Missteps by Iraqi Spokesman and Commanding U.S. General On SOFA

On December 14 President Bush on his last trip to Iraq as leader of the United States met with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to sign the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). As reported earlier, after the SOFA goes into affect on January 1, 2009, there will be a referendum on it in July of that year. That means the U.S. and Iraqi governments need to prove their sincerity in limiting the role of American forces in the country to the Iraqi public so that they will confirm it. Recent statements by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh and the U.S. commander in Iraq, General Ray Odierno have already jeopardized this public diplomacy effort.

First, while on a trip to the United States, Maliki’s spokesman al-Dabbagh gave a speech at the Pentagon on December 11 where he said U.S. forces might stay in Iraq for ten years. That was obviously past the 2011 withdrawal date set by the SOFA. Dabbagh believed that the Iraqi forces would not be ready in the three years set by the agreement, and would therefore need a continued U.S. military presence. This was especially true of the Iraqi forces’ logistics, air force, and navy. The Prime Minister quickly rejected his own spokesman’s comments. That didn’t stop political parties that had questions about the agreement from jumping on Dabbagh’s statements as proof that neither side believes in sticking to the SOFA’s timelines.

A few days later on December 13, commander General Ray Odierno made a similar statement contradicting the SOFA. He told the press that U.S. troops would stay in Iraq’s cities as advisors past the summer 2009 deadline set by the SOFA. He said that would mean that U.S. forces would stay in most of the security stations that are now being turned over to the Iraqis. Part of the reason why General Odierno wanted to keep these soldiers in Iraq was to help secure the upcoming Iraqi elections.

Together, in the span of just three days, a major Iraqi official and the commander of U.S. forces might have threatened passage of the SOFA in the July referendum. That doesn’t mean what they said wasn’t true. Iraqi forces probably won’t be ready in just six months to fully patrol all of the country’s cities, nor be ready for full independence three years later either. As military analysts such as Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies have often pointed out, the Iraqi armed forces and police still face major obstacles before they are truly capable of defending their country on their own. These limitations were probably known by the Iraqis and Americans who worked on the SOFA, but the agreement was as much a symbolic one about Iraq’s sovereignty as anything else. Maliki was especially satisfied with the conclusion of the negotiations because it boosted his nationalist standing. He can now claim that he set the date for the U.S. to leave Iraq before the provincial elections in 2009. Dabbagh’s and Odierno’s statements pierce this newly created façade, and may set an early tone with the Iraqi public who have given little credit to the U.S. for the improved security situation, and only went from a negative to a positive view of the SOFA after Maliki was able to get major concessions from the United States. If statements continue like those of Dabbagh and Odierno, they could turn Iraqis against the agreement once again, which would mean a no vote during the referendum.

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “Bush, Maliki sign SOFA,” 12/14/08

Baldor, Lolita, “Commander: Troops to stay in cities past deadline,” Associated Press, 12/13/08

Cordesman, Anthony, “How Soon Is Safe? Iraqi Force Development and Conditions-Based US Withdrawals,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 12/1/08

Iraq Centre For Research & Strategic Studies, “Public Opinion Survey in Iraq; The Security & Political Situation in Iraq,” October 2008

Reid, Robert, “US troops to stay in Iraqi cities after June,” Boston Globe, 12/13/08

Reuters, “Iraq may need U.S. troops for decade: Iraqi official,” 12/11/08

Al-Sabah, “Poll: 46% of Iraqis Support Security Agreement,” 11/23/08

International Organization for Migration’s Numbers On Refugee Returns

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) recently released reports on Iraq’s eighteen provinces. They included statistics on the number of Iraqis that have returned to their homes. As reported earlier, since this summer Baghdad has been calling for Iraq’s displaced to come back. It has offered a number of cash incentives, housing, schooling, and ordered squatters to vacate their premises as well. A European official however, recently told Abu Dhabi’s The National that Iraq has no real plan or process in place to pay, assist or integrate returnees. The IOM found that the Ministry of Displacement and Migration has only provided aid to 26.3% of internal refugees. A September 2008 joint survey by the Displacement Ministry and the IOM of 2,102 returning families found that only around half of them, 1,043 had even applied for the government’s offer of money, and of those, 732 had received nothing compared to 311 who had.

Despite this, Iraqis have started to go back, mostly to Baghdad, which saw the greatest displacement, and then Diyala and Anbar. The vast majority are internally displaced, with only a trickle of international refugees. Many cited the improved security, but also the bad living conditions they were in as factors. For refugees, a lack of money and visa restrictions by host countries were major issues.

Statistics

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for refugees there are 4.4 million displaced Iraqis. 2.4 million are within the country and 2 million outside Iraq.

