Friday, April 14, 2023

This Day In Iraqi History - Apr 14 Saddam wrote article saying Shiites and Kurds were untrustworthy since ancient times because worked for Persians and was reason they started 1991 uprising

(Biography)

 

1915 Ottoman campaign to try to retake Basra from British failed

1921 Sayid Talib al-Naqib at dinner party with French and Persian consuls to Iraq complained

about campaign to make Faisal king Threatened another uprising Talib wanted to be king

1925 British declined Iraqi request to form Royal Iraqi Air Force

1948 2nd Railway strike against Anglo-Iraq Treaty

1948 General Student Association formed and joined protests and strikes against Anglo-Iraq Treaty

1969 Bakr govt executed opponents in central Baghdad Meant to rally support for regime

1980 Natl Sec Adv Brzezinski said no differences between US and Iraqi interests and two could work

            together

1983 Iraq claimed it repulsed Iran’s Op Wa al-Fajr 1 after counterattack

(Musings On Iraq review Iran-Iraq War Volume 4: The Forgotten Fronts)

1983 Iraqi High Command warned Iran that it had new modern weapons and would use them for first

time in war Meant new WMD capabilities

(Musings On Iraq Origins Of Iraq’s WMD Programs)

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Use Of Chemical Weapons In Iran-Iraq War And Their Western Origin)

1987 Iran Op Fath 5 Iranian Rev Guard and PUK attacked Iraqi 27th Div supply lines in Kurdistan

(Musings On Iraq interview with author Anthony Tucker-Jones on Iran-Iraq War)

(Musings On Iraq interview with author Tom Cooper on Iran-Iraq War)

(Musings On Iraq review The Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988)

(Musings On Iraq review Iran-Iraq War, The Lion of Babylon, 1980-1988)

(Musings On Iraq review The Iran-Iraq War)

(Musings On Iraq review The Longest War, The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict)

(Musings On Iraq review The Iran-Iraq War Volume 1: The Battle for Khuzestan, September 1980-May 1982)

(Musings On Iraq review The Iran-Iraq War Volume 2: Iran Strikes back, June 1982-December 1986)

(Musings On Iraq review The Iran-Iraq War Volume 3: Iraq’s Triumph)

(Musings On Iraq review The Iran-Iraq War Volume 4: The Forgotten Fronts)

1991 Saddam article on 91 uprising Said Shiites and Kurds were untrustworthy because had been

used by Persians in ancient times Said Turkmen felt superior due to their Turkish origins and never integrated into Iraq Claimed King Faisal brought Kurds and Arabs together but then destroyed by UK who used Kurds in 1936 coup Blamed Barzani for starting Kurdish revolt in 1940s Said Qasim backed Kurds and Communists that undermined pan-Arabism and the unity of Iraq

1992 US UK France warned Iraq to stop military buildup along border with Kurdistan

1993 During trip to Kuwait Iraqi intelligence attempted to assassinate fmr Pres Bush

1995 UN Res 986 created Oil for Food Program allowing $1 bil in Iraq oil exports every 90 days for

food and humanitarian aid

(Musings On Iraq review Invisible War, The United States And The Iraq Sanctions)

1995 Saddam initially rejected UN Res 986 thinking that inspectors would clear Iraq of WMD and

sanctions would soon end Proved wrong

2002 Vanity Fair article talked with Iraqi defector Saadi who claimed Iraq building WMD

2003 Pentagon said major fighting in Iraq was over Bush claimed there was some evidence Saddam

was dead

2003 White House said Iraq had WMD that was what war was about and they would be found

(Musings On Iraq Iraq One Of The Worst Intelligence Failures In US History)

(Musings On Iraq review Hoodwinked, The Documents That Reveal How Bush Sold Us a War)

(Musings On Iraq review What Happened, Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception)

(Musings On Iraq review The WMD Mirage, Iraq’s Decade of Deception and America’s False Premise for War)

2003 Local tribes in Najaf scattered Sadrists threatening to expel Ayatollahs Sistani Hakim and

Fayadh from city

(Musings On Iraq A Divided Sadr Trend)

2003 Association of Muslim Scholars founded by Harith Dhari Advocated for armed struggle vs

US occupation

(Musings On Iraq Spiritual Leader To Iraq’s Insurgency Harith Dhari Dies In Exile)

2003 1st joint patrol in Baghdad between Iraqi police and U.S. forces

(Musings On Iraq interview with Col Ted Spain on how US struggled to establish law and order in post-invasion Iraq) 

2003 Final IAEA report given to UN Found no active Iraq nuclear program Niger docs were fakes

aluminum tubes for rockets not centrifuges

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Failed The Iraq-Niger Uranium Story)

(Musings On Iraq Review Hubris, The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, And The Selling Of The Iraq War)

