Sadrists) | 6,133 | 2 |
| Gathering of Independent in Salahadin | 4,739 | 2 |
| TOTAL VALID BALLOTS | 137,476 | 41 |
| INVALID BALLOTS | 1,834 |
Governor: Dana Ahmed Majid, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
| Party | Votes | Seats |
| Patriotic Union of Kurdistan | 485,718 | 28 |
| Kurdistan Islamic Union | 75,008 | 5 |
| Islamic Group of Kurdistan | 53,088 | 5 |
| Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq | 91,578 | 3 |
| Communist Party of Kurdistan | 8,192 | |
| TOTAL VALID BALLOTS | 731,323 | 41 |
| INVALID BALLOTS | 13,183 |
Governor: Abdulrahman Mustapha Fatah
| Party | Votes | Seats |
| List of Kurdistan Brotherhood (Kurdistan Democratic Party) | 237,303 | 26 |
| Iraqi Turkoman Front | 73,791 | 8 |
| Iraqi Republican Group | 43,635 | 5 |
| Islamic Turkoman Coalition | 12,678 | 1 |
| National Iraq Union | 12,329 | 1 |
| TOTAL VALID BALLOTS | 400,892 | 41 |
| INVALID BALLOTS | 5,059 |
Governor: Latif Hamid Turfa, Sadrist
| Party | Votes | Seats |
| Iraqi Elites Gathering | 185,813 | 31 |
| Shiite Political Council (Supreme Council & Dawa) | 22,346 | 4 |
| Gathering of the Independents in Wasit | 16,518 | 3 |
| Iraqi Communist Party | 12,780 | 2 |
| Democratic Iraq Gathering | 9,010 | 1 |
| TOTAL VALID BALLOTS | 324,678 | 41 |
| INVALID BALLOTS | 2,704 |
NOTES
Allawi = Former Interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi of the Iraqi National List, aka Iraqi National Accord
Hashemi = Vice President Tariq Hashemi of the Iraqi Islamic Party that is part of the Iraqi Accordance Front
SOURCES
BBC, “Q&A: Iraqi election,” 2/13/05
Biddle, Stephen, Nasr, Vali, Nash, William, “Political and Security Developments in Iraq and the Region,” Council on Foreign Relations, 6/12/08
Chon, Gina and Naji, Zaineb, “Iraq Drive for Voters Lags,” Wall Street Journal, 9/18/08
Cordesman, Anthony, “The Shi’ite Gamble: Rolling The Dice For Iraq’s Future,” Center for Strategic And International Studies, 4/21/08
Dagher, Sam, “Basra strike against Shiite militias also about oil,” Christian Science Monitor, 4/9/08
Dreyfuss, Robert, “Iraq’s Election: What to Watch For,” The Nation, 1/28/09
Farrell, Stephen, “Election Turnout: Early Figures,” Baghdad Bureau Blog, New York Times, 2/1/09
International Mission for Iraqi Elections, “Final Report: Assessment of the January 30, 2005, Election Process,” August 2005
IRIN, “IRAQ: Year in Review 2005 – Iraqis go to the polls,” 1/9/06
Knights, Michael and McCarthy, Eamon, “Provincial Politics in Iraq: Fragmentation or New Awakening?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2008
Naji, Zaineb and Salman, Daud, “Iraq: Political Dynamics in Advance of Parliamentary Elections,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 2005
Najm, Hayder, “Poor Election Turnout Feared,” Niqash, 12/5/08
Nation Master.com, “Encyclopedia > National Independent Cadres and Elites”
Susman, Tina, “IRAQ: Low turnout mars Iraqi election,” Babylon & Beyond Blog, Los Angeles Times, 2/1/09
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