Here are the IOM’s numbers on returnees:

Anbar: 3,101 families, approx. 18,606 people
Babil: 125 families, approx. 750 people
Baghdad: 26,347 families, approx. 158,082 people
Basra: 465 families, approx. 2,790 people
Dhi Qar: 86 families, approx. 516 people
Diyala: 6,216 families, approx. 37,296 people
Karbala: 297 families, approx. 1,782 people
Maysan: 626 families, approx. 3,756 people
Muthanna: 26 families, approx 156 people
Najaf: 102 families, approx. 612 people
Ninewa: 605 families, approx. 3,630 people
Qadisiyah: 24 families, approx. 144 people
Salahaddin: 96 families, approx. 576 people
Tamim: 165 families, approx. 990 people
Wasit: 120 families, approx. 720 people
TOTAL: 38,401 families, approx. 230,406 people, 5% of total number of refugees

There were no returnees to the three Kurdish provinces of Dohuk, Irbil and Sulaymaniyah

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iraqi army destroys Baghdad squatter camp,” 11/13/08

CNN, “UN Gears Up for Return of Displaced Iraqis,” 12/4/08

Ministry of Displacement and Migration & International Organization for Migration, “Returnee Monitoring and Needs Assessments Tabulation Report,” September 2008

Sands, Phil, “Displaced Iraqis at point of no return,” The National, 12/2/08

Monthly Media Coverage of Iraq From November 3 to November 23, 2008

The Pew Research Center runs the Project of Excellence in Journalism (PEJ). The PEJ’s News Index covers all stories in the U.S. press from print journalism to TV to radio to the internet. From November 3 to November 23, 2008 they found that Iraq was in the top 10 news stories two of the three weeks. Perhaps because of the Thanksgiving holiday they did not cover the last part of the month.

For the first full week of November Iraq was not in the top 10. The U.S. elections and economic crisis dominated the media landscape, accounting for six of the top 10 stories. From November 10-16 however, the war reached number 7 with 2% of the overall coverage. Most of the reporting was on violence in Iraq, such as an Iraqi soldier who killed two American G.I.s. In the next week, November 17-23, Iraq dropped one to number 8, but stayed at 2%. The major story was Iraq’s parliament passing the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that will determine the future military and diplomatic relations between the two countries.

November’s coverage of Iraq was on par with the previous reporting from September 29 to November 2. During that time period the war was in the top ten four out of five weeks. This was an increase from the rest of the year when Iraq made it into the top stories on average two out of every four weeks. With the recession getting worse and the new Obama administration planning on putting more emphasis upon the war in Afghanistan, it is probably unlikely that Iraq reporting will go up anytime soon unless something dramatic happens there.

For more on U.S. press coverage of Iraq see:

The Decline of Reporting on Iraq

Iraq News Coverage Update I

Monthly Media Coverage of Iraq From June 2 to July 9, 2008

Monthly Media Coverage of Iraq From July 7 to August 3

Monthly Media Coverage of Iraq From July 28 to August 31, 2008

Monthly Media Coverage of Iraq From September 1 to September 28, 2008

Monthly Media Coverage of Iraq From September 29 to November 2, 2008

SOURCES

Dagher, Sam, “Iraqi Soldier Reportedly Kills 2 G.I.’s,” New York Times, 11/12/08

Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism, “PEJ News Coverage Index: November 3-9, 2008, In Election Week, Media Pivots From Race To Rahm,” 11/10/08
- “PEJ News Coverage Index: November 10-16, 2008, Post-Election Narrative, A Tale Of Two Women,” 11/17/08
- “PEJ News Coverage Index: November 17-23, 2008, Cars And Appointments Dominate The News,” 11/24/08

Robertson, Campbell and Farrell, Stephen, “Pact, Approved in Iraq, Sets Time for U.S. Pullout,” New York Times, 11/16/08

Are Budget Cuts Ahead For Iraq?

Iraq’s financial woes seem to only be beginning. A member of the Iraqi parliament’s Finance Committee said that the country’s 2009 budget would have a 23% deficit, that could increase to 50% if oil prices keep on dropping. The budget was based upon a $62 a barrel price of oil, which was a conservative estimate at the time when oil was at over $100 a barrel. The problem stems from the fact that on December 8, oil was selling at $45 a barrel. The politician criticized the government saying that other countries in the region had planned budgets based upon a $40 a barrel price. As reported earlier, Iraq is far more dependent upon oil revenues that its Arab neighbors.

The budget problems are going to have a negative affect upon government services. Finance Minister Bayan Baqir Jabor has already called on ministries, government offices, and the provinces to cut spending. A financial expert from the Central Bank of Iraq told Aswat al-Iraq that austerity measures were probably in order to balance Iraq’s budget. He said Baghdad could cut spending by 20 trillion dinars. Otherwise the advisor suggested Iraq could issue bonds or seek international loans, but he discouraged that last one. Iraq is still struggling to come out from under Saddam era debts.

When the price of oil dropped a few observers noted this would have a dire affect upon Iraq. Calls for reducing spending and austerity measures are probably only the beginning of an approaching budget crisis. Reconstruction and programs for the needy could be the targets of cuts as most of the budget goes towards salaries, pensions, and paying operating costs. This would adversely affect the populace, up to 60% of which lives below the international poverty line. The fact that the economy was under sanctions for years, mismanaged by the Americans, flooded with cheap imports, and been underdeveloped by the current government will all mean that Iraq will continue to be dependent upon world oil markets for revenue, something they have no real control over.

