Helfont, Samuel, Iraq Against The World, Saddam, America, And The Post-Cold War Order, New York: Oxford University Press, 2023
Professor Samuel Helfont of the Naval War College has written his second book, Iraq Against The World, Saddam, America, And The Post-Cold War Order, again largely based upon Baathist documents that were captured after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. This time he focuses upon how Iraq tried to break down the new world order that President Bush proclaimed after the Gulf War. The U.S. hoped that there would be an international system based upon rule of law and enforced by the United Nations. Iraq was the focus of this strategy as it had U.N. sanctions and weapons inspectors for over a dozen years. Saddam’s response was to have Baathist offices and embassies around the world organize information campaigns and protests against Iraq’s treatment. Helfont breaks new ground with this work as few have delved into this topic before.
Helfont begins by explaining what President Bush’s vision of the future was after the Gulf War. Bush said he wanted a new international system based upon rules which would be enforced by the United Nations and Iraq would be the test subject. There was much support for this idea after the Gulf War as most of the major powers and members of the Security Council pushed cooperation rather than rivalries. Not only the U.S., but England, Russia, France and others blamed Saddam for all that befell his country during the Gulf War and afterwards. That led to weapons inspections, two no fly zones one other northern Iraq and one over the south and the maintenance of sanctions. It appeared that Bush had largely been successful in his plans for a new world order and Iraq suffered the consequences.
What Iraq Against The World focuses upon is all the various machinations Iraq launched to undermine this new system. Shortly after the Gulf War ended Baghdad ordered all its embassies and Baath Party offices around the world to organize against sanctions. Committees were also formed to coordinate ministries and government run groups for the same purpose. The main theme pushed was Iraqi victimization. For instance in 1999 UNICEF came out with a report that the death rate for children under five had doubled since 1990. After 2003 it was discovered that the data was all faked. Less elaborate efforts were Iraq creating flyers and pictures of Iraqi children suffering from sanctions which were sent out across the globe. Iraq created youth and students organizations and other front groups which claimed to be independent but were run by the government to reach out to their counterparts and organize meetings, rallies, letter writing campaigns and protests over the humanitarian crisis in Iraq. Helfont writes that these were largely effective when Iraq worked with groups that were either already opposed to the U.S.’s policy towards Iraq or open to criticize it.
Another element in Iraq’s strategy opened up in 1995 when Saddam agreed to the Oil for Food program. Iraq was able to sell some of its oil in return for food and humanitarian supplies. The book points out that Iraq first focused upon using this new system to win political support. Iraq was able to pick companies to sell oil to. It often gave contracts at a loss to try to gain support of corporations and foreign officials and focused upon Russia, China, France and Italy. Later it used the sales to earn money as it charged illegal surcharges while also giving kickbacks to foreigners. This coincided with a breakdown of the international consensus on Iraq. Russia was the focus of Iraq’s dealings and came to criticize sanctions in the Security Council. The U.N. official in charge of the Oil for Food program was given bribes and in turn ignored Iraq’s illicit work. There were various reasons why countries like Russia broke with the U.S. from the Balkans to the expansion of NATO. Helfont argues that Iraq was just as important but has largely been ignored in literature on the issue.
One criticism of the book is that while the author talks about how Iraq was able to gradually break down the sanctions it has nothing on what was actually happening with them during the same time period. Helfont writes that Iraq was able to earn more than $1.5 billion from 2000-2002 by manipulating the Oil for Food program. Starting in 1999 the U.N. sanctions committee which was controlled by the U.S. and UK and was largely independent of the Security Council blocked more and more humanitarian contracts for Iraq. In November 1998 it blocked $147.5 million in deals. By August 1999 that had increased to $500 million, rising to $1.7 billion in April 2000 to over $5 billion in May 2002. If you’d just read Iraq Against The World it would seem the whole system was coming apart and would quickly collapse. The reality is more nuanced as Iraq was able to get around many restrictions but at the same time it was getting less and less of much needed materials such as paper, books, tires, etc. because of the sanctions. Saddam and his cronies benefited while the masses suffered.
Samuel Helfont has published another very interesting book on Iraq. Few have talked about how Iraq largely succeeded in breaking down the international alliance against it following the Gulf War. It launched a massive campaign using agents and front groups and was able to amass quite a bit of public opinion in many countries against sanctions. Through the Oil for Food program it manipulated many politicians and companies to break with the U.S. One of the reasons why the 2003 invasion happened was because the United States believed the international system created after the Gulf War was fading, sanctions would soon end and Iraq would be free to openly build weapons of mass destruction again and terrorize its neighbors. Helfont has plenty of details about Iraq’s strategy largely based upon Baathist documents that gives an insider’s view of how the regime operated. The amount of influence Iraq was able to build up was quite impressive and largely done in the shadows. Iraq Against The World has peeled back the curtain and exposed what Saddam was up to and ironically how it helped lead to his overthrow.
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