U.S.-Iraqi-Peshmerga Joint Patrols Get Off To Rough Start

In mid-January 2010 joint patrols and checkpoints run by U.S., Iraqi, and Kurdish peshmerga forces were established in Diyala, Tamim, and Ninewa along the border of disputed territories within those provinces such as around the city of Kirkuk. The U.S. commander in Iraq General Ray Odierno originally made the proposal for these operations in August 2009 in an attempt to ease tensions between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The idea generated widespread opposition amongst Arabs and Turkmen in northern Iraq, but a deal was eventually worked out between the central and regional governments. In mid-February and the beginning of March the operation faced two major setbacks.

First, on February 10, 2010 the U.S. commander in Ninewa set up a joint escort for the governor of the province that led to a confrontation with Kurdish forces. The incident began when a joint force took Governor Atheel al-Nujafi to the Kurdish controlled town of Takleef. There, locals threw rocks and tomatoes at his caravan leading to shots being fired in the air. Iraqi forces with the governor ended up arresting some peshmerga troops, who in turn detained some government soldiers. The standoff eventually ended when all of the prisoners were released, but the affair wasn’t over. Afterward, the governor accused the Kurds of kidnapping. KRG President Massoud Barzani countered by suspending joint patrols, and calling Nujafi a criminal who would be arrested if he ever entered another Kurdish area in Ninewa again. After the January 2009 provincial elections in which Nujafi’s al-Hadbaa party won a majority and took over the local government, the Kurds boycotted and set up their own administration in sixteen districts that they controlled. Takleef was in one of those areas. The U.S. tried to smooth over the situation by saying that it was all a misunderstanding, but the American commander in Ninewa still said that local officials should be able to go anywhere in the governorate. Eventually Barzani okayed the continuation of joint patrols.

The second mishap occurred on March 7, the day of general voting for Iraq’s parliament. A provincial council member in Ninewa who was going to cast his ballot just outside of Mosul was mistakenly fired upon by a joint checkpoint. The council member later died of his wounds in a hospital, while eight others in his entourage were wounded. The incident was labeled a tragic misunderstanding between the two parties.

So far these two incidents have not become a national issue, but if another problem happens the joint patrols could quickly become one. Gen. Odierno envisioned the operation as a way to relieve tensions between Arabs and Kurds, which he considers the main threat to stability in Iraq. He was able to overcome a lot of local opposition to get the program up and running. The two recent events show that they may not be able to accomplish much. That’s especially true in Ninewa where there are two rival administrations, one run by the provincial council and another by the KRG. There it seems the best that the patrols and checkpoints could do is maintain the status quo. At their worst, they could lead to another confrontation that blows up in the face of the Americans.

SOURCES

Arraf, Jane, “Before Iraq election, Arab and Kurd tensions soar in the north,” Christian Science Monitor, 3/1/10

KUNA, “Mosul explosions kill one, injure 20 others,” 3/7/10

Reuters, “FACTBOX-Security developments in Iraq, March 7,” 3/7/10

The Accountability And Justice Commission Tries To Have The Last Word

On March 10, 2010 the heads of the Accountability and Justice Commission Ahmad Chalabi and Ali al-Lami announced that 55 candidates that ran in the election were banned because of their alleged ties to the Baath party. The candidates were replacements for the original ones barred by the Accountability and Justice Commission in January 2010. Former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi of the Iraqi National Movement claimed that 30 of those newly banned were from his list, while one was from Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law. Six of the 55 might have won a seat in parliament.

The question now is what to do with the votes for the banned candidates. The Election Commission is considering distributing their votes to others amongst their lists. Allawi however, said that members of the Accountability and Justice Commission might push to have their votes disqualified. The U.S. and United Nations are understandable upset with this turn of events, especially if the public or candidates don’t accept their banning.