For more on Iraq’s budget see:

GAO August Report On Iraq’s Budget And Spending

Iraq Cuts Its 2009 Budget, But Still Can’t Spend It

Iraq’s New Budget Woes

NY Times Finds Iraq Spends Even Less Of Their Budget

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s Quarterly October Report

United Nations Humanitarian Report On Iraq

SOURCES

Aswat al-Iraq, “Austerity could save 20 trillion dinars for 2009 budget – expert,” 12/9/08
- “Deficit in 2009 budget may reach 50% - MP,” 12/9/08
- “Finance ministry urges expenditure cuts,” 12/7/08

Bruno, Greg, “Transparency and Surpluses in Iraq’s Oil-Dependent Budget,” Council on Foreign Relations, 10/28/08

Chon, Gina, “As Crude Falls, Iraqi Leaders Scramble to Plan Budget,” Wall Street Journal, 10/22/08

IRIN, “Iraq: Low oil prices could affect government aid to IDPs,” 12/11/08

Sachet, Khalid Hantoush, “Results of the Field Survey For Needs and Opinions of The Poor in Iraq,” Iraqi Al Amal Association, University of Baghdad, September 2008

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 10/30/08

United Nations’ Dec. 08 Human Rights Report On Iraq

In the beginning of December 2008 the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) released its human rights report covering the first six months of the year. The paper documented the continuing violence and casualties in Iraq, as well as the situation of women, minorities, the press, the internally displaced, and detainees. The U.N found that there are still mass casualty attacks in Iraq, although not at previous levels. Women are also targeted, especially in Kurdistan in honor killings, minorities continue to be threatened, the press, especially in Kurdistan continues to be limited, and the situation of the country’s internally displaced is deteriorating. Iraq’s prisons are also overcrowded with reports of torture and abuse, as the legal system is overloaded. Overall, while security is improving in Iraq, the U.N. agency noted that there are still widespread abuses and human rights concerns.

Violence

Violence is down, but not over in Iraq. On January 23, 2008, for example, there was a bombing in Mosul that killed 15 and wounded 132. There continue to be attacks on civilians, security forces, government officials, politicians, educators, professionals, members of the judicial system, and the press. The U.N. no longer reports on total casualties for the country however. In its January 2007 Human Rights report, the U.N. recorded almost three times as many deaths as the Iraqi government. Baghdad then stopped issuing official death counts claiming that it couldn’t accurately keep track of deaths, but also to conceal the increasing killings due to the sectarian war that was taking off at that time.

Instead of total deaths, the report covered mass casualty attacks. The U.N. found that these declined from January to June 2008. There were eight such attacks in January compared to only 4 in June, while the number of killed and wounded went down from 330 to 206 for those same months. From March to June however, the total number of casualties actually increased going from 161 to 206.

Large Scale Attacks
January – 8 attacks resulting in 330 casualties
February – 6 attacks resulting in 253 casualties
March – 5 attacks resulting in 161 casualties
April – 6 attacks resulting in 177 casualties
May – 3 attacks resulting in 205 casualties
June – 4 attacks resulting in 206 casualties

Government employees, religious figures, activists, judges, lawyers, professionals, and academics all continue to be targeted. Attacks on security forces not only resulted in they being wounded and killed, but civilians as well. There were 11 such incidents resulting in 274 civilian casualties from January to June 2008. There were 22 attacks on government officials, politicians and civil servants. In June for example, two members of the Sadr City Council were killed and ten wounded in a bombing of the council building. Kidnappings are also common, especially in Diyala province. Large numbers of unidentified bodies were found in Diyala, Ninewa, Anbar, Qadisiyah, but mainly in Baghdad. Mass graves have also been found, particularly after insurgents have been cleared from an area.

Deaths due to foreigners were also a concern. There were two high-profile cases of Iraqis being wounded and killed by security contractors in the first six months of 2008. In January 5 a car fleeing an attack hit five students, aged 6-10. In February Blackwater contractors trying to clear traffic killed one civilian. There were also six Coalition air strikes that resulted in civilian casualties.

Women

The U.N. received many complaints about the rights of women being limited by conservatives in their neighborhoods, in the government, and in schools. The Major concern was in Kurdistan where there were reports of honor killings. A women’s group in Irbil found 145 cases of violence against women in just the first two months of 2008. In May, the Kurdistan Regional Government Prime Minister held a meeting on violence against women promising action on this issue. England’s Guardian also just reported on honor killings in Basra where authorities were turning a blind eye.

Minorities

Iraq’s minorities, consisting of Shabaks, Yezidis, Christians, and Turkomen in Ninewa and Tamim continue to worry the U.N. There were 17 reported kidnappings of Christians in those two provinces, along with nine attacks on Shabaks, mostly in Mosul, 2 Turkomen leaders were killed in that city in June, and Sabean Mandeans were threatened.

Press

Journalists continue to be attacked in Iraq. The Kurds were singled out in the report for their restrictions on the press as well. Many reporters and editors have been arrested in Kurdistan, with the Committee to Protect Journalists issuing a report in May calling for the end of their persecution. The KRG claims that they are only going after those that are guilty of libel and lack professionalism, but UNAMI doubts these claims. The results have been that many papers are intimidated by the regional government, and practice self-censorship.