(Musings On Iraq How US Intelligence Created An Iraqi Nuclear Threat In 2002)

2003 Report PUK was telling Arabs to leave villages around Kirkuk city

(Musings On Iraq How Did Kirkuk Become Such A Divisive Issue? A Portrait of The City In

2003)

2003 Report 40 people killed in fighting between Kurds and Baathists in Kirkuk City

(Musings On Iraq interview with Petit of 173rd Airborne Bgd on operations in Kirkuk)

2003 US forces captured Palestinian terrorist Abu Abbas Claimed proved Saddam backed terrorism

2003 Mishan Jabouri went to Mosul govt building Was mistrusted for ties to Saddam Many

thought he was going to declare himself Ninewa governor Gave speech which led to riot Marines shot at Returned fire and killed 7

2004 UN representative Brahimi outlined power of interim Iraqi govt including positions

(Musings On Iraq US Army History of Iraq War Vol 1 – Chapter 13 The Changing Of The Guard, Again Spring-Summer 2004)

(Musings On Iraq review Squandered Victory, The American Occupation And the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq)

2004 5 bridges connecting central to southern Iraq destroyed limiting movement of US forces

2004 Russia announced it would withdraw 800 civilian contractors from Iraq due to security concerns

2004 Italian security guard became first foreign hostage executed by insurgents

2006 US Amb to Iraq Khalilzad said militias were bigger problem than insurgents due to sectarian

violence

2006 Iraqi general said militias would not put down their weapons as long as ISF couldn’t provide

security

2007 Report Mujahadden Army fighting against ISI in Diyala Set up checkpoints in Baquba More

than 100 ISI arrested in Buhriz and Tahrir in province

(Musings On Iraq Diyala Province Backgrounder)

(Musings On Iraq The Demise But Not Death of Al Qaeda In Iraq)

(Musings On Iraq review Iraq’s Sunni Insurgency)

(Musings On Iraq review The Caliphate At War, Operational Realities and Innovations of the Islamic State)

2008 Sadr returned to Iraq from Iran Fled to Qom during Surge fearing US would target him

2008 Sahwa in Baghdad and Abu Ghraib formed political party to run in 09 provincial elections

(Musings On Iraq review Illusions of Victory, The Anbar Awakening And The Rise Of The Islamic State)

(Musings On Iraq interview with author Carter Malkasian on Anbar Awakening)

2008 UK military report on Charge of Knights ISF underperformed vs Mahdi Army Relied heavily

upon US for communications rations and air strikes Said ISF had little planning nor targeting of Mahdi Army until US teams arrived Basra police chief said hundreds of police deserted 1st 24 hrs of op and others joined later on National Police sent from Baghad did much better Were mostly from Basra and wanted to fight Mahdi Army Iraqi army lost tactical engagements with Mahdi Army Iraqi Special Forces ineffective until US trainers arrived

2009 Parliament picked Iyad al-Samarraie to become new speaker

2009 VP Abdul Mahdi said Sahwa had been infiltrated by ISI and that’s why govt was arresting

Sahwa Said Anbar Awakening was legitimate

2009 Army had to take over 10 checkpoints in Iskandiriya after Sahwa walked off job

            because hadn’t been paid

2010 State of Law complained about parties going to other countries to discuss putting together new

govt

2010 Dep PM Issawi went to Iran to talk about forming new govt

2010 Iraq asked to buy 24 F-16 fighters from US

2010 Iranian Amb to Iraq said trade between two countries had reached $7 bil in 2009 Was almost all

Iranian imports to Iraq

(Musings On Iraq Iran’s Policy Towards Iraq)

2011 State of Law parliamentarians walked out of session to vote on vice presidents stopping election

2011 Media activist beaten by Asayesh in Kalar

2012 KRG official said there were around 700 advisers experts and general managers in Kurdish govt

Said they cost 6.3 bil dinars

2012 Dep PM Mutlaq said arrest warrants for Election Commission members was political move Pres

Barzani said it was attempt by PM Maliki to centralize govt Sadr said Maliki wanted to control future elections

(Musings On Iraq Iraq’s Prime Minister Takes On Election Commission Once Again)

(Musings On Iraq How The No Confidence Move Against Iraq’s Premier Split The Kurdish Parties)

(Musings On Iraq Argument For Maliki Being Iraq’s Next Strongman)

(Musings On Iraq review Iraq After America, Strongmen, Sectarians, Resistance)

(Musings On Iraq review Iraq From War To A New Authoritarianism)

(Musings On Iraq Is Iraq’s Prime Minister Becoming A Dictator? An Interview With Kirk Sowell Of Inside Iraqi Politics)

(Musings On Iraq Is Iraq’s Prime Minister Maliki More Like Premier Nuri al-Sa’id Than Saddam? An Interview With Historian Phebe Marr)