Before the Accountability and Justice Commission dropped their latest bomb, the Election Commission was tallying the votes, and the large parties were beginning to make feelers to each other in an attempt to form a new ruling coalition. The Accountability and Justice Commission appears to want to derail this process just as it hijacked the pre-election campaign by focusing all of the lists upon Baathism. It’s no surprise that they would target the National Movement once again, as 72 of the original 511 candidates banned in January 2010 were from that list. Allawi is said to have finished second behind Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law, while the National Alliance, that Chalabi and Lami were candidates for, came in third. Getting rid of National Movement candidates would eliminate one of the National Alliance’s main rivals. This could open the door to a State of Law-National Alliance coalition that would likely then make a deal with the Kurds to re-create the current government. The Accountability Commission can even ban more candidates before they get sworn into office, which could be held over the heads of opposing lists to intimidate them even more.

SOURCES

International Crisis Group, “Iraq’s Uncertain Future: Elections and Beyond,” 2/25/10

Londono, Ernesto and Fadel, Leila, “Dispute over candidate disqualifications could mar Iraqi vote’s legitimacy,” Washington Post, 3/10/10

Morris, Loveday, “Battle over Iraq candidates’ Baath links heads for courts,” The National, 3/10/10

Iraq’s Oil Exports Up In February 2010

Iraq’s oil exports continue to follower their rollercoaster pattern of going up and down each month. The Oil Ministry reported that in February 2010 it exported an average of 2.083 million barrels a day, up from 1.926 million barrels in January. The State Department reported a slightly lower number for February at an average of 1.99 million barrels a day. Overall, oil production and exports hit a plateau in mid-2009. Oil production averaged 2.45 million barrels from May 2009 to February 2010, while exports stood at 1.94 million barrels a day. At the same time the price of Iraqi crude has steadily gone up as the world recovers from the recession. At its low point in January 2009 a barrel of Iraqi oil only sold for $36. One year later it was selling for $73.97. That has meant that Iraq has been earning more and more money, which it desperately needs for reconstruction, despite the up and down pattern of exports. The big questions now are when will the new oil deals signed with foreign companies begin to come into affect, will they be able to overcome the various bottlenecks in Iraq’s oil industry so that the country can begin to reach its potential, and will the money trickle down to the average Iraqi?

Iraq Avg. Oil Production/Exports Per Day (State Dept.)
2009
May 2.41/1.90
June 2.43/1.94
July 2.49/2.04
Aug. 2.49/1.98
Sep. 2.50/1.95
Oct. 2.50/1.89
Nov. 2.37/1.92
Dec. 2.40/1.91
2010
Jan. 2.46/1.92
Feb. 2.45/1.99

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “$4.4b Iraq’s oil revenues in Jan.,” 2/23/10

Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, “Iraq Status Report,” 3/3/10

Reuters, “Iraq oil exports rise in Feb to 2.083 mln bpd,” 2/28/10

How Much Change Will The 2010 Elections Bring To Iraq?

Some early returns from Iraq’s March 2010 parliamentary election are in. Leading politicians are also beginning to make statements about the results, and hinting at possible alliances to put together a new government. These together beg the question as to just how much change this year’s vote will bring to the country.

First, early results have been reported in the northern province of Diyala and Karbala in the south. In Diyala, only five of 22 lists got enough votes to win at least one seat in parliament. Former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi’s Iraqi National Movement came in first, followed by the Iraqi National Alliance, the Kurdish Alliance, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law, and finally the Accordance Front. Together those five will divide up the 13 seats up for grabs in Diyala. In Karbala, three lists, the State of Law, the National Alliance, and the National Movement, are reported to have collected 99% of the vote so far out of twelve total coalitions. 