Internally Displaced

The U.N. counts 2.8 million internally displaced Iraqis. 1.2 million were forced out of their homes before 2006, and 1.6 million afterwards. Displacement has slowed in 2008, and over 100,000 Iraqis have returned to their homes since 2007. There were new displacements in the Dora, Jamia, Sulaik, Adhamiya and Karkh districts of Baghdad however. The U.N. is also concerned about the fact that eleven of Iraq’s eighteen provinces have restricted the movement of refugees into their areas. Overall, the internally displaced suffer from a lack of services and jobs, resulting in deteriorating living conditions.

Prisons

The plight of Iraqi detainees was a major concern. At the end of June 2008 there were a total of 50,595 prisoners. The highest number was in March when there were 56,320.

Detainees - 2008
January: 23,800 held by Coalition, 26,676 held by Iraq, TOTAL: 50,476
February: 23,862 held by Coalition, 26,854 held by Iraq, TOTAL: 50,791
March: 23,862 held by Coalition, 32,458 held by Iraq, TOTAL: 56,320
April: 23,862 held by Coalition, 28,283 held by Iraq, TOTAL: 52,145
May: 23,229 held by Coalition, 28,028 held by Iraq, TOTAL: 51,257
June: 23,229 held by Coalition, 27,366 held by Iraq, TOTAL: 50,595

The jump in numbers in March coincided with the security operation in Basra

These numbers revealed two things. First, the February 2008 Amnesty Law has had no real affect on prisoners. Most of those affected by the act were actually people on wanted lists or on bail with only 2,000 detainees and convicts let go. Second, the U.S. setup a new program in its prison facilities during the Surge, aimed at increasing the number of those released. They claimed that they were discharging more prisoners than taking in new ones, but for the first six months of 2008 there as no real change in Iraqis held by the Americans. A May 19, 2008 report by the USA Today quoted U.S. military officials who said that the number of detainees they were holding dropped from 26,000 in 2007 to around 22,000 in May. UNAMI’s numbers show only a slight decline from 23,800 in January 2008 to 23,229 in May, only a 571 decrease. This brings into question the U.S. claims of successful rehabilitation and increased releases of Iraqis.

The major problem with the U.S. and Iraqi systems has been overcrowding and a lack of capacity by Iraq’s courts. Most prisoners are held for months, sometimes years, before they are ever charged, receive legal aid, or go before a judge. The courts simply cannot handle the number of prisoners. The detainees are therefore overcrowded with horrible conditions. Reports of abuse and torture are also common. Kurdistan is no better than the rest of Iraq. There are reports of secret detention facilities there, and the Kurdish Regional Government often moves prisoners when U.N. officials come to inspect sites.

Recommendations

The United Nations Mission had several recommendations for the Iraqi government. First, the Health Ministry needs to release official numbers of casualties in Iraq. Reports today are based upon leaks from various ministries and officials or the U.S. military. The government also has to protect vulnerable groups like minorities and the displaced, and investigate attacks on women. The legal system needs to deal with the large number of detainees, who are usually held without ever being processed, and address torture. That would begin to alleviate some of the problems in the overcrowded detention facilities. The U.N. also wants Iraq’s parliament to pass a human rights law to give legal standing to protecting against some of these abuses.

SOURCES

Babylon & Beyond Blog, “IRAQ: U.N.’s Iraq report still missing casualty count,” Los Angeles Times, 12/3/08

Michaels, Jim, “Military retools detainee releases,” USA Today, 5/19/08

Reilly, Corinne, “As clock ticks, U.S. letting thousands of Iraqi prisoners go,” McClatchy Newspapers, 10/27/08

UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, “Human Rights Report 1 January – 30 June 2008,” United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq

Combating Terrorism Center’s Report On Iran’s Role In Iraq

In October 2008 the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point released a report, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” that covered Iran’s role in Iraq from the time of the Iranian Revolution to the present. The study found that Iran uses all kinds of tools to influence Iraq. It backs both the government as well as Shiite militants, and has extensive economic ties. This seems at odds because Tehran supports Iraq, while undermining its stability at the same time with militias. In fact, this is part of Iran’s strategy to keep the country divided. Tehran’s main goals are to limit the U.S. so that it doesn’t intimidate Iran, make sure Iraq is not a threat, and influence the rest of the region. The 1980s Iran-Iraq War largely shaped these objectives when Saddam Hussein’s regime was Iran’s major threat, and the U.S. tilted towards him. Since the U.S. invasion, the instability in the country has meant the Americans are tied up in Iraq, and can’t seriously think about a major military operation against Iran. Its political allies are in the government, and the Iraqi constitution created a federal system that keeps Iraq weak. It is hard to argue then that Iran has not achieved many of its goals.