2012 Integrity Comm reported prisons not following orders to release prisoners found not guilty or

who had served sentences unless got payoffs

2012 Followers of Mahmoud Sarkhi held protest in Baghdad demanding release of their followers

2013 PM Maliki said he would expose politicians connected with terrorism if he was made to appear

before parliament for questioning

2013 PM Maliki said provincial elections would be step to forming majority govt

(Musings On Iraq Interview A Look At Iraq’s 2014 Election Interview With Reidar Visser)

2013 Were coordinated bombings in Baghdad, Babil, Dhi Qar, Salahaddin, Anbar, Kirkuk, Diyala and

Ninewa

2013 Gorran leader said he was against 3rd term for Pres Barzani

(Musings On Iraq President Barzani Attempting To Manipulate Political System For A 3rd Term In Iraq’s Kurdistan)

2015 Sinjar militia leader Haider Sesho said that his arrest by KDP was illegal That he would work

with Peshmerga but not follow their orders

2015 New offensive to take Garma from IS in Anbar launched

2016 VP Maliki Allawi and Sadr MPs voted to dismiss Speaker Jabouri but didn’t have votes Maliki

and Allawi wanted to weaken PM Abadi

2017 Report KDP and PUK agreed on independence referendum Turkey and Iran against

(Musings On Iraq What’s Next For Kurdistan After The Referendum?)

(Musings On Iraq review The Great Betrayal, How America Abandoned The Kurds And Lost The Middle East)

2017 Report 26 members of Qatari royal family kidnapped in south Iraq by pro-Iran group in 2015

Supposed to be released after Qatar helped negotiate moving Sunnis and Shiites from towns in Syria Was done by Kataib Hezbollah

(Musings On Iraq Instrument Of Iran’s Power In Iraq And Syria Kataib Hezbollah)

2018 Kurdistan Islamic Group said KRG had turned over its oil revenue to Baghdad as required by 2018 budget

2018 Report Iraq’s Foreign Min wanted Arab Summit to come out against US airstrikes in Syria

            Said they caused instability and helped terrorism

2018 Report Lebanese paper claimed Iran gave $10 mil each to Maliki and Hakim for elections

2021 Pro-Iran groups launched drone strike on Irbil airport hangar used by CIA Fired rockets at

Turkish army base in KRG

(Musings On Iraq Pro-Iran Hashd Becoming A Regional Force For Tehran)

View The Iraq History Timelines 

7 comments:

Anonymous said...

Source: Kanan Makiya or another infamous hoaxer.

Yes, Saddam would totally insult and alienate most of his RCC, over 70% of hist Baath party, most of the military, and most of his supporters among the population, despite to this day no evidence of him being sectarian and plenty to prove he was pluralistic and Iraqi nationalistic.

Most intelligent Joel Wing post.

Joel Wing said...

Hi genius,

Saddam posted 7 articles on the 1991 uprising in Al-Thawra. You could read about it in Eric Davis' book Memories of State or Fanar Haddad's Sectarianism in Iraq but I'm sure you won't.

Anonymous said...

Still not approving comments debunking your lie with the books you point out that don't say what you claim they say.

Joel Wing said...

What are you 12 years old or did you just the miss whole part of growing up where you learn how to ACT LIKE AN ADULT and interact with people????

This is what your comments are like:

INSULT INSULT INSULT
Saddam Saddam Saddam
Oh I don't know this person or don't like them so you just make some shit up
INSULT INSULT INSULT

Until you learn how to act like an adult I will not be publishing your comments.

On top of that it appears you DON'T KNOW HOW TO READ. I gave you the books that the the timeline event came from.

ERIC DAVIS

In his last article, “The Kurds, Turkomans, and the Struggle for Supremacy – the March 11 Declaration” (April 14), SADDAM PORTRAYS IRAQ'S MINORITIES AS THE VEHICLES FOR OTTOMAN TURKISH AND IRANIAN INTERFERENCE in the nation’s internal affairs. Despite ethnic differentiation, he argues, the peoples of ancient Iraq were never divided. This unity continued when Baghdad became the capital of the Abbasid Empire. Only in modern times did sectarianism spread, as Iraq became a battleground between the Turks to the west and the Persians to the east. by arguing that the Iranians used the city of Khanaqin as a base from which to attack Baghdad, and that the Ottoman sultans used the Khanaqin-Madnali-Kirkuk axis to create a “human barrier” between themselves and Iran, SADDAM CASTS FURTHER DOUBT ON THE LOYALTY OF BOTH THE SHI’A AND THE KURDS. Because Khanaqin and Mandali are two northern cities with large Shi’I populations, and Kirkuk is largely inhabited by Kurds, HE IMPLIES THE LOCAL INHABITANTS OF THE THREE CITIES CONSPIRED WITH FOREIGN FORCES AT IRAQ’S EXPENSE.