In both cases, the leading lists are made up of the exact same parties that took all the seats in parliament in 2005 from those two governorates. For example, in December 2005 in Karbala the United Iraqi Alliance won five seats, and the Iraqi National List one. Then, the United Alliance was made up of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), the Sadrists, and the Dawa Party. Today, Dawa is the backbone of the State of Law that finished first, while the Supreme Council and Sadrists make up the National Alliance that came in second. The Iraqi National List is Allawi’s party who now leads the National Movement that is currently in third place in the province. Similarly, in 2005 in Diyala the Iraqi Accordance Front won five seats, the United Iraqi Alliance and the Kurdish Alliance two each, and the Iraqi National List and the Iraqi National Dialogue Front one apiece. The Accordance Front is currently in fifth place. The three major parties in the United Alliance now have the second and fourth most votes. The Kurdish Alliance came in third in 2005, and has that same spot today. Finally, the Iraqi National List and Iraqi National Dialogue Front are today in the National Movement, which holds the most votes so far. The results show that there has been a shift in public opinion creating a new balance of power in Iraq between its major parties. In Karbala, the Shiite parties are still in the lead, it’s just that Maliki has struck out on his own with the State of Law, while Allawi is still in last. In Diyala a different rearrangement has occurred. Whereas in 2005 the Islamic Party’s Accordance Front emerged as the leading Sunni party in Iraq, this year, many Sunnis came out for Allawi’s National Movement instead, leaving the Islamic Party in last place. In contrast to Karbala, in Diyala the Supreme Council and the Sadrists still hold sway with the province’s Shiites over Maliki, while the Kurds remain in the middle.

Selected Comparison Of Alliances and Finishes: 2005 vs 2010

Major Lists/Parties In December 2005 Parliamentary Election
United Iraqi Alliance - Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), Sadrists, Dawa
Kurdish Gathering - Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)
Iraqi Accordance Front -Iraqi Islamic Party
Iraqi National List - Former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi
Iraqi National Dialogue Front -Saleh al-Mutlaq

Major Lists In March 2010 Parliamentary Election
State of Law - Dawa
National Alliance - SIIC, Sadrists
Kurdish Alliance – PUK, KDP
Iraqi Accordance Front – Iraqi Islamic Party
National Movement – Iraqi National List, Iraqi National Dialogue Front

Diyala – 2005 Results
1. Iraqi Accordance Front
2. United Iraqi Alliance
3. Kurdish Gathering
4. Iraqi National List
5. Iraqi National Dialogue Front

Diyala – 2010 Preliminary Results
1. Iraqi National Movement
2. Iraqi National Alliance
3. Kurdish Alliance
4. State of Law
5. Iraqi Accordance Front

Karbala – 2005 Results
1. United Iraqi Alliance
2. Iraqi National List

Karbala – 2010 Preliminary Results
1. State of Law
2. Iraqi National Alliance
3. Iraqi National Movement

Some take this year’s vote as a move towards secularism and nationalism, but upon further inspection this may not be wholly true. For example, in Diyala the National Alliance that ran on a sectarian, anti-Baathist campaign, and Shiite identity beat out the State of Law. Conversely, Allawi’s strong showing in the province in 2010 could simply be Sunnis shifting support to him and away from the Islamic Party rather than a victory for Iraqi nationalism. Allawi is a Shiite, but all of his major allies in the National Movement, parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq, Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi, the al-Hadbaa Party, and Deputy Prime Minister Rafa al-Issawi, are all Sunnis, and Allawi’s National List has always appealed to ex-soldiers from Saddam’s time and ex-Baathists, and opposed Iranian influence that are all popular with Sunnis. Not only that, but no new party emerged in either governorate to win a seat, and most of the smaller parties are made up of technocrats, and stress secularism, nationalism, and local issues.

Not only is the 2010 vote likely to return all of the major parties to power in parliament, top politicians think that the new government won’t be much different from the old one. On March 7 for instance, President Jalal Talabani told Aswat al-Iraq that only minor differences would emerge in Iraqi politics after the election. He said that those in power would stay there, although some new blocks might be added to the ruling coalition. As a sign of things staying the same, Talabani claimed that major parties had asked him to remain as president. Next, on March 9 Niqash on-line magazine published an interview with former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari who ran as part of the Iraqi National Alliance. He said that he felt a “conviction” to join with the State of Law, which would re-unite the two factions of the old United Iraqi Alliance of 2005 to hold onto the top positions in government. Jaafari echoed Talabani’s sentiment by saying that the 2010 vote would lead to some changes, but not dramatic ones as the transformation of countries happens at a very slow pace.