Iranian Policy

At the heart of the Combating Terrorism Center’s report is the study of Iran’s policy towards Iraq. U.S. strategy in Iraq is based upon achieving specific goals such as a democratic government that is an ally in the war on terror. Iran on the other hand, thinks in terms of a process. They don’t want a specific end state, but rather the influence to shape events within Iraq no matter who is power. That’s why they support a variety of groups from the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), to the Dawa Party to Moqtada al-Sadr to Special Groups even though they are opposed to each other. Iran supported the Americans at first as well, because the creation of a new political system was the vehicle for Iran’s allies to gain power in the new government. At the same time, Iran began reaching out to Sadr and Shiite militants. With connections to all these parties, it is trying to ensure that no matter what happens in the country they will be able to play a role. Tehran can change tactics therefore, but its policy won’t. This is a much more dynamic policy than the U.S. one, and the authors fear this could cost the Americans in the long run.

Iranian Revolutionary Guards

The Iranian Revolutionary Guards have been the main tool Tehran has used to exert influence within Iraq. In the 1990s the Revolutionary Guards created the Qods Force to run its foreign policy that runs parallel to Iran’s foreign policy establishment. In 1998 General Qassem Suleimani took over the Qods Force, and is still the current commander. The Qods Force is divided into four corps, the first of which is known as the Ramazan Corps. It was created in the mid-1990s and is responsible for Iraqi affairs. The Ramazan Corps is in charge of funding Iraqi politicians and delivering economic aid. It also maintains contacts with Shiite militias, and runs three camps along the Iraqi border to train them. The commander of the northern camp in Nasr, Mahmoud Farhadi was actually captured in Iraq by the Americans in September 2007. He is probably one of the highest ranking Iranian officers in custody.

Early Ties To Shiite Parties

It was during the Iran-Iraq War that Iran through the Qods Force began funding Iraqi Shiite groups. Iran originally helped form the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), and supported the Dawa party to oppose Saddam. Later it courted Sadr and Special Groups after the U.S. invasion. The diversity of groups that Tehran supports shows that they are only a means to an end of achieving wide-ranging influence throughout Iraq. Iran hopes to sway the government when they want, and also raise the violence level on the streets if need be to achieve its goals.

The Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) has historically been the party closest to Iran. In the 1980s Tehran helped form the SIIC, which was led by Ayatollah Baqir al-Hakim. At the time, Iraqi Shiites were divided between Ayatollah Baqir al-Sadr, the uncle of Moqtada, and Ayatollah Hakim. In 1980 Saddam had Sadr murdered, and Hakim fled to Iran fearing assassination as well. When the Iran-Iraq War started, Hakim’s followers began organizing both inside and outside of Iraq. Hakim agreed to follow Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and later his successor Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in return for help from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. The Iranians ended up forming the Badr Brigade, the SIIC’s armed wing, which became a formal part of the Qods Force and took orders directly from Tehran. During the Iran-Iraq War, Badr fought alongside the Iranians, and felt betrayed afterwards when Khomeini signed a peace agreement with Saddam. After the Gulf War in 1991, Badr was also sent into the south to try to organize and take over the Shiite uprising. Up to 2001, the militia received up to $20 million a year from Iran. Badr also had contacts with Hezbollah, which provided aid and training.

Later, when the SIIC began cooperating with the U.S. in the run up to the invasion, some senior Badr members left the organization. Many of these still operate out of Iran as suppliers to Iraq’s Special Groups, such as Abu Mustafa al-Sheibani. He was the former head of Badr operations in Baghdad in the 1990s, and now runs a smuggling network that is believed to have introduced the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) to Iraq from Iran.

Meanwhile, within Iraq, many Shiites continued to follow the Sadr family. Many of those joined the Dawa party. Iran began funding them as well, even though the organization was divided over this alliance. The Sadr family had always been opposed to Iran and Khomeini’s ideology of a theocratic state ruled by clerics. One faction headed by current Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was more open to the Iranians, while another, led by former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari, was opposed.

Iran Makes Its Move After The U.S. Invasion

After the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003 and deposed Saddam Hussein, Iran supported the American efforts to create a new political system, while at the same time building up its military capacity within Iraq. On the one hand, Tehran believed that elections would allow its allies to gain power. The SIIC and Dawa had already positioned themselves before the invasion as exile groups willing to work with the U.S. At the same time, Iran began a dual track policy of infiltrating thousands of Badr Brigade fighters into Iraq, supported by the Qods Force. They also had Hezbollah send some operatives to work within the country. They eliminated opponents of Iran and set up operations against the U.S.

Iran’s next major move was to reach out to Moqtada al-Sadr. He was an enticing figure as he had strong support amongst the Shiite poor, was anti-American, and had his family’s name. On the other hand, Moqtada had little religious training, and couldn’t compete directly with the top Iraqi ayatollah’s such as Hakim, Ali al-Sistani and Abdel Majid al-Khoei. This power struggle allowed Iran to gain influence with Sadr. On April 7, 2003 Kadhem al-Huseini al-Haeri, a student of Sadr’s uncle Ayatollah Baqir al-Sadr, who lived in Qom, Iran, named Moqtada as his deputy in Iraq. In April 2004, Sadr launched an uprising against the Untied States that sputtered on for months. Iran eventually convinced him to cease his hostilities so that the 2005 elections could take place.