Finally, treating the most important event that split the country, Abd al-Karim Qasim’s rule, SADDAM ASSERTS THAT IRAQ’S PRESENT PROBLEMS CAN BE TRACED TO THE INCLUSION OF THE KURDS IN THE QASIM REGIM’S CONSTITTUIONAL CONSTITUTION (by which means the clause that stated that Arabs and Kurds share an equal partnership in Iraq). With the communists’ help, Qasim promoted shu’ubi (anti-Arab nationalism) thinking and behavior, thereby undermining Iraq’s unity. When Qasim turned against his former allies, the communists established a base of operations in Kurdsitan under al-Barzani family control. The ICP’s dependence on the Kurdish Democratic Party increased after the 1963 Ba’thist revolution. THUS THE KURDS WERE SUCCESSIVELY AGENTS FOR THE BRITISH (BAKR SIDQI), Iraqi nationalsits (The Shu'ubi Qasim and his supporters) and communists (after 1963), ALL OF WHOM SOUGHT TO DIVIDE IRAQ AND CREATE DISUNITY. SADDAM GOES ON TO DISCUSS THE WELL-KNOWN ASSISTANCE THAT MUSTAFA AL-BARZANI RECEIVED DURING THE 1970S FROM THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL, both of whom coveted control of Iraq’s oil production and tried to disrupt Pan-Arab unity.

IN REFERRING TO “THE ENEMIES OF IRAQ AND THE ARABS” SADDAM PITS URBAN SUNNI AND TRIBAL ARABS AGAINST THE SHI’A AND NON-ARABS. IN USING THE SUNNI ARAB COMMUNITY’S VALUES AND HISTORY AS A STANDARD BY WHICH TO MEASURE ALL OTHER ETHNIC GROUPS, SADDAM ASSERTS THAT, AT ITS CORE, IRAQ IS A SUNNI ARAB STATE. WHEN THE DAY IS DONE, IRAQ’S PROBLEMS STEM FROM THOSE GROUPS THAT ARE NOT CULTURALLY AUTHENTIC, INCLUDING THE SHI’A OF THE SOUTHERN MARSHES AND THE KURDS AND TURKOMANS IN THE NORTH.

Groups marginal to Iraq's core culture had, by relying on backwards values and forms of behavior, FACILITATED BY THE INFLUX OF IDEAS FOREIGN TO IRAQI SOCIETY, THEREBY CREATING DISCONTENT AND DISORDER.

WHY DID HE [SADDAM] INTENSIFY SECTARIANISM BY CASTING STILL FURTHER ASPERSIONS ON THE SHI’A, THE MAJORITY COMMUNITY IN IRAQ? … FIRST, THIS SERIES [OF ARTICLES] WAS INTENDED ABOVE ALL TO REASSURE SADDAM’S SUNNI ARAB BASE THAT THE [1991] INTIFADA WAS NOT CAUSED BY A FLAWED SYSTEM, BUT RATHER BY DEVIANT IRAQI ELEMENTS WHO ALLOWED FOREIGN INTERESTS – IRAN, THE UNITED STATES, AND ISRAEL – TO CREATE DISORDER AND POLITICAL CHAOS.

Joel Wing said...

FANAR HADDAD

HOWEVER, IN THE ARTICLES FROM APRIL 1991, THE OPPOSITE IS THE CASE: THE SHI’A ARE OPENLY CONDEMNED AND PORTRAYED AS AN ALIEN OTHER OR AT THE VERY LEAST A CONTAMINATED MEMBER OF THE GROUP.

WHILST THE ARTICLE GOES ON TO EXPLAIN THE MANY PROBLEMS THE AUTHOR SEES IN THE SHI’A AS THE NET EFFECT OF IRANIAN INFLUENCE AMD MACHINATIONS, THE CENTRAL MESSAGE REMAINS UNCHANGED: THE SHI’A ARE DIFFERENT, IN A NEGATIVE WAY, TO THE’ REST OF US’ AND ARE INTENSELY SUBJECT TO IRNAIAN INFLUENCE HENCE THE EVENTS OF MARCH 1991. In fact, the Shi’a are presented as being of a fundamentally different and quintessentially less Arab character than the rest of Arab Iraqis. For despite pride and dignity being amongst, ‘the most important characteristics of Iraqis and .. of Arabs,” IRANIAN INFLUENCE HAS MADE, ‘A PART OF OUR PEOPLE IN IRAQ,’ SUBSERVIENT IN ABJECT HUMILITY TO IRANIAN INFLUENCE THROUGH IRANIAN RELIGIOUS DICTATES.

Joel Wing said...

You're still acting like a child.

Joel Wing said...

You sound mentally unstable as you make things up in a personal attack upon my family and I. You have crossed the line and are now permanently banned from making comments.

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