Beginning in late-2008 Iraq’s politics began to change. The large lists of 2005 began to fragment, and the public lost faith in the old coalitions for not providing jobs, services, and economic development. Those sentiments were shown in the 2009 election when every single party in power was voted out of office, a dramatic event in the Middle East where politicians rarely feel the consequences of their actions. This trend has continued into 2010 as Maliki’s State of Law and Allawi’s National Movement are seen as alternatives to the other major parties that held sway from 2005-2008 such as the Supreme Council, the Sadrists, and the Islamic Party. Maliki’s Dawa Party and Allawi’s National List have been around just as long and shared power with those others, but either through their actions such as the Prime Minister cracking down on Shiite militias, or the former Prime Minister’s promises of a fresh approach to Iraq’s problems, they have won the public’s support, and finished first and second in this year’s election as a result. The two will now battle it out for supremacy to see who can become Iraq’s next leader, and that will actually show the direction Iraq is heading in more than how the different lists finished in the voting.

SOURCES

AK News, “Early results according to observers,” 3/8/10
- “Observers: State of Law first, National list second, Iraqiya third in Karbala,” 3/8/10

Alsumaria, “Iraq Map – Iraq Parliamentary Elections 2010”

Aswat al-Iraq, “Talabani rules out major political changes post election,” 3/7/10

Al Jazeera, “Iraqi parties form new coalition,” 10/31/09

Levinson, Charles, “Iraqis Flock to Polls Despite Early Attacks,” Wall Street Journal, 3/7/10

Najm, Hayder, “coalition possible, constitution vital, says jaafari,” Niqash, 3/9/10

Sullivan, Marisa Cochrane and Danly, James, “Iraq On The Eve Of Elections,” Institute for the Study of War, 3/3/10

Voting Down In 2010, But Election Shows New Balance Of Power In Iraq

The early returns for the March 7, 2010 election are in. They show that voting was down from the last parliamentary vote in 2005. In December 2005 76% of the population showed up at the polls, compared to 62% in 2010. This year participation was down across the country. In Basra, a largely Shiite province turnout went from 74% in 2005 to 57% in 2010. In Ninewa, that has a Sunni majority, but also includes Kurds, Christians, Yazidis, and Shabaks voting went from 70% in 2005 to 66%. In the Kurdish province of Sulaymaniya turnout dropped from 84% in 2005 to 73%. The Shiite provinces of Muthanna and Qadisiyah had the smallest declines going from 66% to 61% and 65% to 63% respectively.

Voter Turnout For 2005 vs 2010 Parliamentary Elections
Anbar 86% vs 61%
Babil 80% vs 62%
Baghdad 70% vs 53%
Basra 74% vs 57%
Dhi Qar 72% vs 60%
Diyala 75% vs 62%
Dohuk 92% vs 80%
Irbil 95% vs 76%
Karbala 70% vs 62%
Maysan 73% vs 50%
Muthanna 66% vs 61%
Najaf 73% vs 61%
Ninewa 70% vs 66%
Qadisiyah 65% vs 63%
Salahaddin 98% vs 73%
Sulaymaniya 84% vs 73%
Tamim 86% vs 73%
Wasit 68% vs 60%

Iraqis greeted the 2005 vote with much enthusiasm after years of dictatorial rule by Saddam Hussein. By 2010 attitudes had begun to change. Most importantly there is a growing level of cynicism, especially amongst the young about the country’s politicians. They have not been able to deliver on their promises of better services, jobs, and economic development, plus Baathism dominated this year’s campaign rather than anything substantive. A change in the publics’ perception could be seen in the January 2009 elections where turnout was lower than the January 2005 provincial balloting. March’s election did have a better showing however than 2009 when only 51% voted. 

The real importance of the vote is that it will solidify the new balance of power within Iraq between its major parties that began to emerge in 2008. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law is likely to come out the frontrunner, showing that his strong actions against the Shiite militias and insurgents in 2008, and his strengthening of the Iraqi state still make him the most popular politician in Iraq. That is quite a change from before when his Dawa Party was a minor player compared to the Supreme Council (SIIC) and the Sadrists, who chose him as their compromise candidate in 2005 because he seemed weak and malleable to their whims. Iyad Allawi’s National Movement looks to be the runner-up. His list is a mix of Sunnis and Shiites, and ran on a nationalist stance, but more importantly, Allawi has not been in power since 2005 so he offers a change from the current ruling parties. The National Alliance is likely to come in third showing that while the SIIC and Sadr still have their followers, they can no longer be considered the leading Shiite parties, having been eclipsed by the Prime Minister. Finally, the Kurdish Alliance must come to grips with the emergence of the Change List, and the Iraqi Islamic Party and its Consensus List has lost almost all relevance as the Sunni vote has been split across various other parties, leaving them behind.