The 2005 Iraqi elections were a turning point for Iran’s policy. All three of Iran’s allies, the SIIC, Dawa, and Sadr participated. The SIIC gained the most as it had the largest amount of money, was better organized, and had religious authority. In the provincial elections, it took over most of the south, while all three parties gained seats in the parliamentary balloting. Iran also supported the Iraqi constitution, which set up a federal system that would weaken the authority of the central government. Iran’s Shiite allies were the main writers of the document. A major goal of Iran’s policy was thus achieved as it successfully positioned its friends in the new Iraqi government.

Sadr’s Tribulations Are Iran’s Gain

The 2005 elections caused a major dilemma for Sadr, which turned out to be to the advantage of Iran. Sadr was divided between being a militia leader and a politician. As he began to move towards politics he lost standing amongst his followers who were opposed to the Iraqi government. That led to a fracturing of his movement, and Iran was all too happy to pick up the pieces.

The Mahdi Army was always a loosely organized, grassroots movement with Sadr as its titular head. Local chiefs got weapons and funding on their own, and carried out independent policies. Revenge, crime, and an anti-U.S. stance were what drove most of them. After the 2004 uprising, many commanders continued to carry out attacks on Americans. The U.S. began calling these Special Groups. Some started looking towards Qais Khazali, who broke away from the Mahdi Army, for leadership rather than Sadr. In turn, Khazali began receiving support form Iran and Hezbollah. Frustrated by these defections, Sadr kicked out 40 militia leaders in October 2006 to try to assert his control. The problem was Sadr had no real authority over these 40 commanders who continued to run their own forces. This was an important symbolic move as Sadr was trying to control what violence had his name on it. The threat of his militia after all was what Sadr’s power was based upon. He would threaten attacks if he didn’t have his say in national politics. The creation of these new Special Groups undermined Sadr’s position as they broke off followers and undermined Sadr’s command over violence.

The fracturing of the Sadr Trend suited Iran. They disliked Sadr’s political moves because he continued to be a nationalist and anti-Iranian, and was a wild card. He could stop or start military actions when Iran didn’t want him to, which would harm Tehran’s larger political policy. The Special Groups on the other hand, were committed to fighting the occupation using violence, so Iran began moving towards them. They could be regulated by the amount of lethal aid Iran provided them. That didn’t mean the Mahdi Arm was cut off. As Iran had done before, it continued to back all variety of Shiite groups.

At the same time, the SIIC and Dawa began turning on Sadr. In Late 2006, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki made his move to kick Sadr out of his ruling coalition. The SIIC, which had a long-time rivalry with the Sadr family, wanted to force Moqtada to pick between politics or violence. Sadr couldn’t make the choice because he relied upon the Mahdi Army to give him standing. At the same time, he was losing face as he was blamed for Special Group attacks and the increasing criminal activity of his militiamen. This growing conflict amongst Iraq’s ruling parties also served Iran as it divided the majority Shiites.

In 2007, Sadr ended up moving away from both his militia and the political system. As early as February, he moved to Qom, Iran to undergo religious training. There are some reports that he is being held by Iran, and has restrictions on his activities. His militia also came under increasing pressure from the Americans as the Surge took off. In April Sadr withdrew his ministers from Maliki’s cabinet. In August he declared a cease-fire. These were all a sign of weakness as he was forfeiting his two main means of influence within the country, his say in the government and his militia, while giving in to more Iranian influence.

In the spring of 2008, Maliki’s government moved against Sadr. Maliki launched operations against the Mahdi Army in Basra, Sadr City, and Maysan province. Sadr’s followers, Special Groups, and local militias and gangs were scattered as a result. What many claimed was a defeat for Iran, actually highlighted their role in Iraq as the head of the Revolutionary Guards General Suleimani brokered the Basra and Sadr City cease-fires. This brings to fore Iran’s multi-faceted policy in Iraq. It both armed the Mahdi Army and Special Groups, while supporting the government that improved its standing afterwards. Thousands of Iraqi militants also fled to Iran for more training and reorganization. Again, it wasn’t that Iran wanted one group to come out on top, it just wanted to make sure that it had influence over events.

Status Of Forces Agreement and Prime Minister Maliki

The recently passed Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that set military and diplomatic relations between Iraq and the United States, was the most recent focus of Tehran. At first, Iran seemed to oppose the deal, but Prime Minister Maliki’s new standing after his security operations allowed him to negotiate a timetable for a U.S. withdrawal. Iran then seemed to shift its stance, seeing the SOFA as the easiest way to get the U.S. out of Iraq. The Combating Terrorism Center said a sign that Iran was in fact standing behind the SOFA was the limited activity by Special Groups during the negotiations. Iran has often turned the violence off and on within the country to suit its political purposes.

On the other hand, Maliki’s new power could pose a long-term problem for Iran. Tehran’s dual military and political strategy has angered the Prime Minister. As he has grown as a leader he has found fewer reasons to listen to Iran as he has to think about the Iraqi public more, especially with elections forthcoming. Iran still has many other political allies within Iraq, which include the Kurds, who were not mentioned at all in the Combating Terrorism Center’s paper. Tehran also continues to back Special Groups, which can be used to harass the U.S., or turned on the Iraqi government or politicians if it wants. Iran’s economic role was also only given short thrift in the report, even though it has become one of Iraq’s main trade partners, and provides energy, and reconstruction funds.

Recommendations

The Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) concluded its study with some suggestions for U.S. policy. First it noted the limitations of current U.S. strategy, namely that it focuses almost exclusive on Iran’s military support for Shiites, which obscures Iran’s more important political moves. In fact, Iran has achieved most of its goals without using violence, but rather through supporting the U.S. effort to create a new political order and carry out elections. This the authors warn, could be the downfall of the U.S. as it believes Iran could end up having more influence in Iraq in 5-10 years unless the U.S. develops a multi-faceted stance to match Tehran’s. The CTC writers believe that the U.S. should support Maliki’s nationalism, because he is souring on Iran’s role in his country. The Americans should also push for open list voting, which would make Iraqi politicians more answerable to the public rather than Iran. Next they suggest that the U.S. co-opt Sadr. He still has a nationalist, anti-Iranian stance, and if the U.S. can work with former insurgents, why not with Sadr. Giving Sadr a chance to participate in the government again could be the means to do this. The U.S. could also create a Sons of Iraq program aimed specifically at Shiites to deal with the local militia commanders and Special Groups. Calling for more transparency could also expose Iran’s funding for Iraqi politicians that would turn the public against them. There are two major problems with these suggestions however. First, the U.S. is losing influence in Iraq as it is drawing down forces, and agreed to a withdrawal date in the SOFA. This means it has fewer options and less ability to shape events. Maliki’s nationalism also cuts both ways. He is just as likely to deny U.S. demands as Iranian ones. Maliki is unlikely to make any changes to Iraq’s voting system or financing as a result. Maliki, the Dawa Party, and the SIIC are also grave rivals of Sadr and would reject working with him. Finally, some members of the SIIC and Dawa will always be close to Iran due to their years of cooperation, and see no reason to limit its influence within Iraq. Iraqi politicians can also play the two sides off of each other to their advantage. For all of these reasons, Iran will probably continue to play a large role in Iraq no matter what the U.S. does.

For more on Iran’s role in Iraq see:

Combating Terrorism Center Report On Iranian Training of Shiite Militants

Continued Reports of Iranian and Hezbollah Training of Shiite Militants

Council on Foreign Relations and Brookings Institution Experts Voice Their Opinions After Recent Trip To Iraq

Going After Iran’s Supply Lines In Iraq

Hezbollah’s Role In Iraq

Iran-Iraq Agree Upon New Free Trade Zones

Iran’s Influence In Iraq Update II

Iranian Influence In Iraq Update I

Iranians And Special Groups Forces Returning To Iraq

Iraq-Iran Trade Agreement

Operation Promise of Peace in Maysan Province

Overview of Iran’s Influence In Iraq

The Status Of Forces Agreement

Vali Nasr: Iranian Policy In Iraq At A Crossroads

VIDEOS: Reconciliation, Iranian Influence, and SOFA Negotiations

SOURCES

Abedin, Mahan, “The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI),” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, October 2003

Allam, Hannah, Landay, Jonathan, and Strobel, Warren, “Is an Iranian general the most powerful man in Iraq?” McClatcy Newspapers, 4/28/08

Associated Press, “Shiite militia may be disintegrating,” 3/21/07

Aswat al-Iraq, “Mahdi Army weaker in Sadr City-U.S. commander,” 11/17/08

Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian, “Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Politics and ‘Other Means,’” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 10/13/08

Filkins, Dexter, “Police Seize Forged Ballots Headed to Iraq From Iran,” New York Times, 12/14/05

International Crisis Group, “Shiite Politics In Iraq: The Role Of The Supreme Council,” 11/15/07

Rashimi, Babak, “The Mumahidun: Muqtada Al-Sadr’s New Militia,” Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, 9/4/08

Ridolfo, Kathleen, “Iraq: Al-Sadr Refuses to Meet Baghdad Delegation In Iran,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 5/4/08

Strobel, Warren and Fadel, Leila, “Iranian who brokered Iraqi peace is on U.S. terrorist watch list,” McClatchy Newspapers, 3/31/08

Tanter, Raymond, “Iran’s Threat to Coalition Forces in Iraq,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1/15/04

U.N. Suspends Work On Disputed Territories Until Provincial Elections Are Over

The disputed territories in Iraq came to the fore this summer. In August 2008 Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki sent the Iraqi army into the Khanaqin district in northern Diyala province. The area had been occupied by the Kurds since the U.S. invasion, and been under official Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) administration since February 2008. Tensions were so high that violence seemed inevitable but for the intervention and mediation of the United States. Khanaqin is one of a dozen districts in Iraq that the Kurds hope to annex. Currently the KRG occupies 300 miles of territory outside of Kurdistan. The United Nations had been working on these disputed areas since late 2007, but in November 2008 the U.N.’s envoy to Iraq Staffan de Mistura said that the organization would be suspending its effort on the issue until after the provincial elections scheduled for January 2009.