Next, the State of Law and National Movement will begin maneuvering to put together a new ruling coalition. They will look to the National Alliance and Kurdish Alliance, because it will take at least one if not both to reach the 163 seats in parliament necessary for a majority. The smaller lists like the Unity of Iraq and Change might also be brought into the negotiations to get the required number of seats. Each will be looking for ministries in exchange for their support, and the Kurds will be asking for concessions on Kirkuk and oil deals. The major debate will be over whether Maliki or Allawi will become Prime Minister, and a compromise candidate may have to emerge if things become deadlocked like they did in 2005. This process is likely to take months as a result.

SOURCES

Arraf, Jane, “Iraq election: Young war generation yearns for old stability,” Christian Science Monitor, 3/4/10

August, Oliver, “Iraq poll turnout at up to 60 per cent despite attacks,” Times of London, 3/8/10

BBC, “Iraq election voter turnout ‘62%,’” 3/8/10

Visser, Reidar, “IHEC Publishes Rates of Participation in the Parliamentary Elections,” Iraq And Gulf Analysis, 3/8/10

Is The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Too Distracted By Internal Affairs To Be Meddling In Iraq Right Now?

When the Accountability and Justice Commission that took over form the old deBaathification Commission banned 511 candidates from Iraq’s March 2010 parliamentary vote, the U.S. was quick to blame the move on Iran. On January 27 for example, General David Petraeus accused the Accountability Commission of working at the behest of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. The next month the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq General Ray Odierno said that the two heads of the Commission Ahmad Chalabi and Ali al-Lami were working with Iran as well. Later on February 25, the U.S. military leaked a report to Washington Post columnist David Ignatius about Iran’s support for parties in the election. The paper said that the Revolutionary Guards’ Qods Force, which is responsible for their foreign operations including Iraq, pushed for the formation of the Iraqi National Alliance, which is made up of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, the Sadrists, the Fadhila Party, the Iraqi National Congress, and former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari. The Americans claimed that Iran was paying $9 million a month to the Supreme Council and $8 million to the Sadrists to help with their campaigning. They said that Iran had a hit list of 600 Iraqis that fought in the Iran-Iraq War that it wanted eliminated as well. Chalabi and Lami responded by saying that the U.S. was trying to bring Baathists back into power and denied any Iranian influence. The two also didn’t need Tehran to tell them to go after the nationalist and secular candidates. Either way, the war of words between Washington and Tehran seemed to be on.

Two other reports have surfaced however that questions whether Iran is that interested in the daily affairs of Iraq right now. The police chief in Maysan province for example, told Newsweek in February 2010 that Qods Force members use to visit the governorate every month, but now haven’t visited in 6-7 months. The police chief believed that Iran’s internal problems with suppressing its opposition after their June 2009 presidential elections had distracted Tehran from working within Iraq. General Petraeus supported that view during a recent speech in Washington where he said that Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei had turned to the Revolutionary Guards and their Qods Force for support and security after the Iranian voting,  sucking them into internal politics.

The truth of the matter of Iran’s current role in Iraq is probably somewhere in between these stories. Iran is definitely supporting Shiite parties in Iraq’s 2010 parliamentary voting as it always has, and did help put together the National Alliance. That suits its main goal, which is a Shiite run government in Baghdad that will be friendly to Tehran and never become a rival again. After Iraq’s voting is finished on March 7, Iran will likely push for the Alliance and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law to mend fences and form a ruling coalition again. That being said, the regime in Tehran is facing a major internal crisis with its public after its own presidential balloting. The Revolutionary Guards were originally formed to protect the Islamic government, and would thus naturally be asked to help in a time like the present to shore up the leadership. It could still be supporting its friends in Iraq without being intimately involved in day-to-day affairs there as it was in the past. Either way, Tehran will continue to play a leading role in Iraq as it has supporters amongst many of the country’s leading parties, is one of the largest trade partners with Iraq, and is the main supplier of religious tourism and students to holy sites in Baghdad, Najaf, and Karbala. Even with its own political problems, Iran will still have these hard and soft power levers to influence events in Iraq.

SOURCES

Alsumaria, “Petraeus: Justice and Accountability manipulated by Iranian Quds Force,” 1/27/10

Dehghanpisheh, Babak, Barry, John and Dickey, Christopher, “Rebirth of a Nation,” Newsweek, 3/8/10

Dickey, Christopher, “The Sandman Cometh,” Newsweek, 3/4/10

Ignatius, David, “Tehran’s Vote Buying in Iraq,” Washington Post, 2/25/10

Pessin, Al, “US Commander Says Iran Planned Political Dispute in Iraq,” Voice of America, 2/16/10

General Voting Begins In Iraq

Iraq’s 2010 parliamentary elections officially opened on March 4. That was when special balloting took place. 459 voting centers were opened, with 1,742 polling stations. 850,000 Iraqis were eligible to cast their ballots including in 16 foreign countries, such as Syria, Jordan, Sweden, the United States, Iran, Lebanon, United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Netherlands, Australia, Germany, Canada, Austria, Egypt, and England. The main participants were members of the security forces, prisoners, and hospital patients within Iraq. Although there were reports that turnout was good, the Iraqi Election Commission’s early returns showed that only 59% participated. In Irbil province, turnout was at 86.6%, reflecting the historically high voting rate amongst Kurds since they held their first elections in 1992. In contrast, in the Netherlands only 6.6%, around 2,000 of 30,000 possible voters showed up. There is a chance that turnout will be low this year, as there is increasing cynicism amongst Iraqis because parliament has been deadlocked on major legislation, politicians and the bureaucracy are seen as corrupt, and the local and central government have failed to improve on basic services despite the improved security situation. As reported before, although Kurds continue to vote in high numbers, and Sunnis came out as well in the 2009 elections to make up for their 2005 boycott, balloting by the Shiite majority saw a decrease in the provincial elections last year.

It’s also important to remember that this year’s voting is only the most public expression of Iraq’s attempt to build a democracy. More important is that institutions and the rule of law develop so that the general public can benefit from the freedoms a democracy is supposed to provide. That will take much longer, and Iraq is struggling on that front. Iraq’s justice system for example, lacks due process, and its jails are famous for beatings, torture, overcrowding, and poor conditions. The deBaathification campaign launched by the Iraqi National Alliance and the Accountability and Justice Commission that it controlled just on the eve of balloting was another instance of the lack of rule of law as the Commission was not appointed by parliament, the charges against the banned candidates was never made public, and the court that dealt with the appeals changed its opinion due to political pressure. That doesn’t mean that Iraq cannot eventually establish a working democratic system, but that claims that it has already arrived are premature, and that it will be a long and arduous process that can see reversals, and even be cut short. Iraq’s people and government do have a chance to move in a positive direction however, which is in stark contrast to most of the countries that surround it that are governed by monarchies and autocracies.

SOURCES

AK News, “Iraq poll in Netherlands: turnout rate 6.6% so far,” 3/6/10

Alsumaria, “High turnout on 1st day of out-of-country vote,” 3/6/10
- “IHEC: Special voting turnout reached 59,” 3/6/10
- “Special voting begins in Iraq with participation of 600,000,” 3/4/10

Arraf, Jane, “Iraq election: Young war generation yearns for old stability,” Christian Science Monitor, 3/4/10

Aswat al-Iraq, “459 centers receive 850,000 voters in special voting – IHEC,” 3/4/10
- “Special voting in Arbil reaches 86.6% - IHEC,” 3/5/10

Dehghanpisheh, Babak, Barry, John and Dickey, Christopher, “Rebirth of a Nation,” Newsweek, 3/8/10

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,” 1/30/10