Map of Kurdish occupied areas outside of Kurdistan

The Iraqi constitution’s Article 140 is supposed to deal with Kirkuk and other disputed territories, but it has never been implemented. By December 31, 2007 the government was supposed to have completed a census of Kirkuk and held a plebiscite on whether the population wanted to join Kurdistan or not. As the end of 2007 approached and nothing substantial had happened, the Kurds agreed to a six-month delay. That too has passed with no action either. In early 2007 when it was apparent that the article was not going to work any time soon, the U.N. began looking into alternatives.

On August 10, 2007 the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1770 that said the U.N. envoy to Iraq would work on the disputed territories. The first thing Staffan de Mistura did under this new resolution was to get Baghdad and the Kurds to agree to delay Article 140. This was supported by the United States who began pushing for a negotiated settlement instead of 140. This was a great disappointment to the Kurds who had hoped that the constitution would ensure a legal take over of the areas. They feared that any negotiations would cost them territory, especially Kirkuk, which is the most revered by the Kurds.

5 – Akre, 17 – Hamdaniya, 77 – Khanaqin, 79 – Kirkuk, 81 - Makhmur, 92 – Shekhan, 93 – Sinjar, 98 – Tal Afar, 100 – Tilkaif are some of the areas to be mediated by the United Nations under Resolution 1770

The U.N. and the U.S. have been moving towards power sharing and a division of disputed areas since the end of 2007. In December of that year, the U.S. pressured the KRG into accepting a division of power with the Arabs in Kirkuk’s Tamim province. At the same time, the U.N. began working on a 3-phase report on what to do with the other territories. In June 2008 they released their initial report that dealt with four areas. The U.N. suggested that two, Makhmur in Tamim and Akre in Ninewa would go to Kurdistan, while Hamdaniya would go to Ninewa and Mandali to Diyala. The U.N. specifically chose these four to go first because they had Arab and Kurdish majorities and would evenly be split. That didn’t seem to help as no side was happy with the report. Both the Kurds and Baghdad however seemed to accept the process. The second report is to address Tal Afar, Tilkaif, Shekhan and Sinjar in Ninewa, and Khanaqin in Diyala. The final one would deal with the thorniest issue, Kirkuk. De Mistura was supposed to have finished this work by September or October 2008, but that didn’t happen. Now the U.N. envoy has said that he is going to postpone his work until after the provincial elections in January 2009. De Mistura said that he didn’t want the process to be caught up in politics and electioneering. The Kurds condemned the delay.

Tensions between Kurdistan and Baghdad have only grown since the first U.N. report. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki feels that his security operations have strengthened his hand, and he is working to limit the Kurds in a number of disputed areas including Mosul, Kirkuk, and Khanaqin. The KRG in turn have condemned his moves, claiming that Maliki is attempting a power grab, and is undermining the constitution. Only through strong pressure by the United States and the United Nations can these contested territories be resolved. Even then they might not be able to resolve this thorny issue, which pits the regional aspirations of the Kurds against the determination of Maliki to assert national power, along with the demands of minorities. The U.N.’s initial recommendations were not welcomed, but all sides seemed to agree to the organization’s work, which is a positive sign that they might accept its arbitration to fix this mounting problem.

For more on Khanaqin and the Kurd-Maliki dispute see:

Cold War Between Baghdad and Kurds Turns Hot

Could Maliki Be Deposed?

Deal Struck To Defuse Khanaqin Issue

Khanaqin Deal Off?

Kurdish-Baghdad Tensions Over Diyala

The Kurds Come Out Swinging

Maliki Still Pushing The Kurds On Khanaqin District

Maliki Ups the Ante in Khanaqin District of Diyala

Mosul: The New Battleground Between Maliki And The Kurds

Two Reports On Trying to Solve The Kirkuk Issue

SOURCES

Agence France Presse, “Iraqi Kurds Accuse UN Of Delaying Report On Disputed Areas,” 11/30/08

Alsumaria, “Arabs in Kirkuk refuse UN recommendations,” 6/9/08

Aswat al-Iraq, “95 lawmakers criticize the U.N. recommendations over disputed districts,” 6/7/08
- “KRG: PM Should Create, Not Undermine, National Unity,” 12/2/08
- “Military units should be under central govt. control,” 8/19/08

Dagher, Sam, “Can the U.N. avert a Kirkuk border war?” Christian Science Monitor, 4/25/08

International Crisis Group, “Oil For Soil: Toward A Grand Bargain On Iraq And The Kurds,” 10/28/08

Janabi, Nazar, “Kirkuk’s Article 140: Expired or Not?,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1/30/08

Londono, Ernesto, “Kurds in N. Iraq Receive Arms From Bulgaria,” Washington Post, 11/23/08

Paley, Amit, “Strip of Iraq ‘on the Verge of Exploding,’” Washington Post, 9/13/08

Russo, Claire, “The Maliki Government Confronts Diyala,” Institute for the Study of War,” 9/23/08